fkie_cve-2025-21756
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd
Published
2025-02-27 03:15
Modified
2025-02-27 19:15
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vsock: Keep the binding until socket destruction Preserve sockets bindings; this includes both resulting from an explicit bind() and those implicitly bound through autobind during connect(). Prevents socket unbinding during a transport reassignment, which fixes a use-after-free: 1. vsock_create() (refcnt=1) calls vsock_insert_unbound() (refcnt=2) 2. transport->release() calls vsock_remove_bound() without checking if sk was bound and moved to bound list (refcnt=1) 3. vsock_bind() assumes sk is in unbound list and before __vsock_insert_bound(vsock_bound_sockets()) calls __vsock_remove_bound() which does: list_del_init(&vsk->bound_table); // nop sock_put(&vsk->sk); // refcnt=0 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __vsock_bind+0x62e/0x730 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88816b46a74c by task a.out/2057 dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x90 print_report+0x174/0x4f6 kasan_report+0xb9/0x190 __vsock_bind+0x62e/0x730 vsock_bind+0x97/0xe0 __sys_bind+0x154/0x1f0 __x64_sys_bind+0x6e/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x93/0x1b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Allocated by task 2057: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x85/0x90 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x131/0x450 sk_prot_alloc+0x5b/0x220 sk_alloc+0x2c/0x870 __vsock_create.constprop.0+0x2e/0xb60 vsock_create+0xe4/0x420 __sock_create+0x241/0x650 __sys_socket+0xf2/0x1a0 __x64_sys_socket+0x6e/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x93/0x1b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Freed by task 2057: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x37/0x60 __kasan_slab_free+0x4b/0x70 kmem_cache_free+0x1a1/0x590 __sk_destruct+0x388/0x5a0 __vsock_bind+0x5e1/0x730 vsock_bind+0x97/0xe0 __sys_bind+0x154/0x1f0 __x64_sys_bind+0x6e/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x93/0x1b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 2057 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xce/0x150 RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xce/0x150 __vsock_bind+0x66d/0x730 vsock_bind+0x97/0xe0 __sys_bind+0x154/0x1f0 __x64_sys_bind+0x6e/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x93/0x1b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 2057 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xee/0x150 RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xee/0x150 vsock_remove_bound+0x187/0x1e0 __vsock_release+0x383/0x4a0 vsock_release+0x90/0x120 __sock_release+0xa3/0x250 sock_close+0x14/0x20 __fput+0x359/0xa80 task_work_run+0x107/0x1d0 do_exit+0x847/0x2560 do_group_exit+0xb8/0x250 __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3a/0x50 x64_sys_call+0xfec/0x14f0 do_syscall_64+0x93/0x1b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version



{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvsock: Keep the binding until socket destruction\n\nPreserve sockets bindings; this includes both resulting from an explicit\nbind() and those implicitly bound through autobind during connect().\n\nPrevents socket unbinding during a transport reassignment, which fixes a\nuse-after-free:\n\n    1. vsock_create() (refcnt=1) calls vsock_insert_unbound() (refcnt=2)\n    2. transport-\u003erelease() calls vsock_remove_bound() without checking if\n       sk was bound and moved to bound list (refcnt=1)\n    3. vsock_bind() assumes sk is in unbound list and before\n       __vsock_insert_bound(vsock_bound_sockets()) calls\n       __vsock_remove_bound() which does:\n           list_del_init(\u0026vsk-\u003ebound_table); // nop\n           sock_put(\u0026vsk-\u003esk);               // refcnt=0\n\nBUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __vsock_bind+0x62e/0x730\nRead of size 4 at addr ffff88816b46a74c by task a.out/2057\n dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x90\n print_report+0x174/0x4f6\n kasan_report+0xb9/0x190\n __vsock_bind+0x62e/0x730\n vsock_bind+0x97/0xe0\n __sys_bind+0x154/0x1f0\n __x64_sys_bind+0x6e/0xb0\n do_syscall_64+0x93/0x1b0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n\nAllocated by task 2057:\n kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40\n kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30\n __kasan_slab_alloc+0x85/0x90\n kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x131/0x450\n sk_prot_alloc+0x5b/0x220\n sk_alloc+0x2c/0x870\n __vsock_create.constprop.0+0x2e/0xb60\n vsock_create+0xe4/0x420\n __sock_create+0x241/0x650\n __sys_socket+0xf2/0x1a0\n __x64_sys_socket+0x6e/0xb0\n do_syscall_64+0x93/0x1b0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n\nFreed by task 2057:\n kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40\n kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30\n kasan_save_free_info+0x37/0x60\n __kasan_slab_free+0x4b/0x70\n kmem_cache_free+0x1a1/0x590\n __sk_destruct+0x388/0x5a0\n __vsock_bind+0x5e1/0x730\n vsock_bind+0x97/0xe0\n __sys_bind+0x154/0x1f0\n __x64_sys_bind+0x6e/0xb0\n do_syscall_64+0x93/0x1b0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n\nrefcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.\nWARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 2057 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xce/0x150\nRIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xce/0x150\n __vsock_bind+0x66d/0x730\n vsock_bind+0x97/0xe0\n __sys_bind+0x154/0x1f0\n __x64_sys_bind+0x6e/0xb0\n do_syscall_64+0x93/0x1b0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n\nrefcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.\nWARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 2057 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xee/0x150\nRIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xee/0x150\n vsock_remove_bound+0x187/0x1e0\n __vsock_release+0x383/0x4a0\n vsock_release+0x90/0x120\n __sock_release+0xa3/0x250\n sock_close+0x14/0x20\n __fput+0x359/0xa80\n task_work_run+0x107/0x1d0\n do_exit+0x847/0x2560\n do_group_exit+0xb8/0x250\n __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3a/0x50\n x64_sys_call+0xfec/0x14f0\n do_syscall_64+0x93/0x1b0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e"
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: vsock: Mantener la vinculaci\u00f3n hasta la destrucci\u00f3n del socket Preservar las vinculaciones de los sockets; esto incluye tanto las resultantes de un bind() expl\u00edcito como las vinculadas impl\u00edcitamente a trav\u00e9s de autobind durante connect(). Evita la desvinculaci\u00f3n de sockets durante una reasignaci\u00f3n de transporte, lo que soluciona un use after free: 1. vsock_create() (refcnt=1) calls vsock_insert_unbound() (refcnt=2) 2. transport-\u0026gt;release() calls vsock_remove_bound() without checking if sk was bound and moved to bound list (refcnt=1) 3. vsock_bind() assumes sk is in unbound list and before __vsock_insert_bound(vsock_bound_sockets()) calls __vsock_remove_bound() which does: list_del_init(\u0026amp;vsk-\u0026gt;bound_table); // nop sock_put(\u0026amp;vsk-\u0026gt;sk); // refcnt=0 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __vsock_bind+0x62e/0x730 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88816b46a74c by task a.out/2057 dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x90 print_report+0x174/0x4f6 kasan_report+0xb9/0x190 __vsock_bind+0x62e/0x730 vsock_bind+0x97/0xe0 __sys_bind+0x154/0x1f0 __x64_sys_bind+0x6e/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x93/0x1b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Allocated by task 2057: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x85/0x90 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x131/0x450 sk_prot_alloc+0x5b/0x220 sk_alloc+0x2c/0x870 __vsock_create.constprop.0+0x2e/0xb60 vsock_create+0xe4/0x420 __sock_create+0x241/0x650 __sys_socket+0xf2/0x1a0 __x64_sys_socket+0x6e/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x93/0x1b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Freed by task 2057: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x37/0x60 __kasan_slab_free+0x4b/0x70 kmem_cache_free+0x1a1/0x590 __sk_destruct+0x388/0x5a0 __vsock_bind+0x5e1/0x730 vsock_bind+0x97/0xe0 __sys_bind+0x154/0x1f0 __x64_sys_bind+0x6e/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x93/0x1b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 2057 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xce/0x150 RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xce/0x150 __vsock_bind+0x66d/0x730 vsock_bind+0x97/0xe0 __sys_bind+0x154/0x1f0 __x64_sys_bind+0x6e/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x93/0x1b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 2057 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xee/0x150 RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xee/0x150 vsock_remove_bound+0x187/0x1e0 __vsock_release+0x383/0x4a0 vsock_release+0x90/0x120 __sock_release+0xa3/0x250 sock_close+0x14/0x20 __fput+0x359/0xa80 task_work_run+0x107/0x1d0 do_exit+0x847/0x2560 do_group_exit+0xb8/0x250 __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3a/0x50 x64_sys_call+0xfec/0x14f0 do_syscall_64+0x93/0x1b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e "
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2025-21756",
  "lastModified": "2025-02-27T19:15:50.513",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 7.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2025-02-27T03:15:16.250",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3f43540166128951cc1be7ab1ce6b7f05c670d8b"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/645ce25aa0e67895b11d89f27bb86c9d444c40f8"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b1afd40321f1c243cffbcf40ea7ca41aca87fa5e"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fcdd2242c0231032fc84e1404315c245ae56322a"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-416"
        }
      ],
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}


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