fkie_cve-2023-54323
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd
Published
2025-12-30 13:16
Modified
2025-12-30 13:16
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cxl/pmem: Fix nvdimm registration races A loop of the form: while true; do modprobe cxl_pci; modprobe -r cxl_pci; done ...fails with the following crash signature: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000040 [..] RIP: 0010:cxl_internal_send_cmd+0x5/0xb0 [cxl_core] [..] Call Trace: <TASK> cxl_pmem_ctl+0x121/0x240 [cxl_pmem] nvdimm_get_config_data+0xd6/0x1a0 [libnvdimm] nd_label_data_init+0x135/0x7e0 [libnvdimm] nvdimm_probe+0xd6/0x1c0 [libnvdimm] nvdimm_bus_probe+0x7a/0x1e0 [libnvdimm] really_probe+0xde/0x380 __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x170 driver_probe_device+0x1f/0x90 __device_attach_driver+0x85/0x110 bus_for_each_drv+0x7d/0xc0 __device_attach+0xb4/0x1e0 bus_probe_device+0x9f/0xc0 device_add+0x445/0x9c0 nd_async_device_register+0xe/0x40 [libnvdimm] async_run_entry_fn+0x30/0x130 ...namely that the bottom half of async nvdimm device registration runs after the CXL has already torn down the context that cxl_pmem_ctl() needs. Unlike the ACPI NFIT case that benefits from launching multiple nvdimm device registrations in parallel from those listed in the table, CXL is already marked PROBE_PREFER_ASYNCHRONOUS. So provide for a synchronous registration path to preclude this scenario.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/18c65667fa9104780eeaa0dc1bc240f0c2094772
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a371788d4f4a7f59eecd22644331d599979fd283
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f57aec443c24d2e8e1f3b5b4856aea12ddda4254
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version


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{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncxl/pmem: Fix nvdimm registration races\n\nA loop of the form:\n\n    while true; do modprobe cxl_pci; modprobe -r cxl_pci; done\n\n...fails with the following crash signature:\n\n    BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000040\n    [..]\n    RIP: 0010:cxl_internal_send_cmd+0x5/0xb0 [cxl_core]\n    [..]\n    Call Trace:\n     \u003cTASK\u003e\n     cxl_pmem_ctl+0x121/0x240 [cxl_pmem]\n     nvdimm_get_config_data+0xd6/0x1a0 [libnvdimm]\n     nd_label_data_init+0x135/0x7e0 [libnvdimm]\n     nvdimm_probe+0xd6/0x1c0 [libnvdimm]\n     nvdimm_bus_probe+0x7a/0x1e0 [libnvdimm]\n     really_probe+0xde/0x380\n     __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x170\n     driver_probe_device+0x1f/0x90\n     __device_attach_driver+0x85/0x110\n     bus_for_each_drv+0x7d/0xc0\n     __device_attach+0xb4/0x1e0\n     bus_probe_device+0x9f/0xc0\n     device_add+0x445/0x9c0\n     nd_async_device_register+0xe/0x40 [libnvdimm]\n     async_run_entry_fn+0x30/0x130\n\n...namely that the bottom half of async nvdimm device registration runs\nafter the CXL has already torn down the context that cxl_pmem_ctl()\nneeds. Unlike the ACPI NFIT case that benefits from launching multiple\nnvdimm device registrations in parallel from those listed in the table,\nCXL is already marked PROBE_PREFER_ASYNCHRONOUS. So provide for a\nsynchronous registration path to preclude this scenario."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2023-54323",
  "lastModified": "2025-12-30T13:16:21.627",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2025-12-30T13:16:21.627",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/18c65667fa9104780eeaa0dc1bc240f0c2094772"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a371788d4f4a7f59eecd22644331d599979fd283"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f57aec443c24d2e8e1f3b5b4856aea12ddda4254"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}


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