fkie_cve-2025-24888
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd
Published
2025-02-13 18:18
Modified
2025-02-13 18:18
Severity ?
Summary
The SecureDrop Client is a desktop application for journalists to communicate with sources and work with submissions on the SecureDrop Workstation. Prior to version 0.14.1, a malicious SecureDrop Server could obtain code execution on the SecureDrop Client virtual machine (`sd-app`). SecureDrop Server itself has multiple layers of built-in hardening, and is a dedicated physical machine exposed on the internet only via Tor hidden services for the Source and Journalist interfaces, and optionally via remote SSH access over another Tor hidden service. A newsroom's SecureDrop Workstation communicates only with its own dedicated SecureDrop Server.
The SecureDrop Client runs in a dedicated Qubes virtual machine, named `sd-app`, as part of the SecureDrop Workstation. The private OpenPGP key used to decrypt submissions and replies is stored in a separate virtual machine and never accessed directly. The vulnerability lies in the code responsible for downloading replies. The filename of the reply is obtained from the `Content-Disposition` HTTP header and used to write the encrypted reply on disk. Note that filenames are generated and sanitized server-side, and files are downloaded in an encrypted format, so a remote attacker who has not achieved server compromise, such as one posing as a source, could not craft the HTTP response necessary for this attack.
While the filename is later checked to guard against path traversal before being moved into the Client’s data storage directory, the file has already been written to a potentially arbitrary location. In this case, `safe_move()` would detect the path traversal and fail, leaving the original downloaded file in the attacker-chosen directory. Code execution can be gained by writing an autostart file in `/home/user/.config/autostart/`.
Version 0.14.1 fixes the issue. As of time of publication, there is no known evidence of exploitation in the wild. This attack requires a previously compromised SecureDrop Server.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The SecureDrop Client is a desktop application for journalists to communicate with sources and work with submissions on the SecureDrop Workstation. Prior to version 0.14.1, a malicious SecureDrop Server could obtain code execution on the SecureDrop Client virtual machine (`sd-app`). SecureDrop Server itself has multiple layers of built-in hardening, and is a dedicated physical machine exposed on the internet only via Tor hidden services for the Source and Journalist interfaces, and optionally via remote SSH access over another Tor hidden service. A newsroom\u0027s SecureDrop Workstation communicates only with its own dedicated SecureDrop Server.\n\nThe SecureDrop Client runs in a dedicated Qubes virtual machine, named `sd-app`, as part of the SecureDrop Workstation. The private OpenPGP key used to decrypt submissions and replies is stored in a separate virtual machine and never accessed directly. The vulnerability lies in the code responsible for downloading replies. The filename of the reply is obtained from the `Content-Disposition` HTTP header and used to write the encrypted reply on disk. Note that filenames are generated and sanitized server-side, and files are downloaded in an encrypted format, so a remote attacker who has not achieved server compromise, such as one posing as a source, could not craft the HTTP response necessary for this attack.\n\nWhile the filename is later checked to guard against path traversal before being moved into the Client\u2019s data storage directory, the file has already been written to a potentially arbitrary location. In this case, `safe_move()` would detect the path traversal and fail, leaving the original downloaded file in the attacker-chosen directory. Code execution can be gained by writing an autostart file in `/home/user/.config/autostart/`.\n\nVersion 0.14.1 fixes the issue. As of time of publication, there is no known evidence of exploitation in the wild. This attack requires a previously compromised SecureDrop Server."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "SecureDrop Client es una aplicaci\u00f3n de escritorio para que los periodistas se comuniquen con las fuentes y trabajen con los env\u00edos en la Estaci\u00f3n de trabajo SecureDrop. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 0.14.1, un Servidor SecureDrop malicioso pod\u00eda obtener la ejecuci\u00f3n de c\u00f3digo en la m\u00e1quina virtual del Cliente SecureDrop (`sd-app`). El Servidor SecureDrop en s\u00ed tiene m\u00faltiples capas de protecci\u00f3n integradas y es una m\u00e1quina f\u00edsica dedicada expuesta en Internet solo a trav\u00e9s de servicios ocultos de Tor para las interfaces de Fuente y Periodista, y opcionalmente a trav\u00e9s de acceso SSH remoto a trav\u00e9s de otro servicio oculto de Tor. La Estaci\u00f3n de trabajo SecureDrop de una sala de redacci\u00f3n se comunica solo con su propio Servidor SecureDrop dedicado. El Cliente SecureDrop se ejecuta en una m\u00e1quina virtual Qubes dedicada, llamada `sd-app`, como parte de la Estaci\u00f3n de trabajo SecureDrop. La clave privada OpenPGP utilizada para descifrar los env\u00edos y las respuestas se almacena en una m\u00e1quina virtual separada y nunca se accede a ella directamente. La vulnerabilidad reside en el c\u00f3digo responsable de descargar las respuestas. El nombre de archivo de la respuesta se obtiene del encabezado HTTP `Content-Disposition` y se utiliza para escribir la respuesta cifrada en el disco. Tenga en cuenta que los nombres de archivo se generan y se depuran en el servidor, y los archivos se descargan en un formato cifrado, por lo que un atacante remoto que no haya logrado comprometer el servidor, como uno que se haga pasar por una fuente, no podr\u00eda manipular la respuesta HTTP necesaria para este ataque. Si bien el nombre de archivo se verifica m\u00e1s tarde para protegerse contra el path traversal antes de moverlo al directorio de almacenamiento de datos del cliente, el archivo ya se ha escrito en una ubicaci\u00f3n potencialmente arbitraria. En este caso, `safe_move()` detectar\u00eda el path traversal y fallar\u00eda, dejando el archivo descargado original en el directorio elegido por el atacante. La ejecuci\u00f3n del c\u00f3digo se puede obtener escribiendo un archivo de inicio autom\u00e1tico en `/home/user/.config/autostart/`. La versi\u00f3n 0.14.1 corrige el problema. Al momento de la publicaci\u00f3n, no hay evidencia conocida de explotaci\u00f3n en la naturaleza. Este ataque requiere un servidor SecureDrop previamente comprometido."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-24888",
"lastModified": "2025-02-13T18:18:23.047",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.1,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.2,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2025-02-13T18:18:23.047",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/freedomofpress/securedrop-client/blob/0.14.0/client/securedrop_client/utils.py#L79"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/freedomofpress/securedrop-client/blob/main/client/securedrop_client/api_jobs/downloads.py#L164"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/freedomofpress/securedrop-client/blob/release/0.14.0/client/securedrop_client/sdk/__init__.py#L956-L957"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/freedomofpress/securedrop-client/commit/120bac14649db0bcf5f24f2eb82731c76843b1ba"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/freedomofpress/securedrop-client/security/advisories/GHSA-6c3p-chq6-q3j2"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/split-gpg"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-22"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
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