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GCVE-1-2026-20184 (CVE-2026-85238)

Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-09-03 15:29 – Updated: 2026-09-03 15:30
VLAI
Title
Session Fixation in MISP CustomAuth Authentication Allows Session Hijacking
Summary
MISP contains a session fixation vulnerability in the CustomAuth authentication (a custom configuration) flow. When a user was successfully authenticated through CustomAuth, MISP stored the authenticated user identity in the existing session without first rotating the session identifier. As a result, if an attacker can cause a victim to use a session identifier known to the attacker before authentication, that same session identifier remains valid after the victim successfully authenticates. The attacker could subsequently reuse the fixed session identifier to access the victim's authenticated MISP session, potentially gaining the privileges associated with the victim's account. The issue occurs because __customAuthentication() wrote the authenticated user into the existing CakePHP session while the call to Session->renew() had previously been disabled. The patch restores session identifier rotation when a new authentication occurs or when the authenticated user changes, while avoiding unnecessary session renewal on every request.
CWE
Assigner
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
misp misp Affected: 0 , ≤ 2.5.45 (semver)
guessed Create a notification for this product.

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          "product": "misp",
          "repo": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/",
          "vendor": "misp",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "2.5.45",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
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      ],
      "credits": [
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          "type": "remediation developer",
          "value": "Andras Iklody"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "Scottish Government - National Cyber Team"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
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        }
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              "value": "\u003cp\u003eMISP contains a session fixation vulnerability in the \u003cstrong\u003eCustomAuth authentication (a custom configuration) flow\u003c/strong\u003e. When a user was successfully authenticated through CustomAuth, MISP stored the authenticated user identity in the existing session without first rotating the session identifier.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAs a result, if an attacker can cause a victim to use a session identifier known to the attacker before authentication, that same session identifier remains valid after the victim successfully authenticates. The attacker could subsequently reuse the fixed session identifier to access the victim\u0027s authenticated MISP session, potentially gaining the privileges associated with the victim\u0027s account.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe issue occurs because \u003ccode\u003e__customAuthentication()\u003c/code\u003e wrote the authenticated user into the existing CakePHP session while the call to \u003ccode\u003eSession-\u0026gt;renew()\u003c/code\u003e had previously been disabled. The patch restores session identifier rotation when a \u003cstrong\u003enew authentication\u003c/strong\u003e occurs or when the authenticated user changes, while avoiding unnecessary session renewal on every request.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cbr\u003e"
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            "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
            "attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 7.6,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
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            "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
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          "scenarios": [
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          "descriptions": [
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              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
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      "providerMetadata": {
        "orgId": "00000000-0000-4000-9000-000000000000"
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      "references": [
        {
          "tags": [
            "patch"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/e2eb2f058"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Session Fixation in MISP CustomAuth Authentication Allows Session Hijacking",
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  "cveMetadata": {
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    "cveId": "CVE-2026-85238",
    "datePublished": "2026-09-03T15:29:00.000Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-09-03T15:29:00.000Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-09-03T15:30:33.757388Z",
    "requesterUserId": "00000000-0000-4000-9000-000000000000",
    "serial": 1,
    "state": "PUBLISHED",
    "vulnId": "gcve-1-2026-20184"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.1"
}



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