GHSA-326G-5C6Q-7782

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-25 15:30 – Updated: 2026-01-25 15:30
VLAI?
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

x86/fpu: Clear XSTATE_BV[i] in guest XSAVE state whenever XFD[i]=1

When loading guest XSAVE state via KVM_SET_XSAVE, and when updating XFD in response to a guest WRMSR, clear XFD-disabled features in the saved (or to be restored) XSTATE_BV to ensure KVM doesn't attempt to load state for features that are disabled via the guest's XFD. Because the kernel executes XRSTOR with the guest's XFD, saving XSTATE_BV[i]=1 with XFD[i]=1 will cause XRSTOR to #NM and panic the kernel.

E.g. if fpu_update_guest_xfd() sets XFD without clearing XSTATE_BV:

------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:1524 at exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110, CPU#29: amx_test/848 Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass CPU: 29 UID: 1000 PID: 848 Comm: amx_test Not tainted 6.19.0-rc2-ffa07f7fd437-x86_amx_nm_xfd_non_init-vm #171 NONE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110 Call Trace: asm_exc_device_not_available+0x1a/0x20 RIP: 0010:restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x36/0x90 switch_fpu_return+0x4a/0xb0 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1245/0x1e40 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2c3/0x8f0 [kvm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8f/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x62/0x940 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

This can happen if the guest executes WRMSR(MSR_IA32_XFD) to set XFD[18] = 1, and a host IRQ triggers kernel_fpu_begin() prior to the vmexit handler's call to fpu_update_guest_xfd().

and if userspace stuffs XSTATE_BV[i]=1 via KVM_SET_XSAVE:

------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:1524 at exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110, CPU#14: amx_test/867 Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass CPU: 14 UID: 1000 PID: 867 Comm: amx_test Not tainted 6.19.0-rc2-2dace9faccd6-x86_amx_nm_xfd_non_init-vm #168 NONE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110 Call Trace: asm_exc_device_not_available+0x1a/0x20 RIP: 0010:restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x36/0x90 fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate+0x6b/0x120 kvm_load_guest_fpu+0x30/0x80 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x85/0x1e40 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2c3/0x8f0 [kvm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8f/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x62/0x940 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

The new behavior is consistent with the AMX architecture. Per Intel's SDM, XSAVE saves XSTATE_BV as '0' for components that are disabled via XFD (and non-compacted XSAVE saves the initial configuration of the state component):

If XSAVE, XSAVEC, XSAVEOPT, or XSAVES is saving the state component i, the instruction does not generate #NM when XCR0[i] = IA32_XFD[i] = 1; instead, it operates as if XINUSE[i] = 0 (and the state component was in its initial state): it saves bit i of XSTATE_BV field of the XSAVE header as 0; in addition, XSAVE saves the initial configuration of the state component (the other instructions do not save state component i).

Alternatively, KVM could always do XRSTOR with XFD=0, e.g. by using a constant XFD based on the set of enabled features when XSAVEing for a struct fpu_guest. However, having XSTATE_BV[i]=1 for XFD-disabled features can only happen in the above interrupt case, or in similar scenarios involving preemption on preemptible kernels, because fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate()'s call to save_fpregs_to_fpstate() saves the outgoing FPU state with the current XFD; and that is (on all but the first WRMSR to XFD) the guest XFD.

Therefore, XFD can only go out of sync with XSTATE_BV in the above interrupt case, or in similar scenarios involving preemption on preemptible kernels, and it we can consider it (de facto) part of KVM ABI that KVM_GET_XSAVE returns XSTATE_BV[i]=0 for XFD-disabled features.

[Move clea ---truncated---

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-23005"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-25T15:15:55Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nx86/fpu: Clear XSTATE_BV[i] in guest XSAVE state whenever XFD[i]=1\n\nWhen loading guest XSAVE state via KVM_SET_XSAVE, and when updating XFD in\nresponse to a guest WRMSR, clear XFD-disabled features in the saved (or to\nbe restored) XSTATE_BV to ensure KVM doesn\u0027t attempt to load state for\nfeatures that are disabled via the guest\u0027s XFD.  Because the kernel\nexecutes XRSTOR with the guest\u0027s XFD, saving XSTATE_BV[i]=1 with XFD[i]=1\nwill cause XRSTOR to #NM and panic the kernel.\n\nE.g. if fpu_update_guest_xfd() sets XFD without clearing XSTATE_BV:\n\n  ------------[ cut here ]------------\n  WARNING: arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:1524 at exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110, CPU#29: amx_test/848\n  Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass\n  CPU: 29 UID: 1000 PID: 848 Comm: amx_test Not tainted 6.19.0-rc2-ffa07f7fd437-x86_amx_nm_xfd_non_init-vm #171 NONE\n  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015\n  RIP: 0010:exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110\n  Call Trace:\n   \u003cTASK\u003e\n   asm_exc_device_not_available+0x1a/0x20\n  RIP: 0010:restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x36/0x90\n   switch_fpu_return+0x4a/0xb0\n   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1245/0x1e40 [kvm]\n   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2c3/0x8f0 [kvm]\n   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8f/0xd0\n   do_syscall_64+0x62/0x940\n   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53\n   \u003c/TASK\u003e\n  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---\n\nThis can happen if the guest executes WRMSR(MSR_IA32_XFD) to set XFD[18] = 1,\nand a host IRQ triggers kernel_fpu_begin() prior to the vmexit handler\u0027s\ncall to fpu_update_guest_xfd().\n\nand if userspace stuffs XSTATE_BV[i]=1 via KVM_SET_XSAVE:\n\n  ------------[ cut here ]------------\n  WARNING: arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:1524 at exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110, CPU#14: amx_test/867\n  Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass\n  CPU: 14 UID: 1000 PID: 867 Comm: amx_test Not tainted 6.19.0-rc2-2dace9faccd6-x86_amx_nm_xfd_non_init-vm #168 NONE\n  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015\n  RIP: 0010:exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110\n  Call Trace:\n   \u003cTASK\u003e\n   asm_exc_device_not_available+0x1a/0x20\n  RIP: 0010:restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x36/0x90\n   fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate+0x6b/0x120\n   kvm_load_guest_fpu+0x30/0x80 [kvm]\n   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x85/0x1e40 [kvm]\n   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2c3/0x8f0 [kvm]\n   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8f/0xd0\n   do_syscall_64+0x62/0x940\n   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53\n   \u003c/TASK\u003e\n  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---\n\nThe new behavior is consistent with the AMX architecture.  Per Intel\u0027s SDM,\nXSAVE saves XSTATE_BV as \u00270\u0027 for components that are disabled via XFD\n(and non-compacted XSAVE saves the initial configuration of the state\ncomponent):\n\n  If XSAVE, XSAVEC, XSAVEOPT, or XSAVES is saving the state component i,\n  the instruction does not generate #NM when XCR0[i] = IA32_XFD[i] = 1;\n  instead, it operates as if XINUSE[i] = 0 (and the state component was\n  in its initial state): it saves bit i of XSTATE_BV field of the XSAVE\n  header as 0; in addition, XSAVE saves the initial configuration of the\n  state component (the other instructions do not save state component i).\n\nAlternatively, KVM could always do XRSTOR with XFD=0, e.g. by using\na constant XFD based on the set of enabled features when XSAVEing for\na struct fpu_guest.  However, having XSTATE_BV[i]=1 for XFD-disabled\nfeatures can only happen in the above interrupt case, or in similar\nscenarios involving preemption on preemptible kernels, because\nfpu_swap_kvm_fpstate()\u0027s call to save_fpregs_to_fpstate() saves the\noutgoing FPU state with the current XFD; and that is (on all but the\nfirst WRMSR to XFD) the guest XFD.\n\nTherefore, XFD can only go out of sync with XSTATE_BV in the above\ninterrupt case, or in similar scenarios involving preemption on\npreemptible kernels, and it we can consider it (de facto) part of KVM\nABI that KVM_GET_XSAVE returns XSTATE_BV[i]=0 for XFD-disabled features.\n\n[Move clea\n---truncated---",
  "id": "GHSA-326g-5c6q-7782",
  "modified": "2026-01-25T15:30:27Z",
  "published": "2026-01-25T15:30:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23005"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b45f721775947a84996deb5c661602254ce25ce6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eea6f395ca502c4528314c8112da9b5d65f685eb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f577508cc8a0adb8b4ebe9480bba7683b6149930"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}


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