fkie_cve-2023-54253
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd
Published
2025-12-30 13:16
Modified
2025-12-31 20:42
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: set page extent mapped after read_folio in relocate_one_page One of the CI runs triggered the following panic assertion failed: PagePrivate(page) && page->private, in fs/btrfs/subpage.c:229 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/subpage.c:229! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP CPU: 0 PID: 923660 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 6.5.0-rc3+ #1 pstate: 61400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0 lr : btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0 sp : ffff800093213720 x29: ffff800093213720 x28: ffff8000932138b4 x27: 000000000c280000 x26: 00000001b5d00000 x25: 000000000c281000 x24: 000000000c281fff x23: 0000000000001000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffffff42b95bf880 x20: ffff42b9528e0000 x19: 0000000000001000 x18: ffffffffffffffff x17: 667274622f736620 x16: 6e69202c65746176 x15: 0000000000000028 x14: 0000000000000003 x13: 00000000002672d7 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: ffffcd3f0ccd9204 x10: ffffcd3f0554ae50 x9 : ffffcd3f0379528c x8 : ffff800093213428 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffffcd3f091771e8 x5 : ffff42b97f333948 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff42b9556cde80 x0 : 000000000000004f Call trace: btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0 btrfs_subpage_set_dirty+0x38/0xa0 btrfs_page_set_dirty+0x58/0x88 relocate_one_page+0x204/0x5f0 relocate_file_extent_cluster+0x11c/0x180 relocate_data_extent+0xd0/0xf8 relocate_block_group+0x3d0/0x4e8 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x2d8/0x490 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x54/0x1a8 btrfs_balance+0x7f4/0x1150 btrfs_ioctl+0x10f0/0x20b8 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x120/0x11d8 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x80/0xd8 do_el0_svc+0x6c/0x158 el0_svc+0x50/0x1b0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x130 el0t_64_sync+0x194/0x198 Code: 91098021 b0007fa0 91346000 97e9c6d2 (d4210000) This is the same problem outlined in 17b17fcd6d44 ("btrfs: set_page_extent_mapped after read_folio in btrfs_cont_expand") , and the fix is the same. I originally looked for the same pattern elsewhere in our code, but mistakenly skipped over this code because I saw the page cache readahead before we set_page_extent_mapped, not realizing that this was only in the !page case, that we can still end up with a !uptodate page and then do the btrfs_read_folio further down. The fix here is the same as the above mentioned patch, move the set_page_extent_mapped call to after the btrfs_read_folio() block to make sure that we have the subpage blocksize stuff setup properly before using the page.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/08daa38ca212d87f77beae839bc9be71079c7abf
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9d1e020ed9649cf140fcfafd052cfdcce9e9d67d
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e7f1326cc24e22b38afc3acd328480a1183f9e79
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version


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{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbtrfs: set page extent mapped after read_folio in relocate_one_page\n\nOne of the CI runs triggered the following panic\n\n  assertion failed: PagePrivate(page) \u0026\u0026 page-\u003eprivate, in fs/btrfs/subpage.c:229\n  ------------[ cut here ]------------\n  kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/subpage.c:229!\n  Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP\n  CPU: 0 PID: 923660 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 6.5.0-rc3+ #1\n  pstate: 61400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)\n  pc : btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0\n  lr : btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0\n  sp : ffff800093213720\n  x29: ffff800093213720 x28: ffff8000932138b4 x27: 000000000c280000\n  x26: 00000001b5d00000 x25: 000000000c281000 x24: 000000000c281fff\n  x23: 0000000000001000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffffff42b95bf880\n  x20: ffff42b9528e0000 x19: 0000000000001000 x18: ffffffffffffffff\n  x17: 667274622f736620 x16: 6e69202c65746176 x15: 0000000000000028\n  x14: 0000000000000003 x13: 00000000002672d7 x12: 0000000000000000\n  x11: ffffcd3f0ccd9204 x10: ffffcd3f0554ae50 x9 : ffffcd3f0379528c\n  x8 : ffff800093213428 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffffcd3f091771e8\n  x5 : ffff42b97f333948 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000\n  x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff42b9556cde80 x0 : 000000000000004f\n  Call trace:\n   btrfs_subpage_assert+0xbc/0xf0\n   btrfs_subpage_set_dirty+0x38/0xa0\n   btrfs_page_set_dirty+0x58/0x88\n   relocate_one_page+0x204/0x5f0\n   relocate_file_extent_cluster+0x11c/0x180\n   relocate_data_extent+0xd0/0xf8\n   relocate_block_group+0x3d0/0x4e8\n   btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x2d8/0x490\n   btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x54/0x1a8\n   btrfs_balance+0x7f4/0x1150\n   btrfs_ioctl+0x10f0/0x20b8\n   __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x120/0x11d8\n   invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x80/0xd8\n   do_el0_svc+0x6c/0x158\n   el0_svc+0x50/0x1b0\n   el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x130\n   el0t_64_sync+0x194/0x198\n  Code: 91098021 b0007fa0 91346000 97e9c6d2 (d4210000)\n\nThis is the same problem outlined in 17b17fcd6d44 (\"btrfs:\nset_page_extent_mapped after read_folio in btrfs_cont_expand\") , and the\nfix is the same.  I originally looked for the same pattern elsewhere in\nour code, but mistakenly skipped over this code because I saw the page\ncache readahead before we set_page_extent_mapped, not realizing that\nthis was only in the !page case, that we can still end up with a\n!uptodate page and then do the btrfs_read_folio further down.\n\nThe fix here is the same as the above mentioned patch, move the\nset_page_extent_mapped call to after the btrfs_read_folio() block to\nmake sure that we have the subpage blocksize stuff setup properly before\nusing the page."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2023-54253",
  "lastModified": "2025-12-31T20:42:43.210",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2025-12-30T13:16:13.997",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/08daa38ca212d87f77beae839bc9be71079c7abf"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9d1e020ed9649cf140fcfafd052cfdcce9e9d67d"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e7f1326cc24e22b38afc3acd328480a1183f9e79"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}


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