fkie_cve-2024-41051
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd
Published
2024-07-29 15:15
Modified
2024-11-21 09:32
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cachefiles: wait for ondemand_object_worker to finish when dropping object When queuing ondemand_object_worker() to re-open the object, cachefiles_object is not pinned. The cachefiles_object may be freed when the pending read request is completed intentionally and the related erofs is umounted. If ondemand_object_worker() runs after the object is freed, it will incur use-after-free problem as shown below. process A processs B process C process D cachefiles_ondemand_send_req() // send a read req X // wait for its completion // close ondemand fd cachefiles_ondemand_fd_release() // set object as CLOSE cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read() // set object as REOPENING queue_work(fscache_wq, &info->ondemand_work) // close /dev/cachefiles cachefiles_daemon_release cachefiles_flush_reqs complete(&req->done) // read req X is completed // umount the erofs fs cachefiles_put_object() // object will be freed cachefiles_ondemand_deinit_obj_info() kmem_cache_free(object) // both info and object are freed ondemand_object_worker() When dropping an object, it is no longer necessary to reopen the object, so use cancel_work_sync() to cancel or wait for ondemand_object_worker() to finish.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version



{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncachefiles: wait for ondemand_object_worker to finish when dropping object\n\nWhen queuing ondemand_object_worker() to re-open the object,\ncachefiles_object is not pinned. The cachefiles_object may be freed when\nthe pending read request is completed intentionally and the related\nerofs is umounted. If ondemand_object_worker() runs after the object is\nfreed, it will incur use-after-free problem as shown below.\n\nprocess A  processs B  process C  process D\n\ncachefiles_ondemand_send_req()\n// send a read req X\n// wait for its completion\n\n           // close ondemand fd\n           cachefiles_ondemand_fd_release()\n           // set object as CLOSE\n\n                       cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read()\n                       // set object as REOPENING\n                       queue_work(fscache_wq, \u0026info-\u003eondemand_work)\n\n                                // close /dev/cachefiles\n                                cachefiles_daemon_release\n                                cachefiles_flush_reqs\n                                complete(\u0026req-\u003edone)\n\n// read req X is completed\n// umount the erofs fs\ncachefiles_put_object()\n// object will be freed\ncachefiles_ondemand_deinit_obj_info()\nkmem_cache_free(object)\n                       // both info and object are freed\n                       ondemand_object_worker()\n\nWhen dropping an object, it is no longer necessary to reopen the object,\nso use cancel_work_sync() to cancel or wait for ondemand_object_worker()\nto finish."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: cachefiles: espere a que finalice ondemand_object_worker al soltar el objeto Al poner en cola ondemand_object_worker() para volver a abrir el objeto, cachefiles_object no est\u00e1 fijado. El objeto cachefiles_object se puede liberar cuando la solicitud de lectura pendiente se completa intencionalmente y se desmontan los erofs relacionados. Si ondemand_object_worker() se ejecuta despu\u00e9s de liberar el objeto, incurrir\u00e1 en un problema de use after free como se muestra a continuaci\u00f3n. proceso A procesos B proceso C proceso D cachefiles_ondemand_send_req() // env\u00eda una solicitud de lectura X // espera a que se complete // cierra ondemand fd cachefiles_ondemand_fd_release() // establece el objeto como CERRAR cachefiles_ondemand_daemon_read() // establece el objeto como REAPERTURA queue_work(fscache_wq , \u0026amp;info-\u0026gt;ondemand_work) // cerrar /dev/cachefiles cachefiles_daemon_release cachefiles_flush_reqs complete(\u0026amp;req-\u0026gt;done) // leer la solicitud X est\u00e1 completa // desmontar el erofs fs cachefiles_put_object() // el objeto ser\u00e1 liberado cachefiles_ondemand_deinit_obj_info() kmem_cache_free(object ) // tanto la informaci\u00f3n como el objeto se liberan ondemand_object_worker() Cuando se suelta un objeto, ya no es necesario volver a abrirlo, as\u00ed que use cancel_work_sync() para cancelar o espere a que finalice ondemand_object_worker()."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2024-41051",
  "lastModified": "2024-11-21T09:32:08.613",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2024-07-29T15:15:13.327",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/12e009d60852f7bce0afc373ca0b320f14150418"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b26525b2183632f16a3a4108fe6a4bfa8afac6ed"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d3179bae72b1b5e555ba839d6d9f40a350a4d78a"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ec9289369259d982e735a71437e32e6b4035290c"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/12e009d60852f7bce0afc373ca0b320f14150418"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b26525b2183632f16a3a4108fe6a4bfa8afac6ed"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d3179bae72b1b5e555ba839d6d9f40a350a4d78a"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ec9289369259d982e735a71437e32e6b4035290c"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}


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