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FKIE_CVE-2026-72043

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-15 06:21 - Updated: 2026-08-17 06:18
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: LoongArch: Fix missing dirty page tracking in {pte,pmd}_wrprotect() When hardware page table walker (PTW) is enabled on LoongArch, the CPU may set _PAGE_DIRTY directly in the page table entry during a write TLB miss, without going through the software TLB store handler. The software TLB store handler (tlbex.S:254) sets both _PAGE_DIRTY and_PAGE_MODIFIED together: ori t0, t0, (_PAGE_VALID | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_MODIFIED) Since hardware PTW only sets _PAGE_DIRTY, the software-only bit, i.e. _PAGE_MODIFIED is left unchanged. This creates a window where a PTE has _PAGE_DIRTY set (hardware knows the page is dirty) but _PAGE_MODIFIED clear (software is unaware). When fork()/clone() triggers copy-on-write, __copy_present_ptes() calls pte_wrprotect(), which unconditionally clears both the _PAGE_WRITE and _PAGE_DIRTY bits: pte_val(pte) &= ~(_PAGE_WRITE | _PAGE_DIRTY); Since _PAGE_MODIFIED was never set, the dirtiness information is lost completely. Subsequently, when memory pressure triggers page reclaim, page_mkclean() / try_to_unmap() sees the page as clean (i.e. pte_dirty() returns false) and the page may be freed without writeback, causing data corruption. Fix this by propagating the _PAGE_DIRTY bit to the _PAGE_MODIFIED bit in both pte_wrprotect() and pmd_wrprotect() before clearing writeable bits: if (pte_val(pte) & _PAGE_DIRTY) pte_val(pte) |= _PAGE_MODIFIED; The pmd_wrprotect() fix handles the CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE case, where pmd entries need the same treatment. This ensures the software dirty tracking bit (checked by pte_dirty() and pmd_dirty(), which read both the _PAGE_DIRTY and _PAGE_MODIFIED bits) is preserved across fork COW write-protection. The issue was found by the LTP madvise09 test case, which exercises page reclaim after "madvise(MADV_FREE), write and fork" operation sequence on private anonymous mappings.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "arch/loongarch/include/asm/pgtable.h"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "76f88650763a35cbf1384c65d66d096fa31cc58d",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "09cfefb7fa70c3af011b0db0a513fd80b2f18abc",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "e8a916579e427af32f2de8213dfa23c5df6e6664",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "09cfefb7fa70c3af011b0db0a513fd80b2f18abc",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "39bb21a4bff0d70058bf752d7b5aa2e2ccc864a9",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "09cfefb7fa70c3af011b0db0a513fd80b2f18abc",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "a65f49b6f7ece756394f8f0e85570020e7fd0e35",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "09cfefb7fa70c3af011b0db0a513fd80b2f18abc",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "e483da960892c41fa7f0cf0d2fc2410d65a483d6",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "09cfefb7fa70c3af011b0db0a513fd80b2f18abc",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "018e9828eb523c638fa3d9bdf0fd4956b74555b2",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "09cfefb7fa70c3af011b0db0a513fd80b2f18abc",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "arch/loongarch/include/asm/pgtable.h"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5.19"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "5.19",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.1.178",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.6.145",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.97",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.40",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.1.5",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nLoongArch: Fix missing dirty page tracking in {pte,pmd}_wrprotect()\n\nWhen hardware page table walker (PTW) is enabled on LoongArch, the CPU\nmay set _PAGE_DIRTY directly in the page table entry during a write TLB\nmiss, without going through the software TLB store handler. The software\nTLB store handler (tlbex.S:254) sets both _PAGE_DIRTY and_PAGE_MODIFIED\ntogether:\n\n    ori t0, t0, (_PAGE_VALID | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_MODIFIED)\n\nSince hardware PTW only sets _PAGE_DIRTY, the software-only bit, i.e.\n_PAGE_MODIFIED is left unchanged. This creates a window where a PTE has\n_PAGE_DIRTY set (hardware knows the page is dirty) but _PAGE_MODIFIED\nclear (software is unaware).\n\nWhen fork()/clone() triggers copy-on-write, __copy_present_ptes() calls\npte_wrprotect(), which unconditionally clears both the _PAGE_WRITE and\n_PAGE_DIRTY bits:\n\n    pte_val(pte) \u0026= ~(_PAGE_WRITE | _PAGE_DIRTY);\n\nSince _PAGE_MODIFIED was never set, the dirtiness information is lost\ncompletely. Subsequently, when memory pressure triggers page reclaim,\npage_mkclean() / try_to_unmap() sees the page as clean (i.e. pte_dirty()\nreturns false) and the page may be freed without writeback, causing data\ncorruption.\n\nFix this by propagating the _PAGE_DIRTY bit to the _PAGE_MODIFIED bit in\nboth pte_wrprotect() and pmd_wrprotect() before clearing writeable bits:\n\n    if (pte_val(pte) \u0026 _PAGE_DIRTY)\n        pte_val(pte) |= _PAGE_MODIFIED;\n\nThe pmd_wrprotect() fix handles the CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE case,\nwhere pmd entries need the same treatment.\n\nThis ensures the software dirty tracking bit (checked by pte_dirty() and\npmd_dirty(), which read both the _PAGE_DIRTY and _PAGE_MODIFIED bits) is\npreserved across fork COW write-protection.\n\nThe issue was found by the LTP madvise09 test case, which exercises page\nreclaim after \"madvise(MADV_FREE), write and fork\" operation sequence on\nprivate anonymous mappings."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-72043",
  "lastModified": "2026-08-17T06:18:02.257",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 7.1,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
        "impactScore": 5.2,
        "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-08-15T06:21:13.480",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/018e9828eb523c638fa3d9bdf0fd4956b74555b2"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/39bb21a4bff0d70058bf752d7b5aa2e2ccc864a9"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/76f88650763a35cbf1384c65d66d096fa31cc58d"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a65f49b6f7ece756394f8f0e85570020e7fd0e35"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e483da960892c41fa7f0cf0d2fc2410d65a483d6"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e8a916579e427af32f2de8213dfa23c5df6e6664"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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