Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-275H-V5H9-VR82

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-02 14:17 – Updated: 2026-09-02 14:17

Summary

Siyuan: Authenticated path traversal in /snippets/ static handler (serveSnippets) leaks conf/conf.json secrets and siyuan.db

Details

Reporter: Cavan Loughran, Celvex Group Inc.

Summary

The /snippets/*filepath route handler serveSnippets in kernel/server/serve.go performs a bare filepath.Join(util.SnippetsPath, filePath) on the single-decoded c.Request.URL.Path and serves the result with c.File(), with NO IsSubPath containment and NO IsSensitivePath denylist - unlike the sibling /export/ (serveExport) and /appearance/ (serveAppearance) handlers, which both carry IsSubPath, and unlike /assets/ (serveAssets), whose traversal was fixed in GHSA-p4m3-mgmm-c664. Because util.SnippetsPath = WorkspaceDir/data/snippets, an authenticated request to GET /snippets/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/conf/conf.json resolves to WorkspaceDir/conf/conf.json and leaks the kernel API token and AccessAuthCode (the same secret file CVE-2026-30869 leaked from /export/); GET /snippets/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/temp/siyuan.db leaks the full document database.

Affected versions

v3.6.5 and current master (verified by direct source read). The /export/ and /assets/ fixes were endpoint-scoped and never reached serveSnippets.

Technical detail

Sink, kernel/server/serve.go, serveSnippets (verbatim, current master and v3.6.5):

func serveSnippets(ginServer gin.Engine) { ginServer.Handle("GET", "/snippets/filepath", model.CheckAuth, func(c *gin.Context) { filePath := strings.TrimPrefix(c.Request.URL.Path, "/snippets/") if !model.IsAdminRoleContext(c) { if "conf.json" == filePath { c.Status(http.StatusUnauthorized) return } } ext := filepath.Ext(filePath) name := strings.TrimSuffix(filePath, ext) confSnippets, err := model.LoadSnippets() ... for _, s := range confSnippets { if s.Name == name && ("" != ext && s.Type == ext[1:]) { c.Header("Content-Type", mime.TypeByExtension(ext)) c.String(http.StatusOK, s.Content) return } } // when not matched in the config file, look it up on the filesystem filePath = filepath.Join(util.SnippetsPath, filePath) // <-- TAINTED join, no containment c.File(filePath) // <-- arbitrary workspace file read }) }

Taint path, end to end: 1. Route GET /snippets/*filepath is registered with the single middleware model.CheckAuth (authentication only; NO CheckAdminRole). 2. c.Request.URL.Path is the request path AFTER Go net/http has percent-decoded it ONCE. The kernel runs gin.New() with default settings (UseRawPath = false, UnescapePathValues = true) and installs NO path-sanitizing middleware (the global ginServer.Use(...) chain is ControlConcurrency, Timing, Recover, corsMiddleware(), jwtMiddleware, gzip, sessions only - none cleans or rejects ..). net/http does not path.Clean URL.Path for gin handlers, so a single-encoded %2e%2e arrives at the handler as a literal .. segment. 3. filePath := strings.TrimPrefix(c.Request.URL.Path, "/snippets/") yields the attacker-controlled remainder, e.g. ../../conf/conf.json. 4. The non-admin guard checks only "conf.json" == filePath; with traversal the value is "../../conf/conf.json", so the guard does not fire (and admins are not checked at all). 5. The config-snippet name/ext loop does not match a traversal string, so control falls through to the filesystem branch. 6. filePath = filepath.Join(util.SnippetsPath, filePath): Go's filepath.Join runs Clean, which RESOLVES .. segments. Clean("WorkspaceDir/data/snippets" + "/../../conf/conf.json") = WorkspaceDir/conf/conf.json. There is no IsSubPath confinement, so the resolved path escapes the snippets root. 7. c.File(filePath) streams the resolved file to the response body.

Directory layout (confirmed by kernel/util/working.go): WorkspaceDir/ data/snippets/ = util.SnippetsPath (the /snippets/ base) conf/conf.json <-- API token + AccessAuthCode (the secret) temp/siyuan.db <-- full SQLite database From util.SnippetsPath = WorkspaceDir/data/snippets the climb-out is exactly two levels: - GET /snippets/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/conf/conf.json -> WorkspaceDir/conf/conf.json (kernel API token, AccessAuthCode, cookie signing material - the same secrets CVE-2026-30869 leaked). - GET /snippets/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/temp/siyuan.db -> WorkspaceDir/temp/siyuan.db (the entire document database). - GET /snippets/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd (and deeper) reaches host files outside the workspace; c.File serves any path Clean resolves to, subject only to OS file permissions.

Incomplete-fix lineage (patch-diff)

SiYuan has been fixing path traversal in file-serving handlers ONE endpoint at a time: - /export/ (serveExport): CVE-2026-30869 (IsSensitivePath denylist, v3.5.10), then CVE-2026-41894 / GHSA-hjh7-r5w8-5872 (double-encode bypass, v3.6.5). Now has IsSubPath(exportBaseDir, fullPath) + IsSensitivePath. - /appearance/ (serveAppearance): hardened alongside; has IsSubPath(appearancePath, filePath). - /assets/path (serveAssets): GHSA-p4m3-mgmm-c664; delegates to model.GetAssetAbsPath (containment) + publish-access check. - /snippets/filepath (serveSnippets): NONE. NO IsSubPath, NO IsSensitivePath; only a literal "conf.json" string match for non-admins, defeated by traversal. The fixes that closed /export/ and /assets/ were endpoint-scoped (per-handler IsSubPath/IsSensitivePath/GetAssetAbsPath) rather than a shared request-level path-confinement primitive applied to every c.File/http.ServeFile sink. serveSnippets was never touched. It reaches the SAME secret file (conf/conf.json) the parent CVE-2026-30869 was filed for, at a LOWER bar in one respect: it needs only single URL encoding (no double-encode trick), because there is no containment check to bypass in the first place.

Privilege / reachability (stated honestly)

The route is gated by model.CheckAuth only (any authenticated user), NOT CheckAdminRole. CheckAuth admits any principal that presents a valid API token (Conf.Api.Token), a valid session whose AccessAuthCode == Conf.AccessAuthCode, or BasicAuth. The handler's own if !model.IsAdminRoleContext(c) branch confirms non-admin reachability; that branch only blocks the literal string "conf.json", which the traversal payload "../../conf/conf.json" does not match, so even non-admins leak the secret file. SiYuan supports non-admin authenticated roles (RoleEditor, RoleReader) in shared/published workspace modes, plus access-auth-code logins. Privilege required: PR:L (a valid authenticated session), NOT pre-auth and NOT admin-gated. Reading conf/conf.json yields the admin API token/AccessAuthCode, letting a non-admin escalate to full kernel-admin API control; siyuan.db leaks all note content. The kernel HTTP server is the published interface for self-hosted/Docker deployments (AV:N).

SiYuan's SECURITY.md excludes arbitrary file WRITE outside the workspace as a non-issue, but this finding is arbitrary file READ of in-workspace secrets (conf/conf.json, siyuan.db) and host files. Read-side traversal of conf.json is exactly what CVE-2026-30869 was accepted for, so this is squarely in scope.

Non-destructive: no weaponized exploit is included; the chain is described in prose for the maintainer to reproduce.

Secondary (reported for completeness, not the headline): serveRepoDiff (/repo/diff/*path) shares the same bare filepath.Join(util.TempDir, "repo", "diff", requestPath) + http.ServeFile with NO containment, so .. in requestPath escapes TempDir/repo/diff. BUT it carries model.CheckAdminRole (admin-only), so the trust boundary crossed is weak (an admin already holds the API token). Lower severity; shares the same one-line fix.

Impact

Authenticated (non-admin, PR:L) arbitrary workspace file read: kernel API token + AccessAuthCode (conf/conf.json), the full document database (siyuan.db), and host files outside the workspace. Leaking conf.json enables escalation to full kernel-admin API control (and, per the parent CVE, can be chained toward RCE).

Novelty

GitHub Security Advisories for siyuan-note/siyuan include GHSA-2h2p-mvfx-868w / CVE-2026-30869 (/export/), GHSA-hjh7-r5w8-5872 / CVE-2026-41894 (/export/ double-encode), GHSA-p4m3-mgmm-c664 (/assets/ double-encode), plus stored-XSS/template-injection advisories. NONE references /snippets/ or serveSnippets. OSV / GitLab Advisory Database for the Go module github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel lists only the /export/ and /assets/ path-traversal entries. Not a duplicate; the contribution is the distinct, unpatched sibling handler serveSnippets reached at a non-admin authenticated privilege.

Remediation

Add the same containment SiYuan already uses in serveExport/serveAppearance: resolve filePath and reject if !gulu.File.IsSubPath(util.SnippetsPath, resolved), and apply util.IsSensitivePath. The identical one-line containment also closes the admin-only /repo/diff/*path (serveRepoDiff) handler.

CWE: CWE-22 (Path Traversal), related CWE-23 (Relative Path Traversal). CVSS v3.1 7.7 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N).

Coordinated-disclosure terms: 90 days from acknowledgement before public disclosure, aligned earlier if a fix ships sooner. No public issue / PR / gist / post has been or will be opened before a coordinated date or a shipped fix. No weaponized PoC has been shared.

Severity

7.7 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.0-20260704035520-68cc0f537dfa"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-59832"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-23"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-02T14:17:44Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-09T23:17:05Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Reporter: Cavan Loughran, Celvex Group Inc.\n\nSummary\n-------\nThe /snippets/*filepath route handler serveSnippets in kernel/server/serve.go performs a bare filepath.Join(util.SnippetsPath, filePath) on the single-decoded c.Request.URL.Path and serves the result with c.File(), with NO IsSubPath containment and NO IsSensitivePath denylist - unlike the sibling /export/ (serveExport) and /appearance/ (serveAppearance) handlers, which both carry IsSubPath, and unlike /assets/ (serveAssets), whose traversal was fixed in GHSA-p4m3-mgmm-c664. Because util.SnippetsPath = WorkspaceDir/data/snippets, an authenticated request to GET /snippets/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/conf/conf.json resolves to WorkspaceDir/conf/conf.json and leaks the kernel API token and AccessAuthCode (the same secret file CVE-2026-30869 leaked from /export/); GET /snippets/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/temp/siyuan.db leaks the full document database.\n\nAffected versions\n-----------------\nv3.6.5 and current master (verified by direct source read). The /export/ and /assets/ fixes were endpoint-scoped and never reached serveSnippets.\n\nTechnical detail\n----------------\nSink, kernel/server/serve.go, serveSnippets (verbatim, current master and v3.6.5):\n\n  func serveSnippets(ginServer *gin.Engine) {\n      ginServer.Handle(\"GET\", \"/snippets/*filepath\", model.CheckAuth, func(c *gin.Context) {\n          filePath := strings.TrimPrefix(c.Request.URL.Path, \"/snippets/\")\n          if !model.IsAdminRoleContext(c) {\n              if \"conf.json\" == filePath {\n                  c.Status(http.StatusUnauthorized)\n                  return\n              }\n          }\n          ext := filepath.Ext(filePath)\n          name := strings.TrimSuffix(filePath, ext)\n          confSnippets, err := model.LoadSnippets()\n          ...\n          for _, s := range confSnippets {\n              if s.Name == name \u0026\u0026 (\"\" != ext \u0026\u0026 s.Type == ext[1:]) {\n                  c.Header(\"Content-Type\", mime.TypeByExtension(ext))\n                  c.String(http.StatusOK, s.Content)\n                  return\n              }\n          }\n          // when not matched in the config file, look it up on the filesystem\n          filePath = filepath.Join(util.SnippetsPath, filePath)   // \u003c-- TAINTED join, no containment\n          c.File(filePath)                                        // \u003c-- arbitrary workspace file read\n      })\n  }\n\nTaint path, end to end:\n1. Route GET /snippets/*filepath is registered with the single middleware model.CheckAuth (authentication only; NO CheckAdminRole).\n2. c.Request.URL.Path is the request path AFTER Go net/http has percent-decoded it ONCE. The kernel runs gin.New() with default settings (UseRawPath = false, UnescapePathValues = true) and installs NO path-sanitizing middleware (the global ginServer.Use(...) chain is ControlConcurrency, Timing, Recover, corsMiddleware(), jwtMiddleware, gzip, sessions only - none cleans or rejects ..). net/http does not path.Clean URL.Path for gin handlers, so a single-encoded %2e%2e arrives at the handler as a literal .. segment.\n3. filePath := strings.TrimPrefix(c.Request.URL.Path, \"/snippets/\") yields the attacker-controlled remainder, e.g. ../../conf/conf.json.\n4. The non-admin guard checks only \"conf.json\" == filePath; with traversal the value is \"../../conf/conf.json\", so the guard does not fire (and admins are not checked at all).\n5. The config-snippet name/ext loop does not match a traversal string, so control falls through to the filesystem branch.\n6. filePath = filepath.Join(util.SnippetsPath, filePath): Go\u0027s filepath.Join runs Clean, which RESOLVES .. segments. Clean(\"WorkspaceDir/data/snippets\" + \"/../../conf/conf.json\") = WorkspaceDir/conf/conf.json. There is no IsSubPath confinement, so the resolved path escapes the snippets root.\n7. c.File(filePath) streams the resolved file to the response body.\n\nDirectory layout (confirmed by kernel/util/working.go):\n  WorkspaceDir/\n    data/snippets/  = util.SnippetsPath  (the /snippets/ base)\n    conf/conf.json  \u003c-- API token + AccessAuthCode (the secret)\n    temp/siyuan.db  \u003c-- full SQLite database\nFrom util.SnippetsPath = WorkspaceDir/data/snippets the climb-out is exactly two levels:\n- GET /snippets/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/conf/conf.json -\u003e WorkspaceDir/conf/conf.json (kernel API token, AccessAuthCode, cookie signing material - the same secrets CVE-2026-30869 leaked).\n- GET /snippets/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/temp/siyuan.db -\u003e WorkspaceDir/temp/siyuan.db (the entire document database).\n- GET /snippets/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd (and deeper) reaches host files outside the workspace; c.File serves any path Clean resolves to, subject only to OS file permissions.\n\nIncomplete-fix lineage (patch-diff)\n-----------------------------------\nSiYuan has been fixing path traversal in file-serving handlers ONE endpoint at a time:\n- /export/ (serveExport): CVE-2026-30869 (IsSensitivePath denylist, v3.5.10), then CVE-2026-41894 / GHSA-hjh7-r5w8-5872 (double-encode bypass, v3.6.5). Now has IsSubPath(exportBaseDir, fullPath) + IsSensitivePath.\n- /appearance/ (serveAppearance): hardened alongside; has IsSubPath(appearancePath, filePath).\n- /assets/*path (serveAssets): GHSA-p4m3-mgmm-c664; delegates to model.GetAssetAbsPath (containment) + publish-access check.\n- /snippets/*filepath (serveSnippets): NONE. NO IsSubPath, NO IsSensitivePath; only a literal \"conf.json\" string match for non-admins, defeated by traversal.\nThe fixes that closed /export/ and /assets/ were endpoint-scoped (per-handler IsSubPath/IsSensitivePath/GetAssetAbsPath) rather than a shared request-level path-confinement primitive applied to every c.File/http.ServeFile sink. serveSnippets was never touched. It reaches the SAME secret file (conf/conf.json) the parent CVE-2026-30869 was filed for, at a LOWER bar in one respect: it needs only single URL encoding (no double-encode trick), because there is no containment check to bypass in the first place.\n\nPrivilege / reachability (stated honestly)\n------------------------------------------\nThe route is gated by model.CheckAuth only (any authenticated user), NOT CheckAdminRole. CheckAuth admits any principal that presents a valid API token (Conf.Api.Token), a valid session whose AccessAuthCode == Conf.AccessAuthCode, or BasicAuth. The handler\u0027s own if !model.IsAdminRoleContext(c) branch confirms non-admin reachability; that branch only blocks the literal string \"conf.json\", which the traversal payload \"../../conf/conf.json\" does not match, so even non-admins leak the secret file. SiYuan supports non-admin authenticated roles (RoleEditor, RoleReader) in shared/published workspace modes, plus access-auth-code logins. Privilege required: PR:L (a valid authenticated session), NOT pre-auth and NOT admin-gated. Reading conf/conf.json yields the admin API token/AccessAuthCode, letting a non-admin escalate to full kernel-admin API control; siyuan.db leaks all note content. The kernel HTTP server is the published interface for self-hosted/Docker deployments (AV:N).\n\nSiYuan\u0027s SECURITY.md excludes arbitrary file WRITE outside the workspace as a non-issue, but this finding is arbitrary file READ of in-workspace secrets (conf/conf.json, siyuan.db) and host files. Read-side traversal of conf.json is exactly what CVE-2026-30869 was accepted for, so this is squarely in scope.\n\nNon-destructive: no weaponized exploit is included; the chain is described in prose for the maintainer to reproduce.\n\nSecondary (reported for completeness, not the headline): serveRepoDiff (/repo/diff/*path) shares the same bare filepath.Join(util.TempDir, \"repo\", \"diff\", requestPath) + http.ServeFile with NO containment, so .. in requestPath escapes TempDir/repo/diff. BUT it carries model.CheckAdminRole (admin-only), so the trust boundary crossed is weak (an admin already holds the API token). Lower severity; shares the same one-line fix.\n\nImpact\n------\nAuthenticated (non-admin, PR:L) arbitrary workspace file read: kernel API token + AccessAuthCode (conf/conf.json), the full document database (siyuan.db), and host files outside the workspace. Leaking conf.json enables escalation to full kernel-admin API control (and, per the parent CVE, can be chained toward RCE).\n\nNovelty\n-------\nGitHub Security Advisories for siyuan-note/siyuan include GHSA-2h2p-mvfx-868w / CVE-2026-30869 (/export/), GHSA-hjh7-r5w8-5872 / CVE-2026-41894 (/export/ double-encode), GHSA-p4m3-mgmm-c664 (/assets/ double-encode), plus stored-XSS/template-injection advisories. NONE references /snippets/ or serveSnippets. OSV / GitLab Advisory Database for the Go module github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel lists only the /export/ and /assets/ path-traversal entries. Not a duplicate; the contribution is the distinct, unpatched sibling handler serveSnippets reached at a non-admin authenticated privilege.\n\nRemediation\n-----------\nAdd the same containment SiYuan already uses in serveExport/serveAppearance: resolve filePath and reject if !gulu.File.IsSubPath(util.SnippetsPath, resolved), and apply util.IsSensitivePath. The identical one-line containment also closes the admin-only /repo/diff/*path (serveRepoDiff) handler.\n\nCWE: CWE-22 (Path Traversal), related CWE-23 (Relative Path Traversal). CVSS v3.1 7.7 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N).\n\nCoordinated-disclosure terms: 90 days from acknowledgement before public disclosure, aligned earlier if a fix ships sooner. No public issue / PR / gist / post has been or will be opened before a coordinated date or a shipped fix. No weaponized PoC has been shared.",
  "id": "GHSA-275h-v5h9-vr82",
  "modified": "2026-09-02T14:17:44Z",
  "published": "2026-09-02T14:17:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-275h-v5h9-vr82"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59832"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/68cc0f537dfa4502496dfa794e71835421c25c09"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/releases/tag/v3.7.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Siyuan: Authenticated path traversal in /snippets/ static handler (serveSnippets) leaks conf/conf.json secrets and siyuan.db"
}

CVE-2026-59832 (GCVE-0-2026-59832)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-09 22:18 – Updated: 2026-07-10 14:41

Title

SiYuan: Authenticated path traversal in /snippets/ static handler (serveSnippets) leaks conf/conf.json secrets and siyuan.db

Summary

SiYuan is an open-source personal knowledge management system. Prior to 3.7.1, the /snippets/*filepath route handler serveSnippets in kernel/server/serve.go joins a single-decoded request path with the snippets directory without subpath containment or sensitive-path checks, allowing an authenticated request such as /snippets/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/conf/conf.json to read workspace secrets and the document database. This issue is fixed in versions 3.7.1.

Severity

7.7 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-07-10 14:41 UTC

CWE

CWE-22 - Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
CWE-23 - Relative Path Traversal

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root

References

3 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/ad…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/68cc…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/releases/ta…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
siyuan-note	siyuan	Affected: < 3.7.1

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-59832",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-07-10T14:41:47.607410Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-07-10T14:41:54.043Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "siyuan",
          "vendor": "siyuan-note",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 3.7.1"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "SiYuan is an open-source personal knowledge management system. Prior to 3.7.1, the /snippets/*filepath route handler serveSnippets in kernel/server/serve.go joins a single-decoded request path with the snippets directory without subpath containment or sensitive-path checks, allowing an authenticated request such as /snippets/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/conf/conf.json to read workspace secrets and the document database. This issue is fixed in versions 3.7.1."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 7.7,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "NONE",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "scope": "CHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-22",
              "description": "CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-23",
              "description": "CWE-23: Relative Path Traversal",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-07-09T22:18:15.776Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-275h-v5h9-vr82",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-275h-v5h9-vr82"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/68cc0f537dfa4502496dfa794e71835421c25c09",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/68cc0f537dfa4502496dfa794e71835421c25c09"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/releases/tag/v3.7.1",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/releases/tag/v3.7.1"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-275h-v5h9-vr82",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "SiYuan: Authenticated path traversal in /snippets/ static handler (serveSnippets) leaks conf/conf.json secrets and siyuan.db"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-59832",
    "datePublished": "2026-07-09T22:18:15.776Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-07-07T15:00:50.979Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-07-10T14:41:54.043Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.

Action not permitted

GHSA-275H-V5H9-VR82

Summary

Affected versions

Technical detail

Incomplete-fix lineage (patch-diff)

Privilege / reachability (stated honestly)

Impact

Novelty

Remediation

CVE-2026-59832 (GCVE-0-2026-59832)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature