GHSA-4MF8-7864-FF29
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-27 09:31 – Updated: 2026-07-30 06:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: bound NTFS_DE view.data_off in UpdateRecordData{Root,Allocation}
In do_action()'s UpdateRecordDataRoot (fslog.c:3489) and
UpdateRecordDataAllocation (fslog.c:3697) cases, the memmove
destination is Add2Ptr(e, le16_to_cpu(e->view.data_off)),
where e->view.data_off comes from an on-disk NTFS_DE inside
an INDEX_ROOT or INDEX_BUFFER. Neither case validates
view.data_off + dlen against e->size; the existing
check_if_index_root / check_if_alloc_index helpers walk the
entry chain and validate the entry's offset, but not its
internal view fields.
The neighbouring read sites (e.g., fs/ntfs3/index.c when iterating view entries) check view.data_off + view.data_size <= e->size. Apply the same bound at the two memmove sites.
Reproduced under UML+KASAN on mainline 8d90b09e6741 via pr_warn-only probe instrumentation: with view.data_off forced to 0xFFFC, the memmove writes 32 bytes past the end of the NTFS_DE.
This is similar in shape to Pavitra Jha's 2026-05-02 patch "fs/ntfs3: prevent oob in case UpdateRecordDataRoot" (20260502105008.21827-1-jhapavitra98@gmail.com) which proposes calling ntfs3_bad_de_range(); that helper does not exist in mainline. This patch uses inline checks.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-64532"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-27T08:16:22Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfs/ntfs3: bound NTFS_DE view.data_off in UpdateRecordData{Root,Allocation}\n\nIn do_action()\u0027s UpdateRecordDataRoot (fslog.c:3489) and\nUpdateRecordDataAllocation (fslog.c:3697) cases, the memmove\ndestination is `Add2Ptr(e, le16_to_cpu(e-\u003eview.data_off))`,\nwhere e-\u003eview.data_off comes from an on-disk NTFS_DE inside\nan INDEX_ROOT or INDEX_BUFFER. Neither case validates\nview.data_off + dlen against e-\u003esize; the existing\ncheck_if_index_root / check_if_alloc_index helpers walk the\nentry chain and validate the entry\u0027s offset, but not its\ninternal view fields.\n\nThe neighbouring read sites (e.g., fs/ntfs3/index.c when\niterating view entries) check view.data_off + view.data_size\n\u003c= e-\u003esize. Apply the same bound at the two memmove sites.\n\nReproduced under UML+KASAN on mainline 8d90b09e6741 via\npr_warn-only probe instrumentation: with view.data_off forced\nto 0xFFFC, the memmove writes 32 bytes past the end of the\nNTFS_DE.\n\nThis is similar in shape to Pavitra Jha\u0027s 2026-05-02 patch\n\"fs/ntfs3: prevent oob in case UpdateRecordDataRoot\"\n(\u003c20260502105008.21827-1-jhapavitra98@gmail.com\u003e) which\nproposes calling ntfs3_bad_de_range(); that helper does not\nexist in mainline. This patch uses inline checks.",
"id": "GHSA-4mf8-7864-ff29",
"modified": "2026-07-30T06:32:32Z",
"published": "2026-07-27T09:31:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64532"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/315d3a9a48b49f889da3d858a9307e677cb9e1bd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/36feda687afebae24c472202694448738809c411"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3e127829e57f5190f612412ece4541cb96d5ec7a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/429d653ca641d38a78609b8f62e81a0a5c780a2d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b20e5a709d8bd190d6e4645606763c7423e694c1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/be306b8d9143a9c076c804a7ca025d69caf9c448"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d41b382068ca4e64e421f736cdd700095464b6ac"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.