GHSA-465G-4Q99-5X86

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-13 17:54 – Updated: 2026-07-13 17:54
VLAI
Summary
NukeViet: Multiple Anti-XSS Filter Bypasses Leading to Stored XSS in News Module
Details

Summary

Two filter-bypass techniques in NukeViet\Core\Request::filterAttr() and NukeViet\Core\Request::unhtmlentities() allow a low-privileged user (any account with news post permission) to store and serve arbitrary JavaScript to any visitor of the affected page.

Affected Component

vendor/vinades/nukeviet/Core/Request.php — class NukeViet\Core\Request

Vulnerability Details

Bypass 1 — Form Feed character prefix (\x0C) before event handler name

The filterAttr() method blocks event-handler attributes using:

preg_match('/^on/i', $attrSubSet[0])

PHP's trim() does not strip the ASCII Form Feed character (\x0C, U+000C). An attacker can prefix the attribute name with \x0C so that \x0Conerror does not match /^on/. The HTML5 browser parser treats \x0C as a valid whitespace separator and correctly activates the event handler.

Proof-of-concept payload (URL-encoded POST body field bodyhtml):

<img src="x" %0Conerror="alert('XSS')">

Bypass 2 — Decimal HTML entity tab (&#9;) inside javascript: URI

unhtmlentities() strips the hex-encoded tab &#x09; via str_ireplace, but did not strip its decimal equivalent &#9;. The keyword-blocking regex /j\s*a\s*v\s*a\s*s\s*c\s*r\s*i\s*p\s*t/si uses \s* which does not match HTML entities. The value jav&#9;ascript:alert() passes the filter, is stored in the database, and is decoded by the browser into a working javascript: URI.

Proof-of-concept payload (inside a Markdown-style link):

[Click me](jav&#9;ascript:alert('XSS'))

Impact

An authenticated attacker with news-posting permission can inject persistent JavaScript that executes in the browser of any user (including administrators) who views the affected article. This enables session cookie theft, credential harvesting, defacement, and further privilege escalation.

Patches

Fixed in commit <commit-sha> by modifying vendor/vinades/nukeviet/Core/Request.php:

  1. filterAttr() — strip all ASCII control characters (\x00\x20) from the attribute name before the /^on/ check: php $attrSubSet[0] = preg_replace('/[\x00-\x20]/', '', strtolower($attrSubSet[0]));

  2. unhtmlentities() — strip decimal HTML entities for all ASCII control characters (0–31) before the keyword checks: php $value = preg_replace('/&#0;*(?:3[01]|[12][0-9]|[0-9]);/', '', $value);

Workarounds

None. Update to the patched version.

Resources

  • CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (Cross-site Scripting)
  • OWASP WSTG-INPV-02: Testing for Stored Cross Site Scripting
  • OWASP Top 10 A03:2021 – Injection
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "nukeviet/nukeviet"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.6.00"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54064"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-13T17:54:08Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nTwo filter-bypass techniques in `NukeViet\\Core\\Request::filterAttr()` and `NukeViet\\Core\\Request::unhtmlentities()` allow a low-privileged user (any account with news post permission) to store and serve arbitrary JavaScript to any visitor of the affected page.\n\n## Affected Component\n\n`vendor/vinades/nukeviet/Core/Request.php` \u2014 class `NukeViet\\Core\\Request`\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n### Bypass 1 \u2014 Form Feed character prefix (`\\x0C`) before event handler name\n\nThe `filterAttr()` method blocks event-handler attributes using:\n```php\npreg_match(\u0027/^on/i\u0027, $attrSubSet[0])\n```\nPHP\u0027s `trim()` does **not** strip the ASCII Form Feed character (`\\x0C`, U+000C). An attacker can prefix the attribute name with `\\x0C` so that `\\x0Conerror` does not match `/^on/`. The HTML5 browser parser treats `\\x0C` as a valid whitespace separator and correctly activates the event handler.\n\n**Proof-of-concept payload (URL-encoded POST body field `bodyhtml`):**\n```\n\u003cimg src=\"x\" %0Conerror=\"alert(\u0027XSS\u0027)\"\u003e\n```\n\n### Bypass 2 \u2014 Decimal HTML entity tab (`\u0026#9;`) inside `javascript:` URI\n\n`unhtmlentities()` strips the hex-encoded tab `\u0026#x09;` via `str_ireplace`, but did **not** strip its decimal equivalent `\u0026#9;`. The keyword-blocking regex `/j\\s*a\\s*v\\s*a\\s*s\\s*c\\s*r\\s*i\\s*p\\s*t/si` uses `\\s*` which does not match HTML entities. The value `jav\u0026#9;ascript:alert()` passes the filter, is stored in the database, and is decoded by the browser into a working `javascript:` URI.\n\n**Proof-of-concept payload (inside a Markdown-style link):**\n```\n[Click me](jav\u0026#9;ascript:alert(\u0027XSS\u0027))\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated attacker with news-posting permission can inject persistent JavaScript that executes in the browser of **any user** (including administrators) who views the affected article. This enables session cookie theft, credential harvesting, defacement, and further privilege escalation.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in commit `\u003ccommit-sha\u003e` by modifying `vendor/vinades/nukeviet/Core/Request.php`:\n\n1. **`filterAttr()`** \u2014 strip all ASCII control characters (`\\x00`\u2013`\\x20`) from the attribute name before the `/^on/` check:\n   ```php\n   $attrSubSet[0] = preg_replace(\u0027/[\\x00-\\x20]/\u0027, \u0027\u0027, strtolower($attrSubSet[0]));\n   ```\n\n2. **`unhtmlentities()`** \u2014 strip decimal HTML entities for all ASCII control characters (0\u201331) before the keyword checks:\n   ```php\n   $value = preg_replace(\u0027/\u0026#0*(?:3[01]|[12][0-9]|[0-9]);/\u0027, \u0027\u0027, $value);\n   ```\n\n## Workarounds\n\nNone. Update to the patched version.\n\n## Resources\n\n- CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (Cross-site Scripting)\n- OWASP WSTG-INPV-02: Testing for Stored Cross Site Scripting\n- [OWASP Top 10 A03:2021 \u2013 Injection](https://owasp.org/Top10/A03_2021-Injection/)",
  "id": "GHSA-465g-4q99-5x86",
  "modified": "2026-07-13T17:54:08Z",
  "published": "2026-07-13T17:54:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nukeviet/nukeviet/security/advisories/GHSA-465g-4q99-5x86"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nukeviet/nukeviet"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "NukeViet: Multiple Anti-XSS Filter Bypasses Leading to Stored XSS in News Module"
}



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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

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Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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