fkie_cve-2022-48847
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd
Published
2024-07-16 13:15
Modified
2024-11-21 07:34
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
watch_queue: Fix filter limit check
In watch_queue_set_filter(), there are a couple of places where we check
that the filter type value does not exceed what the type_filter bitmap
can hold. One place calculates the number of bits by:
if (tf[i].type >= sizeof(wfilter->type_filter) * 8)
which is fine, but the second does:
if (tf[i].type >= sizeof(wfilter->type_filter) * BITS_PER_LONG)
which is not. This can lead to a couple of out-of-bounds writes due to
a too-large type:
(1) __set_bit() on wfilter->type_filter
(2) Writing more elements in wfilter->filters[] than we allocated.
Fix this by just using the proper WATCH_TYPE__NR instead, which is the
number of types we actually know about.
The bug may cause an oops looking something like:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in watch_queue_set_filter+0x659/0x740
Write of size 4 at addr ffff88800d2c66bc by task watch_queue_oob/611
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x59
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x150
...
kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b
...
watch_queue_set_filter+0x659/0x740
...
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x190
do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Allocated by task 611:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
__kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0
watch_queue_set_filter+0x23a/0x740
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x190
do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800d2c66a0
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-32 of size 32
The buggy address is located 28 bytes inside of
32-byte region [ffff88800d2c66a0, ffff88800d2c66c0)
References
Impacted products
Vendor | Product | Version | |
---|---|---|---|
linux | linux_kernel | * | |
linux | linux_kernel | * | |
linux | linux_kernel | * |
{ configurations: [ { nodes: [ { cpeMatch: [ { criteria: "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", matchCriteriaId: "FFACA37D-D2EA-44A7-8ED6-E58EE2222AFE", versionEndExcluding: "5.10.106", versionStartIncluding: "5.8", vulnerable: true, }, { criteria: "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", matchCriteriaId: "15DC6588-B28F-4637-9A1E-3753B34A40CF", versionEndExcluding: "5.15.29", versionStartIncluding: "5.11", vulnerable: true, }, { criteria: "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", matchCriteriaId: "83FDEDF2-0E19-4879-91FD-171E66D1B335", versionEndExcluding: "5.16.15", versionStartIncluding: "5.16", vulnerable: true, }, ], negate: false, operator: "OR", }, ], }, ], cveTags: [], descriptions: [ { lang: "en", value: "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwatch_queue: Fix filter limit check\n\nIn watch_queue_set_filter(), there are a couple of places where we check\nthat the filter type value does not exceed what the type_filter bitmap\ncan hold. One place calculates the number of bits by:\n\n if (tf[i].type >= sizeof(wfilter->type_filter) * 8)\n\nwhich is fine, but the second does:\n\n if (tf[i].type >= sizeof(wfilter->type_filter) * BITS_PER_LONG)\n\nwhich is not. This can lead to a couple of out-of-bounds writes due to\na too-large type:\n\n (1) __set_bit() on wfilter->type_filter\n (2) Writing more elements in wfilter->filters[] than we allocated.\n\nFix this by just using the proper WATCH_TYPE__NR instead, which is the\nnumber of types we actually know about.\n\nThe bug may cause an oops looking something like:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in watch_queue_set_filter+0x659/0x740\n Write of size 4 at addr ffff88800d2c66bc by task watch_queue_oob/611\n ...\n Call Trace:\n <TASK>\n dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x59\n print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x150\n ...\n kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b\n ...\n watch_queue_set_filter+0x659/0x740\n ...\n __x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x190\n do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae\n\n Allocated by task 611:\n kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40\n __kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0\n watch_queue_set_filter+0x23a/0x740\n __x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x190\n do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae\n\n The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800d2c66a0\n which belongs to the cache kmalloc-32 of size 32\n The buggy address is located 28 bytes inside of\n 32-byte region [ffff88800d2c66a0, ffff88800d2c66c0)", }, { lang: "es", value: "En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: watch_queue: corrige la verificación del límite del filtro En watch_queue_set_filter(), hay un par de lugares donde verificamos que el valor del tipo de filtro no exceda lo que puede contener el mapa de bits type_filter. Un lugar calcula el número de bits mediante: if (tf[i].type >= sizeof(wfilter->type_filter) * 8) lo cual está bien, pero el segundo sí: if (tf[i].type >= sizeof( wfilter->type_filter) * BITS_PER_LONG) que no lo es. Esto puede provocar un par de escrituras fuera de los límites debido a un tipo demasiado grande: (1) __set_bit() en wfilter->type_filter (2) Escribir más elementos en wfilter->filters[] de los que asignamos. Solucione este problema simplemente usando el WATCH_TYPE__NR adecuado, que es la cantidad de tipos que realmente conocemos. El error puede provocar un error parecido a: ERROR: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in watch_queue_set_filter+0x659/0x740 Escritura de tamaño 4 en la dirección ffff88800d2c66bc mediante la tarea watch_queue_oob/611... Seguimiento de llamadas: dump_stack_lvl+ 0x45/0x59 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x150 ... kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b ... watch_queue_set_filter+0x659/0x740 ... __x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x190 do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90 entrada_ SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Asignado por tarea 611: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 __kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0 watch_queue_set_filter+0x23a/0x740 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x190 do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90 Entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x 44/0xae La dirección con errores pertenece al objeto en ffff88800d2c66a0 que pertenece al caché kmalloc-32 de tamaño 32 La dirección con errores se encuentra a 28 bytes dentro de la región de 32 bytes [ffff88800d2c66a0, ffff88800d2c66c0)", }, ], id: "CVE-2022-48847", lastModified: "2024-11-21T07:34:12.187", metrics: { cvssMetricV31: [ { cvssData: { attackComplexity: "LOW", attackVector: "LOCAL", availabilityImpact: "HIGH", baseScore: 7.8, baseSeverity: "HIGH", confidentialityImpact: "HIGH", integrityImpact: "HIGH", privilegesRequired: "LOW", scope: "UNCHANGED", userInteraction: "NONE", vectorString: "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", version: "3.1", }, exploitabilityScore: 1.8, impactScore: 5.9, source: "nvd@nist.gov", type: "Primary", }, ], }, published: "2024-07-16T13:15:11.950", references: [ { source: "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", tags: [ "Patch", ], url: "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1b09f28f70a5046acd64138075ae3f095238b045", }, { source: "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", tags: [ "Patch", ], url: "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/648895da69ced90ca770fd941c3d9479a9d72c16", }, { source: "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", tags: [ "Patch", ], url: "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b36588ebbcef74583824c08352e75838d6fb4ff2", }, { source: "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", tags: [ "Patch", ], url: "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c993ee0f9f81caf5767a50d1faeba39a0dc82af2", }, { source: "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108", tags: [ "Patch", ], url: "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1b09f28f70a5046acd64138075ae3f095238b045", }, { source: "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108", tags: [ "Patch", ], url: "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/648895da69ced90ca770fd941c3d9479a9d72c16", }, { source: "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108", tags: [ "Patch", ], url: "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b36588ebbcef74583824c08352e75838d6fb4ff2", }, { source: "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108", tags: [ "Patch", ], url: "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c993ee0f9f81caf5767a50d1faeba39a0dc82af2", }, ], sourceIdentifier: "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", vulnStatus: "Modified", weaknesses: [ { description: [ { lang: "en", value: "CWE-787", }, ], source: "nvd@nist.gov", type: "Primary", }, ], }
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Sightings
Author | Source | Type | Date |
---|
Nomenclature
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