fkie_cve-2023-52478
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd
Published
2024-02-29 06:15
Modified
2025-01-10 18:27
Severity ?
4.7 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: logitech-hidpp: Fix kernel crash on receiver USB disconnect hidpp_connect_event() has *four* time-of-check vs time-of-use (TOCTOU) races when it races with itself. hidpp_connect_event() primarily runs from a workqueue but it also runs on probe() and if a "device-connected" packet is received by the hw when the thread running hidpp_connect_event() from probe() is waiting on the hw, then a second thread running hidpp_connect_event() will be started from the workqueue. This opens the following races (note the below code is simplified): 1. Retrieving + printing the protocol (harmless race): if (!hidpp->protocol_major) { hidpp_root_get_protocol_version() hidpp->protocol_major = response.rap.params[0]; } We can actually see this race hit in the dmesg in the abrt output attached to rhbz#2227968: [ 3064.624215] logitech-hidpp-device 0003:046D:4071.0049: HID++ 4.5 device connected. [ 3064.658184] logitech-hidpp-device 0003:046D:4071.0049: HID++ 4.5 device connected. Testing with extra logging added has shown that after this the 2 threads take turn grabbing the hw access mutex (send_mutex) so they ping-pong through all the other TOCTOU cases managing to hit all of them: 2. Updating the name to the HIDPP name (harmless race): if (hidpp->name == hdev->name) { ... hidpp->name = new_name; } 3. Initializing the power_supply class for the battery (problematic!): hidpp_initialize_battery() { if (hidpp->battery.ps) return 0; probe_battery(); /* Blocks, threads take turns executing this */ hidpp->battery.desc.properties = devm_kmemdup(dev, hidpp_battery_props, cnt, GFP_KERNEL); hidpp->battery.ps = devm_power_supply_register(&hidpp->hid_dev->dev, &hidpp->battery.desc, cfg); } 4. Creating delayed input_device (potentially problematic): if (hidpp->delayed_input) return; hidpp->delayed_input = hidpp_allocate_input(hdev); The really big problem here is 3. Hitting the race leads to the following sequence: hidpp->battery.desc.properties = devm_kmemdup(dev, hidpp_battery_props, cnt, GFP_KERNEL); hidpp->battery.ps = devm_power_supply_register(&hidpp->hid_dev->dev, &hidpp->battery.desc, cfg); ... hidpp->battery.desc.properties = devm_kmemdup(dev, hidpp_battery_props, cnt, GFP_KERNEL); hidpp->battery.ps = devm_power_supply_register(&hidpp->hid_dev->dev, &hidpp->battery.desc, cfg); So now we have registered 2 power supplies for the same battery, which looks a bit weird from userspace's pov but this is not even the really big problem. Notice how: 1. This is all devm-maganaged 2. The hidpp->battery.desc struct is shared between the 2 power supplies 3. hidpp->battery.desc.properties points to the result from the second devm_kmemdup() This causes a use after free scenario on USB disconnect of the receiver: 1. The last registered power supply class device gets unregistered 2. The memory from the last devm_kmemdup() call gets freed, hidpp->battery.desc.properties now points to freed memory 3. The first registered power supply class device gets unregistered, this involves sending a remove uevent to userspace which invokes power_supply_uevent() to fill the uevent data 4. power_supply_uevent() uses hidpp->battery.desc.properties which now points to freed memory leading to backtraces like this one: Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffb2140e017f08 ... Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: RIP: 0010:power_supply_uevent+0xee/0x1d0 ... Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: ? power_supply_uevent+0xee/0x1d0 Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: ? power_supply_uevent+0x10d/0x1d0 Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: dev_uevent+0x10f/0x2d0 Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: kobject_uevent_env+0x291/0x680 Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: ---truncated---
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/093af62c023537f097d2ebdfaa0bc7c1a6e874e1Patch
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/28ddc1e0b898291323b62d770b1b931de131a528Patch
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/44481b244fcaa2b895a53081d6204c574720c38cPatch
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ca0c4cc1d215dc22ab0e738c9f017c650f3183f5Patch
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cd0e2bf7fb22fe9b989c59c42dca06367fd10e6bPatch
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dac501397b9d81e4782232c39f94f4307b137452Patch
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f7b2c7d9831af99369fe8ad9b2a68d78942f414ePatch
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fd72ac9556a473fc7daf54efb6ca8a97180d621dPatch
af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/093af62c023537f097d2ebdfaa0bc7c1a6e874e1Patch
af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/28ddc1e0b898291323b62d770b1b931de131a528Patch
af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/44481b244fcaa2b895a53081d6204c574720c38cPatch
af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ca0c4cc1d215dc22ab0e738c9f017c650f3183f5Patch
af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cd0e2bf7fb22fe9b989c59c42dca06367fd10e6bPatch
af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dac501397b9d81e4782232c39f94f4307b137452Patch
af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f7b2c7d9831af99369fe8ad9b2a68d78942f414ePatch
af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fd72ac9556a473fc7daf54efb6ca8a97180d621dPatch
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
linux linux_kernel *
linux linux_kernel *
linux linux_kernel *
linux linux_kernel *
linux linux_kernel *
linux linux_kernel *
linux linux_kernel *
linux linux_kernel 6.6
linux linux_kernel 6.6
linux linux_kernel 6.6
linux linux_kernel 6.6
linux linux_kernel 6.6


To clipboard 

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  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nHID: logitech-hidpp: Fix kernel crash on receiver USB disconnect\n\nhidpp_connect_event() has *four* time-of-check vs time-of-use (TOCTOU)\nraces when it races with itself.\n\nhidpp_connect_event() primarily runs from a workqueue but it also runs\non probe() and if a \"device-connected\" packet is received by the hw\nwhen the thread running hidpp_connect_event() from probe() is waiting on\nthe hw, then a second thread running hidpp_connect_event() will be\nstarted from the workqueue.\n\nThis opens the following races (note the below code is simplified):\n\n1. Retrieving + printing the protocol (harmless race):\n\n\tif (!hidpp-\u003eprotocol_major) {\n\t\thidpp_root_get_protocol_version()\n\t\thidpp-\u003eprotocol_major = response.rap.params[0];\n\t}\n\nWe can actually see this race hit in the dmesg in the abrt output\nattached to rhbz#2227968:\n\n[ 3064.624215] logitech-hidpp-device 0003:046D:4071.0049: HID++ 4.5 device connected.\n[ 3064.658184] logitech-hidpp-device 0003:046D:4071.0049: HID++ 4.5 device connected.\n\nTesting with extra logging added has shown that after this the 2 threads\ntake turn grabbing the hw access mutex (send_mutex) so they ping-pong\nthrough all the other TOCTOU cases managing to hit all of them:\n\n2. Updating the name to the HIDPP name (harmless race):\n\n\tif (hidpp-\u003ename == hdev-\u003ename) {\n\t\t...\n\t\thidpp-\u003ename = new_name;\n\t}\n\n3. Initializing the power_supply class for the battery (problematic!):\n\nhidpp_initialize_battery()\n{\n        if (hidpp-\u003ebattery.ps)\n                return 0;\n\n\tprobe_battery(); /* Blocks, threads take turns executing this */\n\n\thidpp-\u003ebattery.desc.properties =\n\t\tdevm_kmemdup(dev, hidpp_battery_props, cnt, GFP_KERNEL);\n\n\thidpp-\u003ebattery.ps =\n\t\tdevm_power_supply_register(\u0026hidpp-\u003ehid_dev-\u003edev,\n\t\t\t\t\t   \u0026hidpp-\u003ebattery.desc, cfg);\n}\n\n4. Creating delayed input_device (potentially problematic):\n\n\tif (hidpp-\u003edelayed_input)\n\t\treturn;\n\n\thidpp-\u003edelayed_input = hidpp_allocate_input(hdev);\n\nThe really big problem here is 3. Hitting the race leads to the following\nsequence:\n\n\thidpp-\u003ebattery.desc.properties =\n\t\tdevm_kmemdup(dev, hidpp_battery_props, cnt, GFP_KERNEL);\n\n\thidpp-\u003ebattery.ps =\n\t\tdevm_power_supply_register(\u0026hidpp-\u003ehid_dev-\u003edev,\n\t\t\t\t\t   \u0026hidpp-\u003ebattery.desc, cfg);\n\n\t...\n\n\thidpp-\u003ebattery.desc.properties =\n\t\tdevm_kmemdup(dev, hidpp_battery_props, cnt, GFP_KERNEL);\n\n\thidpp-\u003ebattery.ps =\n\t\tdevm_power_supply_register(\u0026hidpp-\u003ehid_dev-\u003edev,\n\t\t\t\t\t   \u0026hidpp-\u003ebattery.desc, cfg);\n\nSo now we have registered 2 power supplies for the same battery,\nwhich looks a bit weird from userspace\u0027s pov but this is not even\nthe really big problem.\n\nNotice how:\n\n1. This is all devm-maganaged\n2. The hidpp-\u003ebattery.desc struct is shared between the 2 power supplies\n3. hidpp-\u003ebattery.desc.properties points to the result from the second\n   devm_kmemdup()\n\nThis causes a use after free scenario on USB disconnect of the receiver:\n1. The last registered power supply class device gets unregistered\n2. The memory from the last devm_kmemdup() call gets freed,\n   hidpp-\u003ebattery.desc.properties now points to freed memory\n3. The first registered power supply class device gets unregistered,\n   this involves sending a remove uevent to userspace which invokes\n   power_supply_uevent() to fill the uevent data\n4. power_supply_uevent() uses hidpp-\u003ebattery.desc.properties which\n   now points to freed memory leading to backtraces like this one:\n\nSep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffb2140e017f08\n...\nSep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event\nSep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: RIP: 0010:power_supply_uevent+0xee/0x1d0\n...\nSep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel:  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30\nSep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel:  ? power_supply_uevent+0xee/0x1d0\nSep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel:  ? power_supply_uevent+0x10d/0x1d0\nSep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel:  dev_uevent+0x10f/0x2d0\nSep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel:  kobject_uevent_env+0x291/0x680\nSep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel:  \n---truncated---"
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: HID: logitech-hidpp: soluciona el fallo del kernel en la desconexi\u00f3n del USB del receptor hidpp_connect_event() tiene *cuatro* carreras de tiempo de verificaci\u00f3n versus tiempo de uso (TOCTOU) cuando corre consigo mismo. hidpp_connect_event() se ejecuta principalmente desde una cola de trabajo, pero tambi\u00e9n se ejecuta en probe() y si el hw recibe un paquete \"dispositivo conectado\" cuando el subproceso que ejecuta hidpp_connect_event() desde probe() est\u00e1 esperando en el hw, entonces se ejecuta un segundo El hilo que ejecuta hidpp_connect_event() se iniciar\u00e1 desde la cola de trabajo. Esto abre las siguientes carreras (tenga en cuenta que el c\u00f3digo siguiente est\u00e1 simplificado):1. Retrieving + printing the protocol (harmless race): if (!hidpp-\u0026gt;protocol_major) { hidpp_root_get_protocol_version() hidpp-\u0026gt;protocol_major = response.rap.params[0]; } We can actually see this race hit in the dmesg in the abrt output attached to rhbz#2227968: [ 3064.624215] logitech-hidpp-device 0003:046D:4071.0049: HID++ 4.5 device connected. [ 3064.658184] logitech-hidpp-device 0003:046D:4071.0049: HID++ 4.5 device connected. Testing with extra logging added has shown that after this the 2 threads take turn grabbing the hw access mutex (send_mutex) so they ping-pong through all the other TOCTOU cases managing to hit all of them: 2. Updating the name to the HIDPP name (harmless race): if (hidpp-\u0026gt;name == hdev-\u0026gt;name) { ... hidpp-\u0026gt;name = new_name; } 3. Initializing the power_supply class for the battery (problematic!): hidpp_initialize_battery() { if (hidpp-\u0026gt;battery.ps) return 0; probe_battery(); /* Blocks, threads take turns executing this */ hidpp-\u0026gt;battery.desc.properties = devm_kmemdup(dev, hidpp_battery_props, cnt, GFP_KERNEL); hidpp-\u0026gt;battery.ps = devm_power_supply_register(\u0026amp;hidpp-\u0026gt;hid_dev-\u0026gt;dev, \u0026amp;hidpp-\u0026gt;battery.desc, cfg); } 4. Creating delayed input_device (potentially problematic): if (hidpp-\u0026gt;delayed_input) return; hidpp-\u0026gt;delayed_input = hidpp_allocate_input(hdev); The really big problem here is 3. Hitting the race leads to the following sequence: hidpp-\u0026gt;battery.desc.properties = devm_kmemdup(dev, hidpp_battery_props, cnt, GFP_KERNEL); hidpp-\u0026gt;battery.ps = devm_power_supply_register(\u0026amp;hidpp-\u0026gt;hid_dev-\u0026gt;dev, \u0026amp;hidpp-\u0026gt;battery.desc, cfg); ... hidpp-\u0026gt;battery.desc.properties = devm_kmemdup(dev, hidpp_battery_props, cnt, GFP_KERNEL); hidpp-\u0026gt;battery.ps = devm_power_supply_register(\u0026amp;hidpp-\u0026gt;hid_dev-\u0026gt;dev, \u0026amp;hidpp-\u0026gt;battery.desc, cfg); So now we have registered 2 power supplies for the same battery, which looks a bit weird from userspace\u0027s pov but this is not even the really big problem. Notice how: 1. This is all devm-maganaged 2. The hidpp-\u0026gt;battery.desc struct is shared between the 2 power supplies 3. hidpp-\u0026gt;battery.desc.properties points to the result from the second devm_kmemdup() This causes a use after free scenario on USB disconnect of the receiver: 1. The last registered power supply class device gets unregistered 2. The memory from the last devm_kmemdup() call gets freed, hidpp-\u0026gt;battery.desc.properties now points to freed memory 3. The first registered power supply class device gets unregistered, this involves sending a remove uevent to userspace which invokes power_supply_uevent() to fill the uevent data 4. power_supply_uevent() uses hidpp-\u0026gt;battery.desc.properties which now points to freed memory leading to backtraces like this one: Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffb2140e017f08 ... Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: RIP: 0010:power_supply_uevent+0xee/0x1d0 ... Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: ? power_supply_uevent+0xee/0x1d0 Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: ? power_supply_uevent+0x10d/0x1d0 Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: dev_uevent+0x10f/0x2d0 Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: kobject_uevent_env+0x291/0x680 Sep 22 20:01:35 eric kernel: ---trun"
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2023-52478",
  "lastModified": "2025-01-10T18:27:26.213",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 4.7,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.0,
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
        "type": "Primary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2024-02-29T06:15:45.920",
  "references": [
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    },
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      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/44481b244fcaa2b895a53081d6204c574720c38c"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ca0c4cc1d215dc22ab0e738c9f017c650f3183f5"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cd0e2bf7fb22fe9b989c59c42dca06367fd10e6b"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dac501397b9d81e4782232c39f94f4307b137452"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f7b2c7d9831af99369fe8ad9b2a68d78942f414e"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fd72ac9556a473fc7daf54efb6ca8a97180d621d"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-367"
        }
      ],
      "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}


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