GHSA-6C49-XC7V-MQVW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-07-25 12:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: mt76: mt7921/mt7925: fix NULL dereference in CSA beacon

This patch is based on a BUG as reported by Bongani Hlope at https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260502125824.425d7159@bongani-mini.home.org.za/

When a channel-switch announcement (CSA) beacon is received, cfg80211 queues a wiphy work item that eventually calls mt7921_channel_switch_rx_beacon(). If the station disconnects (or the channel context is otherwise torn down) between the time the work is queued and the time it runs, the driver's dev->new_ctx pointer can already have been cleared to NULL. mt7921_channel_switch_rx_beacon() then dereferences new_ctx unconditionally, triggering a NULL pointer dereference at address 0x0:

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 RIP: 0010:mt7921_channel_switch_rx_beacon+0x1f/0x100 [mt7921_common]

The same missing guard exists in mt7925_channel_switch_rx_beacon(), which shares the same code pattern introduced by the same commit.

Add an early-return NULL check for dev->new_ctx in both mt7921_channel_switch_rx_beacon() and mt7925_channel_switch_rx_beacon(). When new_ctx is NULL there is no pending channel switch to process, so returning immediately is the correct and safe action.

Oops-Analysis: http://oops.fenrus.org/reports/lkml/20260502125824.425d7159@bongani-mini.home.org.za/report.html

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-64325"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-25T10:17:14Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: mt76: mt7921/mt7925: fix NULL dereference in CSA beacon\n\nThis patch is based on a BUG as reported by Bongani Hlope at\nhttps://lore.kernel.org/all/20260502125824.425d7159@bongani-mini.home.org.za/\n\nWhen a channel-switch announcement (CSA) beacon is received,\ncfg80211 queues a wiphy work item that eventually calls\nmt7921_channel_switch_rx_beacon(). If the station disconnects\n(or the channel context is otherwise torn down) between the\ntime the work is queued and the time it runs, the driver\u0027s\ndev-\u003enew_ctx pointer can already have been cleared to NULL.\nmt7921_channel_switch_rx_beacon() then dereferences new_ctx\nunconditionally, triggering a NULL pointer dereference at\naddress 0x0:\n\n  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000\n  RIP: 0010:mt7921_channel_switch_rx_beacon+0x1f/0x100 [mt7921_common]\n\nThe same missing guard exists in mt7925_channel_switch_rx_beacon(),\nwhich shares the same code pattern introduced by the same commit.\n\nAdd an early-return NULL check for dev-\u003enew_ctx in both\nmt7921_channel_switch_rx_beacon() and\nmt7925_channel_switch_rx_beacon(). When new_ctx is NULL there is\nno pending channel switch to process, so returning immediately is\nthe correct and safe action.\n\nOops-Analysis: http://oops.fenrus.org/reports/lkml/20260502125824.425d7159@bongani-mini.home.org.za/report.html",
  "id": "GHSA-6c49-xc7v-mqvw",
  "modified": "2026-07-25T12:31:31Z",
  "published": "2026-07-25T12:31:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64325"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/351dd7d2c80d23e56dcce6faa4e62bea5b0877c7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/77e7b127472a191e086e1e0b1b051703f33b1801"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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