GHSA-5CH2-359F-FP8J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-04 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-04 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: qce - fix CCM AAD buffer underallocation
The AAD buffer allocated in qce_aead_ccm_prepare_buf_assoclen() can be smaller than the length later programmed into the DMA scatterlist.
The allocation size is currently calculated as:
ALIGN(assoclen, 16) + MAX_CCM_ADATA_HEADER_LEN
while the DMA length is set to:
ALIGN(assoclen + adata_header_len, 16)
Since ALIGN() does not distribute over addition, the allocation can be smaller than the DMA length. For example, when assoclen = 32 and adata_header_len = 2:
allocation = ALIGN(32, 16) + 6 = 38 DMA length = ALIGN(32 + 2, 16) = 48
As a result, the QCE hardware can read beyond the allocated buffer while computing the CBC-MAC over the associated data. The extra bytes are folded into the authentication tag, resulting in an incorrect tag and causing CCM self-test failures such as:
alg: aead: ccm-aes-qce encryption test failed (wrong result) on test vector 8
Fix the allocation by adding the maximum possible AAD header length before alignment:
ALIGN(assoclen + MAX_CCM_ADATA_HEADER_LEN, 16)
This guarantees that the allocated buffer is large enough for the fully padded AAD data for all supported header sizes.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-80832"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-04T16:18:11Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncrypto: qce - fix CCM AAD buffer underallocation\n\nThe AAD buffer allocated in qce_aead_ccm_prepare_buf_assoclen()\ncan be smaller than the length later programmed into the DMA\nscatterlist.\n\nThe allocation size is currently calculated as:\n\n ALIGN(assoclen, 16) + MAX_CCM_ADATA_HEADER_LEN\n\nwhile the DMA length is set to:\n\n ALIGN(assoclen + adata_header_len, 16)\n\nSince ALIGN() does not distribute over addition, the allocation\ncan be smaller than the DMA length. For example, when\nassoclen = 32 and adata_header_len = 2:\n\n allocation = ALIGN(32, 16) + 6 = 38\n DMA length = ALIGN(32 + 2, 16) = 48\n\nAs a result, the QCE hardware can read beyond the allocated\nbuffer while computing the CBC-MAC over the associated data.\nThe extra bytes are folded into the authentication tag,\nresulting in an incorrect tag and causing CCM self-test\nfailures such as:\n\n alg: aead: ccm-aes-qce encryption test failed (wrong result)\n on test vector 8\n\nFix the allocation by adding the maximum possible AAD header\nlength before alignment:\n\n ALIGN(assoclen + MAX_CCM_ADATA_HEADER_LEN, 16)\n\nThis guarantees that the allocated buffer is large enough\nfor the fully padded AAD data for all supported header sizes.",
"id": "GHSA-5ch2-359f-fp8j",
"modified": "2026-09-04T18:31:28Z",
"published": "2026-09-04T18:31:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80832"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/002f1f99aef7ea631cb687fc17bce64e4963f6aa"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/11775b35ce9f27e73d62188d7d38aa0dc0a219aa"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2f65718b9c1095eef1ae9b374aa0384b1b083f3c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/46a84efe2dbaddde89073a3c00c694486937c34b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4839f4c21f9c577eedef2919ced878a3057c7fc3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7f2345f47dd189625f657cd72437179ab4170ee1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c9e0f06a023107694698a7930616aeb460d91816"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cc56d2b0d77cfeea061e98114992ee687d5eb4dd"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.