fkie_cve-2024-53218
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd
Published
2024-12-27 14:15
Modified
2025-02-11 16:15
Severity ?
7.8 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: fix race in concurrent f2fs_stop_gc_thread In my test case, concurrent calls to f2fs shutdown report the following stack trace: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xc6cfff63bb5513fc: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 678 Comm: f2fs_rep_shutdo Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5-next-20241029-g6fb2fa9805c5-dirty #85 Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_regs+0x8b/0xa0 ? __die_body+0x26/0xa0 ? die_addr+0x54/0x90 ? exc_general_protection+0x24b/0x5c0 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30 ? kthread_stop+0x46/0x390 f2fs_stop_gc_thread+0x6c/0x110 f2fs_do_shutdown+0x309/0x3a0 f2fs_ioc_shutdown+0x150/0x1c0 __f2fs_ioctl+0xffd/0x2ac0 f2fs_ioctl+0x76/0xe0 vfs_ioctl+0x23/0x60 __x64_sys_ioctl+0xce/0xf0 x64_sys_call+0x2b1b/0x4540 do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e The root cause is a race condition in f2fs_stop_gc_thread() called from different f2fs shutdown paths: [CPU0] [CPU1] ---------------------- ----------------------- f2fs_stop_gc_thread f2fs_stop_gc_thread gc_th = sbi->gc_thread gc_th = sbi->gc_thread kfree(gc_th) sbi->gc_thread = NULL < gc_th != NULL > kthread_stop(gc_th->f2fs_gc_task) //UAF The commit c7f114d864ac ("f2fs: fix to avoid use-after-free in f2fs_stop_gc_thread()") attempted to fix this issue by using a read semaphore to prevent races between shutdown and remount threads, but it fails to prevent all race conditions. Fix it by converting to write lock of s_umount in f2fs_do_shutdown().
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/60457ed6c67625c87861f96912b4179dc2293896
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/794fa8792d4eacac191f1cbcc2e81b7369e4662a
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7b0033dbc48340a1c1c3f12448ba17d6587ca092
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c631207897a9b3d41167ceca58e07f8f94720e42
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version


To clipboard 

{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nf2fs: fix race in concurrent f2fs_stop_gc_thread\n\nIn my test case, concurrent calls to f2fs shutdown report the following\nstack trace:\n\n Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xc6cfff63bb5513fc: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI\n CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 678 Comm: f2fs_rep_shutdo Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5-next-20241029-g6fb2fa9805c5-dirty #85\n Call Trace:\n  \u003cTASK\u003e\n  ? show_regs+0x8b/0xa0\n  ? __die_body+0x26/0xa0\n  ? die_addr+0x54/0x90\n  ? exc_general_protection+0x24b/0x5c0\n  ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30\n  ? kthread_stop+0x46/0x390\n  f2fs_stop_gc_thread+0x6c/0x110\n  f2fs_do_shutdown+0x309/0x3a0\n  f2fs_ioc_shutdown+0x150/0x1c0\n  __f2fs_ioctl+0xffd/0x2ac0\n  f2fs_ioctl+0x76/0xe0\n  vfs_ioctl+0x23/0x60\n  __x64_sys_ioctl+0xce/0xf0\n  x64_sys_call+0x2b1b/0x4540\n  do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x240\n  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n\nThe root cause is a race condition in f2fs_stop_gc_thread() called from\ndifferent f2fs shutdown paths:\n\n  [CPU0]                       [CPU1]\n  ----------------------       -----------------------\n  f2fs_stop_gc_thread          f2fs_stop_gc_thread\n                                 gc_th = sbi-\u003egc_thread\n    gc_th = sbi-\u003egc_thread\n    kfree(gc_th)\n    sbi-\u003egc_thread = NULL\n                                 \u003c gc_th != NULL \u003e\n                                 kthread_stop(gc_th-\u003ef2fs_gc_task) //UAF\n\nThe commit c7f114d864ac (\"f2fs: fix to avoid use-after-free in\nf2fs_stop_gc_thread()\") attempted to fix this issue by using a read\nsemaphore to prevent races between shutdown and remount threads, but\nit fails to prevent all race conditions.\n\nFix it by converting to write lock of s_umount in f2fs_do_shutdown()."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: f2fs: corregir ejecuci\u00f3n en f2fs_stop_gc_thread concurrente En mi caso de prueba, las llamadas concurrentes a f2fs shutdown informan el siguiente seguimiento de pila: Oops: error de protecci\u00f3n general, probablemente para direcci\u00f3n no can\u00f3nica 0xc6cfff63bb5513fc: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 678 Comm: f2fs_rep_shutdo No contaminado 6.12.0-rc5-next-20241029-g6fb2fa9805c5-dirty #85 Seguimiento de llamada:  ? show_regs+0x8b/0xa0 ? __die_body+0x26/0xa0 ? die_addr+0x54/0x90 ? exc_proteccion_general+0x24b/0x5c0 ? asm_exc_proteccion_general+0x26/0x30 ? kthread_stop+0x46/0x390 f2fs_stop_gc_thread+0x6c/0x110 f2fs_do_shutdown+0x309/0x3a0 f2fs_ioc_shutdown+0x150/0x1c0 __f2fs_ioctl+0xffd/0x2ac0 f2fs_ioctl+0x76/0xe0 vfs_ioctl+0x23/0x60 __x64_sys_ioctl+0xce/0xf0 x64_sys_call+0x2b1b/0x4540 do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e La causa ra\u00edz es una condici\u00f3n de ejecuci\u00f3n en f2fs_stop_gc_thread() llamado desde diferentes rutas de apagado de f2fs: [CPU0] [CPU1] ---------------------- ----------------------- f2fs_stop_gc_thread f2fs_stop_gc_thread gc_th = sbi-\u0026gt;gc_thread gc_th = sbi-\u0026gt;gc_thread kfree(gc_th) sbi-\u0026gt;gc_thread = NULL \u0026lt; gc_th != NULL \u0026gt; kthread_stop(gc_th-\u0026gt;f2fs_gc_task) //UAF el commit c7f114d864ac (\"f2fs: correcci\u00f3n para evitar el use-after-free en f2fs_stop_gc_thread()\") intent\u00f3 corregir este problema al usar un sem\u00e1foro de lectura para evitar ejecuciones entre los subprocesos de apagado y remontaje, pero no logra evitar todas las condiciones de ejecuciones. Arr\u00e9glelo convirtiendo en bloqueo de escritura s_umount en f2fs_do_shutdown()."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2024-53218",
  "lastModified": "2025-02-11T16:15:42.170",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 7.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2024-12-27T14:15:29.840",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/60457ed6c67625c87861f96912b4179dc2293896"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/794fa8792d4eacac191f1cbcc2e81b7369e4662a"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7b0033dbc48340a1c1c3f12448ba17d6587ca092"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c631207897a9b3d41167ceca58e07f8f94720e42"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-416"
        }
      ],
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Sightings

Author Source Type Date

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
  • Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.