{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.0-20260519062212-ffa59ce3aa78"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47243"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-36"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-27T22:50:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nIn the runtime-rs standalone virtio-fs path, verified here with QEMU (and verified with Cloud Hypervisor too), Kata Containers runs host `virtiofsd` as root with:\n\n```\n--sandbox none --seccomp none\n```\n\nIf an attacker has root-equivalent execution inside the Kata guest VM, they can send raw FUSE requests directly to the host `virtiofsd`. With the tested runtime-rs virtio-fs configuration, a raw `FUSE_SYMLINK` request whose new symlink name is an absolute host path is honored outside the virtio-fs shared directory.\n\nThis lets guest root create host-root owned symlinks in sensitive host paths. The PoC created here will create symlinks in the host `/etc/cron.d` directory, causing host cron to execute a guest-controlled payload as host root.\n\nImpact: guest root can execute code as host root.\n\n### Affected configuration\n\nThe verified host used:\n\n```\n/opt/kata/share/defaults/kata-containers/runtime-rs/configuration-qemu-runtime-rs.toml\n\nrootless = false\nshared_fs = \"virtio-fs\"\nvirtio_fs_daemon = \"/opt/kata/libexec/virtiofsd\"\nhypervisor_name = \"qemu\"\ndebug_console_enabled = false\n```\n\nPinned upstream references, using Kata Containers `main` commit `2ffd1538a296cff93a357bfba0dfca747480a1f8`:\n\n- runtime-rs standalone virtio-fs adds [`--sandbox none --seccomp none`](https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/blob/2ffd1538a296cff93a357bfba0dfca747480a1f8/src/runtime-rs/crates/resource/src/share_fs/share_virtio_fs_standalone.rs#L82-L92) to the `virtiofsd` command line.\n- runtime-rs QEMU leaves rootless mode disabled by default: [`rootless = false`](https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/blob/2ffd1538a296cff93a357bfba0dfca747480a1f8/src/runtime-rs/config/configuration-qemu-runtime-rs.toml.in#L31-L34).\n- The QEMU runtime-rs config template generates an installed config that uses standalone virtio-fs and points runtime-rs at the host `virtiofsd` binary: [`shared_fs` and `virtio_fs_daemon`](https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/blob/2ffd1538a296cff93a357bfba0dfca747480a1f8/src/runtime-rs/config/configuration-qemu-runtime-rs.toml.in#L164-L171).\n- The runtime-rs Makefile resolves those placeholders to [`virtio-fs`](https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/blob/2ffd1538a296cff93a357bfba0dfca747480a1f8/src/runtime-rs/Makefile#L496-L499) and [`$(LIBEXECDIR)/virtiofsd`](https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/blob/2ffd1538a296cff93a357bfba0dfca747480a1f8/src/runtime-rs/Makefile#L184-L190).\n- runtime-rs selects the same standalone virtio-fs implementation whenever `shared_fs = \"virtio-fs\"`: [`ShareVirtioFsStandalone`](https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/blob/2ffd1538a296cff93a357bfba0dfca747480a1f8/src/runtime-rs/crates/resource/src/share_fs/mod.rs#L158-L167).\n\n### Details\n\nThe guest kernel normally owns the virtio-fs client. A normal guest process will use filesystem syscalls, and the guest kernel will validate the paths, and only then does the kernel send FUSE messages to the host backend.\n\nAn attacker with root-equivalent access inside the guest can bypass that guest virtio-fs client. They can access the virtio-fs PCI device, mmap the virtio PCI BAR, recover guest physical addresses from `/proc/self/pagemap`, and build their own virtqueue from userspace. That queue can submit attacker-built FUSE messages directly to host `virtiofsd`.\n\nThe relevant primitive is `FUSE_SYMLINK`. An attacker can send a request whose body contains:\n\n```\nnew symlink name: /etc/cron.d/kata-go-escape-cron-\u003cpid\u003e\nsymlink target: /proc/\u003cpid\u003e/root/run/kata-containers/shared/sandboxes/\u003csid\u003e/ro/passthrough/\u003csid\u003e/rootfs/tmp/kata-go-escape-payload\n```\n\nThe new symlink name is an absolute host path. `virtiofsd` should reject that request or force it to resolve below the configured `--shared-dir`. In the tested runtime-rs path, host-root unsandboxed `virtiofsd` accepts the absolute name, creating a real host symlink under `/etc/cron.d`.\n\nThe attacker can make the symlink target resolve through `/proc/\u003cpid\u003e/root/...` for a live Kata runtime process whose mount namespace can see the guest-created payload. One matching runtime PID is enough.\n\nWhen the host cron reads `/etc/cron.d`, it follows the root-owned symlink, loads the guest-created crontab payload, and executes it as host root.\n\n### PoC\n\n```shell\nsudo timeout --foreground --kill-after=10s 600s ctr run --rm \\\n  --runtime /opt/kata/runtime-rs/bin/containerd-shim-kata-v2 \\\n  --runtime-config-path /opt/kata/share/defaults/kata-containers/runtime-rs/configuration-qemu-runtime-rs.toml \\\n  --privileged \\\n  --privileged-without-host-devices \\\n  docker.io/library/kata-go-escape:local \\\n  \"$run_id\"\n```\n\nThe container is privileged only to model the post-escape condition where the attacker already has guest-root capabilities. It is not the vulnerability by itself.\n\nInside the guest, the PoC:\n\n1. Writes a cron payload to guest `/tmp/kata-go-escape-payload`.\n2. Finds the virtio-fs PCI device in guest /sys.\n3. Takes over a virtio-fs queue from userspace.\n4. Sends `FUSE_INIT`.\n5. Discovers the current runtime-rs sandbox under `passthrough/`.\n6. Looks up `passthrough/\u003csid\u003e/rootfs/tmp/kata-go-escape-payload`.\n7. Sends raw `FUSE_SYMLINK` requests where the new symlink names are absolute host paths under `/etc/cron.d`.\n8. Keeps the guest alive while host cron scans.\n\nExample log lines:\n\n```\n[guest] virtio-fs PCI device: /sys/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:05.0\n[res] sandbox_id=kata-go-escape-test-1778522686-1539\n[res] lookup_path_error=0 path=passthrough/kata-go-escape-test-1778522686-1539/rootfs/tmp/kata-go-escape-payload nodeid=21\n[spray] pid=1 err=-2 created_candidates=1\n```\n\n`err=-2` is expected for the symlink spray. `virtiofsd` can return `ENOENT` after the side effect because its follow-up lookup is still relative to the export root. The host symlink creation has already happened.\n\n### Impact\n\nThe PoC proves guest-root to host-root command execution.\n\nVerified host proof:\n\n```\n/run/kata-go-escape.proof\n\nuid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)\nMon May 11 18:05:01 UTC 2026\n```\n\nThe proof file is written in host `/run` by host cron. It is not written by the guest process and not written by `virtiofsd`.\n\nAn attacker who reaches guest root can therefore cross the Kata isolation boundary and execute commands as host root on affected runtime-rs virtio-fs deployments.",
  "id": "GHSA-2gv2-cffp-j227",
  "modified": "2026-05-27T22:50:01Z",
  "published": "2026-05-27T22:50:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/security/advisories/GHSA-2gv2-cffp-j227"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/commit/ffa59ce3aa7877d067c9a372df0c329a23a01744"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/releases/tag/3.31.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:P",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Kata guest escape: runtime-rs guest-root to host-root escape via virtiofs"
}