GHSA-4HX6-RX69-CJ3H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-04 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-04 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: nintendo: fix out-of-bounds read in joycon_ctlr_read_handler()
joycon_ctlr_read_handler() casts an incoming HID input report to struct joycon_input_report and parses it, guarding the cast only with a 12-byte length check:
if (size >= 12) /* make sure it contains the input report */
joycon_parse_report(ctlr, (struct joycon_input_report *)data);
struct joycon_input_report is 49 bytes: a 13-byte header followed by a union whose IMU arm is 36 bytes. For an IMU report joycon_parse_report() -> joycon_parse_imu_report() walks that union (struct offsets 13..48), so a report of exactly 12 bytes with data[0] == JC_INPUT_IMU_DATA passes the guard yet is read up to 37 bytes past its declared length. The over-read bytes are decoded into accelerometer/gyroscope values and forwarded to userspace through the "(IMU)" input device, leaking driver-internal memory. data[0] and size are fully controlled by a malicious or spoofed Joy-Con/Pro Controller.
Receive buffers are sized to the maximum report length, so this is an over-read within the allocation rather than a slab OOB, but the decoded bytes still reach userspace.
The sibling subcmd path in joycon_ctlr_handle_event() already bounds the same cast correctly:
if (size < sizeof(struct joycon_input_report) ||
data[0] != JC_INPUT_SUBCMD_REPLY)
break;
Use the same sizeof(struct joycon_input_report) bound here.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-80772"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-04T16:18:02Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nHID: nintendo: fix out-of-bounds read in joycon_ctlr_read_handler()\n\njoycon_ctlr_read_handler() casts an incoming HID input report to\nstruct joycon_input_report and parses it, guarding the cast only with a\n12-byte length check:\n\n\tif (size \u003e= 12) /* make sure it contains the input report */\n\t\tjoycon_parse_report(ctlr, (struct joycon_input_report *)data);\n\nstruct joycon_input_report is 49 bytes: a 13-byte header followed by a\nunion whose IMU arm is 36 bytes. For an IMU report joycon_parse_report()\n-\u003e joycon_parse_imu_report() walks that union (struct offsets 13..48),\nso a report of exactly 12 bytes with data[0] == JC_INPUT_IMU_DATA passes\nthe guard yet is read up to 37 bytes past its declared length. The\nover-read bytes are decoded into accelerometer/gyroscope values and\nforwarded to userspace through the \"(IMU)\" input device, leaking\ndriver-internal memory. data[0] and size are fully controlled by a\nmalicious or spoofed Joy-Con/Pro Controller.\n\nReceive buffers are sized to the maximum report length, so this is an\nover-read within the allocation rather than a slab OOB, but the decoded\nbytes still reach userspace.\n\nThe sibling subcmd path in joycon_ctlr_handle_event() already bounds the\nsame cast correctly:\n\n\tif (size \u003c sizeof(struct joycon_input_report) ||\n\t data[0] != JC_INPUT_SUBCMD_REPLY)\n\t\tbreak;\n\nUse the same sizeof(struct joycon_input_report) bound here.",
"id": "GHSA-4hx6-rx69-cj3h",
"modified": "2026-09-04T18:31:25Z",
"published": "2026-09-04T18:31:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80772"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/27b376b945c0aac46fcdfcc950b14a85b874b557"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/33ea29f8b6141f2d265de807e110a6435b355cb0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/34725ed4719da424113db8449fb5485aaf71a913"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/51cfd1adbe7a46bb08af162abb3ab3b6820e2d15"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/addca61f9a23c0d20a387c2040e70479f54518e1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bd397c4123a4bc084913d8c7fdb40ef94e9f8172"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d4cabd4089adb59cf7974915737c52cc47a9bb1b"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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