fkie_cve-2024-38610
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd
Published
2024-06-19 14:15
Modified
2024-11-21 09:26
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drivers/virt/acrn: fix PFNMAP PTE checks in acrn_vm_ram_map() Patch series "mm: follow_pte() improvements and acrn follow_pte() fixes". Patch #1 fixes a bunch of issues I spotted in the acrn driver. It compiles, that's all I know. I'll appreciate some review and testing from acrn folks. Patch #2+#3 improve follow_pte(), passing a VMA instead of the MM, adding more sanity checks, and improving the documentation. Gave it a quick test on x86-64 using VM_PAT that ends up using follow_pte(). This patch (of 3): We currently miss handling various cases, resulting in a dangerous follow_pte() (previously follow_pfn()) usage. (1) We're not checking PTE write permissions. Maybe we should simply always require pte_write() like we do for pin_user_pages_fast(FOLL_WRITE)? Hard to tell, so let's check for ACRN_MEM_ACCESS_WRITE for now. (2) We're not rejecting refcounted pages. As we are not using MMU notifiers, messing with refcounted pages is dangerous and can result in use-after-free. Let's make sure to reject them. (3) We are only looking at the first PTE of a bigger range. We only lookup a single PTE, but memmap->len may span a larger area. Let's loop over all involved PTEs and make sure the PFN range is actually contiguous. Reject everything else: it couldn't have worked either way, and rather made use access PFNs we shouldn't be accessing.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version



{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrivers/virt/acrn: fix PFNMAP PTE checks in acrn_vm_ram_map()\n\nPatch series \"mm: follow_pte() improvements and acrn follow_pte() fixes\".\n\nPatch #1 fixes a bunch of issues I spotted in the acrn driver.  It\ncompiles, that\u0027s all I know.  I\u0027ll appreciate some review and testing from\nacrn folks.\n\nPatch #2+#3 improve follow_pte(), passing a VMA instead of the MM, adding\nmore sanity checks, and improving the documentation.  Gave it a quick test\non x86-64 using VM_PAT that ends up using follow_pte().\n\n\nThis patch (of 3):\n\nWe currently miss handling various cases, resulting in a dangerous\nfollow_pte() (previously follow_pfn()) usage.\n\n(1) We\u0027re not checking PTE write permissions.\n\nMaybe we should simply always require pte_write() like we do for\npin_user_pages_fast(FOLL_WRITE)? Hard to tell, so let\u0027s check for\nACRN_MEM_ACCESS_WRITE for now.\n\n(2) We\u0027re not rejecting refcounted pages.\n\nAs we are not using MMU notifiers, messing with refcounted pages is\ndangerous and can result in use-after-free. Let\u0027s make sure to reject them.\n\n(3) We are only looking at the first PTE of a bigger range.\n\nWe only lookup a single PTE, but memmap-\u003elen may span a larger area.\nLet\u0027s loop over all involved PTEs and make sure the PFN range is\nactually contiguous. Reject everything else: it couldn\u0027t have worked\neither way, and rather made use access PFNs we shouldn\u0027t be accessing."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: drivers/virt/acrn: corrige las comprobaciones de PFNMAP PTE en acrn_vm_ram_map() Serie de parches \"mm: mejoras en follow_pte() y correcciones en acrn follow_pte()\". El parche n.\u00ba 1 soluciona varios problemas que detect\u00e9 en el controlador acrn. Se compila, eso es todo lo que s\u00e9. Apreciar\u00e9 algunas revisiones y pruebas por parte de la gente de acrn. El parche #2+#3 mejora follow_pte(), pasa un VMA en lugar del MM, agrega m\u00e1s controles de cordura y mejora la documentaci\u00f3n. Lo prob\u00e9 r\u00e1pidamente en x86-64 usando VM_PAT y termin\u00f3 usando follow_pte(). Este parche (de 3): Actualmente no manejamos varios casos, lo que resulta en un uso peligroso de follow_pte() (anteriormente follow_pfn()). (1) No estamos verificando los permisos de escritura de PTE. \u00bfQuiz\u00e1s simplemente deber\u00edamos requerir siempre pte_write() como lo hacemos para pin_user_pages_fast(FOLL_WRITE)? Es dif\u00edcil saberlo, as\u00ed que busquemos ACRN_MEM_ACCESS_WRITE por ahora. (2) No rechazamos p\u00e1ginas recontadas. Como no utilizamos notificadores MMU, jugar con p\u00e1ginas descontadas es peligroso y puede resultar en use-after-free. Asegur\u00e9monos de rechazarlos. (3) S\u00f3lo estamos ante el primer PTE de una gama mayor. Solo buscamos una PTE, pero memmap-\u0026gt;len puede abarcar un \u00e1rea m\u00e1s grande. Recorramos todos los PTE involucrados y asegur\u00e9monos de que el rango de PFN sea realmente contiguo. Rechace todo lo dem\u00e1s: no podr\u00eda haber funcionado de ninguna manera, y m\u00e1s bien utiliz\u00f3 PFN de acceso a los que no deber\u00edamos acceder."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2024-38610",
  "lastModified": "2024-11-21T09:26:28.660",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2024-06-19T14:15:20.893",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2c8d6e24930b8ef7d4a81787627c559ae0e0d3bb"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3d6586008f7b638f91f3332602592caa8b00b559"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4c4ba3cf3a15ccfbaf787d0296fa42cdb00da9b4"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5c6705aa47b5b78d7ad36fea832bb69caa5bf49a"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/afeb0e69627695f759fc73c39c1640dbf8649b32"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e873f36ec890bece26ecce850e969917bceebbb6"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2c8d6e24930b8ef7d4a81787627c559ae0e0d3bb"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3d6586008f7b638f91f3332602592caa8b00b559"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4c4ba3cf3a15ccfbaf787d0296fa42cdb00da9b4"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5c6705aa47b5b78d7ad36fea832bb69caa5bf49a"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/afeb0e69627695f759fc73c39c1640dbf8649b32"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e873f36ec890bece26ecce850e969917bceebbb6"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}


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