ghsa-522v-vw33-wcv7
Vulnerability from github
Published
2024-10-21 12:30
Modified
2024-10-23 18:33
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

icmp: change the order of rate limits

ICMP messages are ratelimited :

After the blamed commits, the two rate limiters are applied in this order:

1) host wide ratelimit (icmp_global_allow())

2) Per destination ratelimit (inetpeer based)

In order to avoid side-channels attacks, we need to apply the per destination check first.

This patch makes the following change :

1) icmp_global_allow() checks if the host wide limit is reached. But credits are not yet consumed. This is deferred to 3)

2) The per destination limit is checked/updated. This might add a new node in inetpeer tree.

3) icmp_global_consume() consumes tokens if prior operations succeeded.

This means that host wide ratelimit is still effective in keeping inetpeer tree small even under DDOS.

As a bonus, I removed icmp_global.lock as the fast path can use a lock-free operation.

Show details on source website


{
   affected: [],
   aliases: [
      "CVE-2024-47678",
   ],
   database_specific: {
      cwe_ids: [
         "CWE-203",
      ],
      github_reviewed: false,
      github_reviewed_at: null,
      nvd_published_at: "2024-10-21T12:15:04Z",
      severity: "MODERATE",
   },
   details: "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nicmp: change the order of rate limits\n\nICMP messages are ratelimited :\n\nAfter the blamed commits, the two rate limiters are applied in this order:\n\n1) host wide ratelimit (icmp_global_allow())\n\n2) Per destination ratelimit (inetpeer based)\n\nIn order to avoid side-channels attacks, we need to apply\nthe per destination check first.\n\nThis patch makes the following change :\n\n1) icmp_global_allow() checks if the host wide limit is reached.\n   But credits are not yet consumed. This is deferred to 3)\n\n2) The per destination limit is checked/updated.\n   This might add a new node in inetpeer tree.\n\n3) icmp_global_consume() consumes tokens if prior operations succeeded.\n\nThis means that host wide ratelimit is still effective\nin keeping inetpeer tree small even under DDOS.\n\nAs a bonus, I removed icmp_global.lock as the fast path\ncan use a lock-free operation.",
   id: "GHSA-522v-vw33-wcv7",
   modified: "2024-10-23T18:33:07Z",
   published: "2024-10-21T12:30:54Z",
   references: [
      {
         type: "ADVISORY",
         url: "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-47678",
      },
      {
         type: "WEB",
         url: "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/483397b4ba280813e4a9c161a0a85172ddb43d19",
      },
      {
         type: "WEB",
         url: "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/662ec52260cc07b9ae53ecd3925183c29d34288b",
      },
      {
         type: "WEB",
         url: "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8c2bd38b95f75f3d2a08c93e35303e26d480d24e",
      },
      {
         type: "WEB",
         url: "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/997ba8889611891f91e8ad83583466aeab6239a3",
      },
      {
         type: "WEB",
         url: "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a7722921adb046e3836eb84372241f32584bdb07",
      },
   ],
   schema_version: "1.4.0",
   severity: [
      {
         score: "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
         type: "CVSS_V3",
      },
   ],
}


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