GHSA-38J7-23HF-9MHC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-02 19:20 – Updated: 2026-07-02 19:20
VLAI
Summary
electerm has Path Traversal in Zmodem and Trzsz Download Filename Handling
Details

Impact

A path traversal vulnerability exists in the Zmodem and Trzsz file download handlers in electerm. When receiving files via Zmodem or Trzsz protocols, electerm uses the remote-supplied filename directly in path.join() with the user-selected download directory without sanitization.

A malicious SSH server or remote shell process can send a specially crafted filename such as ../escaped.txt to escape the user-selected download directory and write files to arbitrary locations on the user's filesystem, subject to process permissions.

Attack scenario: 1. User connects to a malicious SSH server 2. Attacker initiates a Zmodem or Trzsz file transfer 3. Attacker supplies a traversal filename (e.g., ../../.bashrc, ../escaped.txt) 4. User accepts the transfer and selects a download directory 5. File is written outside the selected directory, potentially overwriting sensitive files

Affected components: - src/app/server/zmodem.js - prepareReceiveFile() at line 736 - src/app/server/trzsz.js - getUniqueFilePath() at line 559, openSaveFile() callback, and savedFilePaths mapping

Patches

  • https://github.com/electerm/electerm/commit/fde153d677a170c5816368f6586647f3af4ef284

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, users can mitigate this vulnerability by: 1. Only connecting to trusted SSH servers 2. Rejecting or canceling any incoming Zmodem or Trzsz file transfers from untrusted sources 3. Avoiding the use of Zmodem (sz/rz) and Trzsz (trz/tsz) commands on untrusted servers

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.11.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "electerm"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.11.11"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-49253"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-02T19:20:20Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nA path traversal vulnerability exists in the Zmodem and Trzsz file download handlers in electerm. When receiving files via Zmodem or Trzsz protocols, electerm uses the remote-supplied filename directly in `path.join()` with the user-selected download directory without sanitization.\n\nA malicious SSH server or remote shell process can send a specially crafted filename such as `../escaped.txt` to escape the user-selected download directory and write files to arbitrary locations on the user\u0027s filesystem, subject to process permissions.\n\n**Attack scenario:**\n1. User connects to a malicious SSH server\n2. Attacker initiates a Zmodem or Trzsz file transfer\n3. Attacker supplies a traversal filename (e.g., `../../.bashrc`, `../escaped.txt`)\n4. User accepts the transfer and selects a download directory\n5. File is written outside the selected directory, potentially overwriting sensitive files\n\n**Affected components:**\n- `src/app/server/zmodem.js` - `prepareReceiveFile()` at line 736\n- `src/app/server/trzsz.js` - `getUniqueFilePath()` at line 559, `openSaveFile()` callback, and `savedFilePaths` mapping\n\n### Patches\n\n- https://github.com/electerm/electerm/commit/fde153d677a170c5816368f6586647f3af4ef284\n\n### Workarounds\n\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, users can mitigate this vulnerability by:\n1. Only connecting to trusted SSH servers\n2. Rejecting or canceling any incoming Zmodem or Trzsz file transfers from untrusted sources\n3. Avoiding the use of Zmodem (`sz`/`rz`) and Trzsz (`trz`/`tsz`) commands on untrusted servers",
  "id": "GHSA-38j7-23hf-9mhc",
  "modified": "2026-07-02T19:20:20Z",
  "published": "2026-07-02T19:20:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/electerm/electerm/security/advisories/GHSA-38j7-23hf-9mhc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/electerm/electerm/commit/fde153d677a170c5816368f6586647f3af4ef284"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/electerm/electerm"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "electerm has Path Traversal in Zmodem and Trzsz Download Filename Handling"
}



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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

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