GHSA-4R4F-GG25-RMG5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-17 18:35 – Updated: 2026-07-17 18:35Impact
A stored XSS affecting RichText fields. RichTextValue.output returns the raw, unsanitized stored value whenever the stored mimeType equals the outputMimeType. Because the safe-HTML output type (text/x-html-safe) is the type that signifies "already sanitized", any value whose stored mimeType equals it bypasses the safe_html transform entirely on render. The transform itself is sound — it correctly strips on* event-handler attributes and javascript:/data: URIs; the defect is that it is never invoked for these values. The unsanitized value is then emitted via tal:content="structure ...", which performs no escaping, so the payload executes in the viewer's browser.
This can be a problem when a RichText field is wrongly defined in code with a mimeType and outputMimeType that are the same, or when the REST API is used to the same effect.
Patches
The problem has been patched:
- For Plone 6.0, upgrade
plone.app.textfieldto 2.0.2. - For Plone 6.1, upgrade
plone.app.textfieldto 3.0.2. - For Plone 6.2, upgrade
plone.app.textfieldto 4.0.1.
Workarounds
There is no known workaround.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "plone.app.textfield"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "plone.app.textfield"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.0.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "plone.app.textfield"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.0.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"4.0.0"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54503"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-80"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-17T18:35:57Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nA stored XSS affecting RichText fields. RichTextValue.output returns the raw, unsanitized stored value whenever the stored mimeType equals the outputMimeType. Because the safe-HTML output type (`text/x-html-safe`) is the type that signifies \"already sanitized\", any value whose stored mimeType equals it bypasses the safe_html transform entirely on render. The transform itself is sound \u2014 it correctly strips `on*` event-handler attributes and `javascript:/data:` URIs; the defect is that it is never invoked for these values. The unsanitized value is then emitted via `tal:content=\"structure ...\"`, which performs no escaping, so the payload executes in the viewer\u0027s browser. \n\nThis can be a problem when a RichText field is wrongly defined in code with a `mimeType` and `outputMimeType` that are the same, or when the REST API is used to the same effect.\n\n### Patches\nThe problem has been patched:\n\n* For Plone 6.0, upgrade `plone.app.textfield` to 2.0.2.\n* For Plone 6.1, upgrade `plone.app.textfield` to 3.0.2.\n* For Plone 6.2, upgrade `plone.app.textfield` to 4.0.1.\n\n### Workarounds\nThere is no known workaround.",
"id": "GHSA-4r4f-gg25-rmg5",
"modified": "2026-07-17T18:35:57Z",
"published": "2026-07-17T18:35:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/plone/plone.app.textfield/security/advisories/GHSA-4r4f-gg25-rmg5"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/plone/plone.app.textfield"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "plone.app.textfield: Stored XSS by spoofing mime type "
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.