GHSA-2PG6-44CX-C49V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-09 23:19 – Updated: 2026-07-09 23:19Summary
Mint's HTTP/1 request encoder splices the caller-supplied method and target directly into the request line without character validation. An application that forwards attacker-controlled input as the HTTP method or the target to Mint.HTTP.request/5 is exposed to request-line CRLF injection, allowing the attacker to terminate the request line early, inject arbitrary headers, and pipeline a fully attacker-chosen second request onto the same TCP connection.
Details
encode_request_line/2 in lib/mint/http1/request.ex writes method and target to the wire verbatim. encode_headers/1 validates header names and values, but there is no equivalent validate_method!/1.
Mint 1.7.0 added validate_request_target/2, which rejects CRLF and other control characters in target by default and closes the path/query vector. The method field remains unvalidated, so a CRLF-bearing method such as "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nX-Smuggled: 1\r\nGET /admin" is accepted and written to the socket as-is. Bytes after the first \r\n are interpreted by the peer as an injected header, or, with a second \r\n, as an additional pipelined request.
PoC
- Stand up a Mint-using gateway/proxy that calls
Mint.HTTP.request(conn, method, "/", [], nil)withmethodtaken from caller input. - Send a request whose forwarded method is
"GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nX-Smuggled-Header: pwned\r\nGET /admin/delete-everything". - Observe the bytes received by the upstream server: the smuggled header line and the second request line appear verbatim in the outbound stream.
Impact
CRLF injection / HTTP request smuggling in the HTTP/1 client encoder, exploitable under default configuration whenever an application passes caller-influenced input as the HTTP method. An attacker who controls the method can inject arbitrary outbound headers (forged Host, Authorization, cache-poisoning headers) and smuggle additional, fully attacker-chosen requests to the upstream server over the same connection, potentially reaching endpoints the legitimate caller never intended to invoke.
Resources
- Introduction commit: https://github.com/elixir-mint/mint/commit/8db1acff30b6a9433762c18b1e1f891b8c1f74f7
- Patch commit: https://github.com/elixir-mint/mint/commit/fad091454cbb7449b19edb8e1fee12ca7cf28c3a
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Hex",
"name": "mint"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.9.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-48861"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-93"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-09T23:19:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-02T16:16:44Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nMint\u0027s HTTP/1 request encoder splices the caller-supplied `method` and `target` directly into the request line without character validation. An application that forwards attacker-controlled input as the HTTP method or the target to `Mint.HTTP.request/5` is exposed to request-line CRLF injection, allowing the attacker to terminate the request line early, inject arbitrary headers, and pipeline a fully attacker-chosen second request onto the same TCP connection.\n\n### Details\n\n`encode_request_line/2` in `lib/mint/http1/request.ex` writes `method` and `target` to the wire verbatim. `encode_headers/1` validates header names and values, but there is no equivalent `validate_method!/1`.\n\nMint 1.7.0 added `validate_request_target/2`, which rejects CRLF and other control characters in `target` by default and closes the path/query vector. The `method` field remains unvalidated, so a CRLF-bearing method such as `\"GET / HTTP/1.1\\r\\nX-Smuggled: 1\\r\\nGET /admin\"` is accepted and written to the socket as-is. Bytes after the first `\\r\\n` are interpreted by the peer as an injected header, or, with a second `\\r\\n`, as an additional pipelined request.\n\n### PoC\n\n1. Stand up a Mint-using gateway/proxy that calls `Mint.HTTP.request(conn, method, \"/\", [], nil)` with `method` taken from caller input.\n2. Send a request whose forwarded method is `\"GET / HTTP/1.1\\r\\nX-Smuggled-Header: pwned\\r\\nGET /admin/delete-everything\"`.\n3. Observe the bytes received by the upstream server: the smuggled header line and the second request line appear verbatim in the outbound stream.\n\n### Impact\n\nCRLF injection / HTTP request smuggling in the HTTP/1 client encoder, exploitable under default configuration whenever an application passes caller-influenced input as the HTTP method. An attacker who controls the method can inject arbitrary outbound headers (forged `Host`, `Authorization`, cache-poisoning headers) and smuggle additional, fully attacker-chosen requests to the upstream server over the same connection, potentially reaching endpoints the legitimate caller never intended to invoke.\n\n## Resources\n\n* Introduction commit: https://github.com/elixir-mint/mint/commit/8db1acff30b6a9433762c18b1e1f891b8c1f74f7\n* Patch commit: https://github.com/elixir-mint/mint/commit/fad091454cbb7449b19edb8e1fee12ca7cf28c3a",
"id": "GHSA-2pg6-44cx-c49v",
"modified": "2026-07-09T23:19:12Z",
"published": "2026-07-09T23:19:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/elixir-mint/mint/security/advisories/GHSA-2pg6-44cx-c49v"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48861"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/elixir-mint/mint/commit/fad091454cbb7449b19edb8e1fee12ca7cf28c3a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-48861.html"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/elixir-mint/mint"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-48861"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "mint has potential CRLF injection in its HTTP request line via unvalidated `method`/`target`"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.