GHSA-4W7M-58CG-CMFF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-13 15:47 – Updated: 2026-03-13 15:47
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw: Leaf subagents could steer sibling sessions across sandbox boundaries
Details

Summary

In affected versions of openclaw, sandboxed leaf subagents could still access the subagents control surface and resolve against the parent requester scope instead of remaining confined to their own session tree.

Impact

A low-privilege sandboxed leaf worker could steer or kill a sibling run owned by the same requester and cause that sibling to execute with its own broader tool policy. This is a sandbox and session-scope boundary bypass.

Affected Packages and Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Affected versions: <= 2026.3.8
  • Fixed in: 2026.3.11

Technical Details

Leaf subagents retained the subagents tool, and subagent control requests were authorized against the parent requester scope rather than the caller's own spawned descendants. The control path prevented only self-targeting, not cross-sibling steering.

Fix

OpenClaw now removes subagents control access from leaf subagents by default, scopes subagent control to the caller's own descendants, and rejects steer and kill requests that target runs outside that descendant tree. The fix shipped in openclaw@2026.3.11.

Workarounds

Upgrade to 2026.3.11 or later.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.3.11"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-269"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-13T15:47:34Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nIn affected versions of `openclaw`, sandboxed leaf subagents could still access the `subagents` control surface and resolve against the parent requester scope instead of remaining confined to their own session tree.\n\n## Impact\nA low-privilege sandboxed leaf worker could steer or kill a sibling run owned by the same requester and cause that sibling to execute with its own broader tool policy. This is a sandbox and session-scope boundary bypass.\n\n## Affected Packages and Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.3.8`\n- Fixed in: `2026.3.11`\n\n## Technical Details\nLeaf subagents retained the `subagents` tool, and subagent control requests were authorized against the parent requester scope rather than the caller\u0027s own spawned descendants. The control path prevented only self-targeting, not cross-sibling steering.\n\n## Fix\nOpenClaw now removes `subagents` control access from leaf subagents by default, scopes subagent control to the caller\u0027s own descendants, and rejects `steer` and `kill` requests that target runs outside that descendant tree. The fix shipped in `openclaw@2026.3.11`.\n\n## Workarounds\nUpgrade to `2026.3.11` or later.",
  "id": "GHSA-4w7m-58cg-cmff",
  "modified": "2026-03-13T15:47:35Z",
  "published": "2026-03-13T15:47:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-4w7m-58cg-cmff"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.3.11"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw: Leaf subagents could steer sibling sessions across sandbox boundaries"
}



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