{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "engramx"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.0.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1188",
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-352",
      "CWE-942"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-22T14:52:03Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe local HTTP server started by `engram server` (binding `127.0.0.1:7337` by default) was exposed to any browser origin with no authentication unless `ENGRAM_API_TOKEN` was explicitly set. Combined with `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` on every response and a body parser that did not require `Content-Type: application/json`, this allowed a malicious web page the developer visited to:\n\n1. **Exfiltrate** the local knowledge graph via `GET /query` and `GET /stats` (function names, file layout, recorded decisions/mistakes).\n2. **Inject persistent prompt-injection payloads** via `POST /learn`, which wrote `mistake`/`decision` nodes that were later surfaced as system-reminders to the user\u0027s AI coding agent on every future session and file edit.\n\nSeverity: **High** \u2014 confidentiality + persistent indirect prompt injection against the user\u0027s coding agent.\n\n### Affected versions\n\n`engramx` \u003e= 1.0.0, \u003c 2.0.2 \u2014 any version that shipped the HTTP server.\n\n### Patched in\n\n`engramx@2.0.2`\n\n### Workarounds (if you cannot upgrade)\n\n- Do **not** run `engram server` or `engram ui`.\n- If developers must, set `ENGRAM_API_TOKEN` to a long random value and terminate the server before browsing the web.\n\n### Remediation (applied in 2.0.2)\n\n1. Fail-closed auth on every non-public route \u2014 Bearer header or HttpOnly cookie, constant-time comparison, 256-bit auto-generated token at `~/.engram/http-server.token` (0600).\n2. Wildcard CORS removed entirely; default is no CORS headers. Opt-in allowlist via `ENGRAM_ALLOWED_ORIGINS`.\n3. Host + Origin validation \u2014 rejects DNS rebinding and Host spoofing.\n4. `Content-Type: application/json` enforced on mutations \u2014 blocks the text/plain CSRF vector.\n5. `/ui?token=` bootstrap with `Sec-Fetch-Site` gate \u2014 prevents cross-origin oracle probing.\n\n### Credit\n\nDiscovered and responsibly disclosed by @gabiudrescu in engram issue #7.",
  "id": "GHSA-2r2p-4cgf-hv7h",
  "modified": "2026-04-22T14:52:03Z",
  "published": "2026-04-22T14:52:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NickCirv/engram/security/advisories/GHSA-2r2p-4cgf-hv7h"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NickCirv/engram/issues/7"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/NickCirv/engram"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "engram: HTTP server CORS wildcard + auth-off-by-default enables CSRF graph exfiltration and persistent indirect prompt injection"
}