ghsa-3r8w-q925-6wvv
Vulnerability from github
Published
2024-08-22 03:31
Modified
2024-08-23 03:30
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

RDMA/cma: Do not change route.addr.src_addr outside state checks

If the state is not idle then resolve_prepare_src() should immediately fail and no change to global state should happen. However, it unconditionally overwrites the src_addr trying to build a temporary any address.

For instance if the state is already RDMA_CM_LISTEN then this will corrupt the src_addr and would cause the test in cma_cancel_operation():

       if (cma_any_addr(cma_src_addr(id_priv)) && !id_priv->cma_dev)

Which would manifest as this trace from syzkaller:

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __list_add_valid+0x93/0xa0 lib/list_debug.c:26 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881546491e0 by task syz-executor.1/32204

CPU: 1 PID: 32204 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc8-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline] dump_stack+0x141/0x1d7 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x5b/0x2f8 mm/kasan/report.c:232 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:399 [inline] kasan_report.cold+0x7c/0xd8 mm/kasan/report.c:416 __list_add_valid+0x93/0xa0 lib/list_debug.c:26 __list_add include/linux/list.h:67 [inline] list_add_tail include/linux/list.h:100 [inline] cma_listen_on_all drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:2557 [inline] rdma_listen+0x787/0xe00 drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:3751 ucma_listen+0x16a/0x210 drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1102 ucma_write+0x259/0x350 drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1732 vfs_write+0x28e/0xa30 fs/read_write.c:603 ksys_write+0x1ee/0x250 fs/read_write.c:658 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

This is indicating that an rdma_id_private was destroyed without doing cma_cancel_listens().

Instead of trying to re-use the src_addr memory to indirectly create an any address derived from the dst build one explicitly on the stack and bind to that as any other normal flow would do. rdma_bind_addr() will copy it over the src_addr once it knows the state is valid.

This is similar to commit bc0bdc5afaa7 ("RDMA/cma: Do not change route.addr.src_addr.ss_family")

Show details on source website


{
   affected: [],
   aliases: [
      "CVE-2022-48925",
   ],
   database_specific: {
      cwe_ids: [
         "CWE-416",
      ],
      github_reviewed: false,
      github_reviewed_at: null,
      nvd_published_at: "2024-08-22T02:15:08Z",
      severity: "HIGH",
   },
   details: "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nRDMA/cma: Do not change route.addr.src_addr outside state checks\n\nIf the state is not idle then resolve_prepare_src() should immediately\nfail and no change to global state should happen. However, it\nunconditionally overwrites the src_addr trying to build a temporary any\naddress.\n\nFor instance if the state is already RDMA_CM_LISTEN then this will corrupt\nthe src_addr and would cause the test in cma_cancel_operation():\n\n           if (cma_any_addr(cma_src_addr(id_priv)) && !id_priv->cma_dev)\n\nWhich would manifest as this trace from syzkaller:\n\n  BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __list_add_valid+0x93/0xa0 lib/list_debug.c:26\n  Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881546491e0 by task syz-executor.1/32204\n\n  CPU: 1 PID: 32204 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc8-syzkaller #0\n  Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011\n  Call Trace:\n   __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline]\n   dump_stack+0x141/0x1d7 lib/dump_stack.c:120\n   print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x5b/0x2f8 mm/kasan/report.c:232\n   __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:399 [inline]\n   kasan_report.cold+0x7c/0xd8 mm/kasan/report.c:416\n   __list_add_valid+0x93/0xa0 lib/list_debug.c:26\n   __list_add include/linux/list.h:67 [inline]\n   list_add_tail include/linux/list.h:100 [inline]\n   cma_listen_on_all drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:2557 [inline]\n   rdma_listen+0x787/0xe00 drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:3751\n   ucma_listen+0x16a/0x210 drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1102\n   ucma_write+0x259/0x350 drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1732\n   vfs_write+0x28e/0xa30 fs/read_write.c:603\n   ksys_write+0x1ee/0x250 fs/read_write.c:658\n   do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46\n   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae\n\nThis is indicating that an rdma_id_private was destroyed without doing\ncma_cancel_listens().\n\nInstead of trying to re-use the src_addr memory to indirectly create an\nany address derived from the dst build one explicitly on the stack and\nbind to that as any other normal flow would do. rdma_bind_addr() will copy\nit over the src_addr once it knows the state is valid.\n\nThis is similar to commit bc0bdc5afaa7 (\"RDMA/cma: Do not change\nroute.addr.src_addr.ss_family\")",
   id: "GHSA-3r8w-q925-6wvv",
   modified: "2024-08-23T03:30:59Z",
   published: "2024-08-22T03:31:34Z",
   references: [
      {
         type: "ADVISORY",
         url: "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-48925",
      },
      {
         type: "WEB",
         url: "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/00265efbd3e5705038c9492a434fda8cf960c8a2",
      },
      {
         type: "WEB",
         url: "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/22e9f71072fa605cbf033158db58e0790101928d",
      },
      {
         type: "WEB",
         url: "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5b1cef5798b4fd6e4fd5522e7b8a26248beeacaa",
      },
      {
         type: "WEB",
         url: "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d350724795c7a48b05bf921d94699fbfecf7da0b",
      },
   ],
   schema_version: "1.4.0",
   severity: [
      {
         score: "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
         type: "CVSS_V3",
      },
   ],
}


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