GCVE Workshop - 22 September 2026 (14:00-18:00), Luxembourg Before The Vulnopticon Conference - Registration

CVE-2026-82751 (GCVE-0-2026-82751)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-06 16:07 – Updated: 2026-09-06 16:07
VLAI
Title
Unbounded key authorization in mpp Tempo fee-payer sponsorship inflates gas cost and sponsors access-key provisioning
Summary
Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to inflate the fee-payer's gas cost per sponsored payment by a large multiplier and to have the sponsor pay for provisioning an access key on the client's own account. When the server sponsors Tempo payments, MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy.measure/3 in lib/mpp/methods/tempo/fee_payer_policy.ex bounds the gas fields, the fee budget, the validity window and the access list of the client-signed 0x76 envelope, but does not check whether the envelope carries the optional key_authorization field. A client can attach a fully signed key authorization, provisioning a new access key with token spending limits on its own account, alongside the normal payment call. The key and each limit entry are persistent storage writes billed as intrinsic gas to the sponsor, bounded only by the gas_limit ceiling. At the reporter's default of one key with three token limits the sponsored cost rises from about 46,587 gas to about 1,808,700 gas, and the client keeps a valid access key it paid nothing for. This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.16.1.
CWE
  • CWE-1284 - Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input
Assigner
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
ZenHive mpp Affected: 0.2.0 , < 0.16.1 (semver)
    cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
ZenHive mpp Affected: d29d54e507918db00a5b65d90136b73166c017d7 , < 0482572b47e1ffe1537ab80ab613d47b92833c2d (git)
    cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
          "cpes": [
            "cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
          ],
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "modules": [
            "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy\u0027",
            "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo\u0027"
          ],
          "packageName": "mpp",
          "packageURL": "pkg:hex/mpp",
          "product": "mpp",
          "programFiles": [
            "lib/mpp/methods/tempo/fee_payer_policy.ex",
            "lib/mpp/methods/tempo.ex"
          ],
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy\u0027:measure/3"
            },
            {
              "name": "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy\u0027:validate/3"
            },
            {
              "name": "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo\u0027:verify/2"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp",
          "vendor": "ZenHive",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "0.16.1",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0.2.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://github.com",
          "cpes": [
            "cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
          ],
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "modules": [
            "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy\u0027",
            "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo\u0027"
          ],
          "packageName": "zenhive/mpp",
          "packageURL": "pkg:github/zenhive/mpp",
          "product": "mpp",
          "programFiles": [
            "lib/mpp/methods/tempo/fee_payer_policy.ex",
            "lib/mpp/methods/tempo.ex"
          ],
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy\u0027:measure/3"
            },
            {
              "name": "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy\u0027:validate/3"
            },
            {
              "name": "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo\u0027:verify/2"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp",
          "vendor": "ZenHive",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "0482572b47e1ffe1537ab80ab613d47b92833c2d",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "d29d54e507918db00a5b65d90136b73166c017d7",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "configurations": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "\u003cp\u003eOnly deployments that enable Tempo server-side fee sponsorship are affected, through \u003ccode\u003e\"fee_payer\" =\u0026gt; true\u003c/code\u003e in \u003ccode\u003emethod_config\u003c/code\u003e with either local co-signing (\u003ccode\u003efee_payer_private_key\u003c/code\u003e) or hosted sponsorship (\u003ccode\u003efee_payer_url\u003c/code\u003e). Sponsorship is disabled by default.\u003c/p\u003e"
            },
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/markdown",
              "value": "Only deployments that enable Tempo server-side fee sponsorship are affected, through `\"fee_payer\" =\u003e true` in `method_config` with either local co-signing (`fee_payer_private_key`) or hosted sponsorship (`fee_payer_url`). Sponsorship is disabled by default."
            }
          ],
          "value": "Only deployments that enable Tempo server-side fee sponsorship are affected, through \"fee_payer\" =\u003e true in method_config with either local co-signing (fee_payer_private_key) or hosted sponsorship (fee_payer_url). Sponsorship is disabled by default."
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "0.16.1",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "0.2.0",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ],
          "operator": "AND"
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "Kian Kai Ang"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "reporter",
          "value": "Kian Kai Ang"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "remediation developer",
          "value": "E.FU"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "coordinator",
          "value": "Jonatan M\u00e4nnchen / EEF"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "\u003cp\u003eImproper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to inflate the fee-payer\u0027s gas cost per sponsored payment by a large multiplier and to have the sponsor pay for provisioning an access key on the client\u0027s own account.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhen the server sponsors Tempo payments, \u003ccode\u003eMPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy.measure/3\u003c/code\u003e in \u003ccode\u003elib/mpp/methods/tempo/fee_payer_policy.ex\u003c/code\u003e bounds the gas fields, the fee budget, the validity window and the access list of the client-signed \u003ccode\u003e0x76\u003c/code\u003e envelope, but does not check whether the envelope carries the optional \u003ccode\u003ekey_authorization\u003c/code\u003e field. A client can attach a fully signed key authorization, provisioning a new access key with token spending limits on its own account, alongside the normal payment call. The key and each limit entry are persistent storage writes billed as intrinsic gas to the sponsor, bounded only by the \u003ccode\u003egas_limit\u003c/code\u003e ceiling. At the reporter\u0027s default of one key with three token limits the sponsored cost rises from about 46,587 gas to about 1,808,700 gas, and the client keeps a valid access key it paid nothing for.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.16.1.\u003c/p\u003e"
            },
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/markdown",
              "value": "Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to inflate the fee-payer\u0027s gas cost per sponsored payment by a large multiplier and to have the sponsor pay for provisioning an access key on the client\u0027s own account.\n\nWhen the server sponsors Tempo payments, `MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy.measure/3` in `lib/mpp/methods/tempo/fee_payer_policy.ex` bounds the gas fields, the fee budget, the validity window and the access list of the client-signed `0x76` envelope, but does not check whether the envelope carries the optional `key_authorization` field. A client can attach a fully signed key authorization, provisioning a new access key with token spending limits on its own account, alongside the normal payment call. The key and each limit entry are persistent storage writes billed as intrinsic gas to the sponsor, bounded only by the `gas_limit` ceiling. At the reporter\u0027s default of one key with three token limits the sponsored cost rises from about 46,587 gas to about 1,808,700 gas, and the client keeps a valid access key it paid nothing for.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.16.1."
            }
          ],
          "value": "Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to inflate the fee-payer\u0027s gas cost per sponsored payment by a large multiplier and to have the sponsor pay for provisioning an access key on the client\u0027s own account.\n\nWhen the server sponsors Tempo payments, MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy.measure/3 in lib/mpp/methods/tempo/fee_payer_policy.ex bounds the gas fields, the fee budget, the validity window and the access list of the client-signed 0x76 envelope, but does not check whether the envelope carries the optional key_authorization field. A client can attach a fully signed key authorization, provisioning a new access key with token spending limits on its own account, alongside the normal payment call. The key and each limit entry are persistent storage writes billed as intrinsic gas to the sponsor, bounded only by the gas_limit ceiling. At the reporter\u0027s default of one key with three token limits the sponsored cost rises from about 46,587 gas to about 1,808,700 gas, and the client keeps a valid access key it paid nothing for.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.16.1."
        }
      ],
      "impacts": [
        {
          "capecId": "CAPEC-130",
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "CAPEC-130 Excessive Allocation"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 8.3,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "LOW",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
          },
          "format": "CVSS",
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "GENERAL"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-1284",
              "description": "CWE-1284 Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-09-06T16:07:26.407Z",
        "orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
        "shortName": "EEF"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "tags": [
            "vendor-advisory",
            "related"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/security/advisories/GHSA-rpwj-vrf7-4x36"
        },
        {
          "tags": [
            "related"
          ],
          "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-82751.html"
        },
        {
          "tags": [
            "related"
          ],
          "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-82751"
        },
        {
          "tags": [
            "patch"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/0482572b47e1ffe1537ab80ab613d47b92833c2d"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
      },
      "title": "Unbounded key authorization in mpp Tempo fee-payer sponsorship inflates gas cost and sponsors access-key provisioning",
      "workarounds": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "\u003cp\u003eDisable Tempo fee sponsorship by leaving \u003ccode\u003e\"fee_payer\"\u003c/code\u003e at its default of \u003ccode\u003efalse\u003c/code\u003e and setting no \u003ccode\u003efee_payer_url\u003c/code\u003e, so the client pays its own gas. Where sponsorship must stay enabled, lower the \u003ccode\u003emax_gas\u003c/code\u003e override in \u003ccode\u003efee_payer_policy\u003c/code\u003e to just above what a legitimate sponsored payment needs (a TIP-20 transfer is roughly 50,000 gas), so an envelope carrying a key authorization either fails the policy or runs out of gas at a bounded cost. This bounds the inflation without closing it.\u003c/p\u003e"
            },
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/markdown",
              "value": "Disable Tempo fee sponsorship by leaving `\"fee_payer\"` at its default of `false` and setting no `fee_payer_url`, so the client pays its own gas. Where sponsorship must stay enabled, lower the `max_gas` override in `fee_payer_policy` to just above what a legitimate sponsored payment needs (a TIP-20 transfer is roughly 50,000 gas), so an envelope carrying a key authorization either fails the policy or runs out of gas at a bounded cost. This bounds the inflation without closing it."
            }
          ],
          "value": "Disable Tempo fee sponsorship by leaving \"fee_payer\" at its default of false and setting no fee_payer_url, so the client pays its own gas. Where sponsorship must stay enabled, lower the max_gas override in fee_payer_policy to just above what a legitimate sponsored payment needs (a TIP-20 transfer is roughly 50,000 gas), so an envelope carrying a key authorization either fails the policy or runs out of gas at a bounded cost. This bounds the inflation without closing it."
        }
      ]
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
    "assignerShortName": "EEF",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-82751",
    "datePublished": "2026-09-06T16:07:26.407Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-08-31T01:00:09.775Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-09-06T16:07:26.407Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "epss": {
      "cve": "CVE-2026-82751",
      "date": "2026-09-07",
      "epss": "0.00329",
      "percentile": "0.25623"
    },
    "nvd": "{\"cve\":{\"id\":\"CVE-2026-82751\",\"sourceIdentifier\":\"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\",\"published\":\"2026-09-06T17:17:56.070\",\"lastModified\":\"2026-09-06T17:17:56.070\",\"vulnStatus\":\"Received\",\"cveTags\":[],\"descriptions\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to inflate the fee-payer\u0027s gas cost per sponsored payment by a large multiplier and to have the sponsor pay for provisioning an access key on the client\u0027s own account.\\n\\nWhen the server sponsors Tempo payments, MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy.measure/3 in lib/mpp/methods/tempo/fee_payer_policy.ex bounds the gas fields, the fee budget, the validity window and the access list of the client-signed 0x76 envelope, but does not check whether the envelope carries the optional key_authorization field. A client can attach a fully signed key authorization, provisioning a new access key with token spending limits on its own account, alongside the normal payment call. The key and each limit entry are persistent storage writes billed as intrinsic gas to the sponsor, bounded only by the gas_limit ceiling. At the reporter\u0027s default of one key with three token limits the sponsored cost rises from about 46,587 gas to about 1,808,700 gas, and the client keeps a valid access key it paid nothing for.\\n\\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.16.1.\"}],\"affected\":[{\"source\":\"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\",\"affectedData\":[{\"vendor\":\"ZenHive\",\"product\":\"mpp\",\"defaultStatus\":\"unaffected\",\"collectionURL\":\"https://repo.hex.pm\",\"packageName\":\"mpp\",\"cpes\":[\"cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\"],\"modules\":[\"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy\u0027\",\"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo\u0027\"],\"programFiles\":[\"lib/mpp/methods/tempo/fee_payer_policy.ex\",\"lib/mpp/methods/tempo.ex\"],\"programRoutines\":[{\"name\":\"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy\u0027:measure/3\"},{\"name\":\"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy\u0027:validate/3\"},{\"name\":\"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo\u0027:verify/2\"}],\"repo\":\"https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp\",\"packageURL\":\"pkg:hex/mpp\",\"versions\":[{\"version\":\"0.2.0\",\"lessThan\":\"0.16.1\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"affected\"}]},{\"vendor\":\"ZenHive\",\"product\":\"mpp\",\"defaultStatus\":\"unaffected\",\"collectionURL\":\"https://github.com\",\"packageName\":\"zenhive/mpp\",\"cpes\":[\"cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\"],\"modules\":[\"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy\u0027\",\"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo\u0027\"],\"programFiles\":[\"lib/mpp/methods/tempo/fee_payer_policy.ex\",\"lib/mpp/methods/tempo.ex\"],\"programRoutines\":[{\"name\":\"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy\u0027:measure/3\"},{\"name\":\"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy\u0027:validate/3\"},{\"name\":\"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo\u0027:verify/2\"}],\"repo\":\"https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp\",\"packageURL\":\"pkg:github/zenhive/mpp\",\"versions\":[{\"version\":\"d29d54e507918db00a5b65d90136b73166c017d7\",\"lessThan\":\"0482572b47e1ffe1537ab80ab613d47b92833c2d\",\"versionType\":\"git\",\"status\":\"affected\"}]}]}],\"metrics\":{\"cvssMetricV40\":[{\"source\":\"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\",\"type\":\"Secondary\",\"cvssData\":{\"version\":\"4.0\",\"vectorString\":\"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X\",\"baseScore\":8.3,\"baseSeverity\":\"HIGH\",\"attackVector\":\"NETWORK\",\"attackComplexity\":\"LOW\",\"attackRequirements\":\"PRESENT\",\"privilegesRequired\":\"NONE\",\"userInteraction\":\"NONE\",\"vulnConfidentialityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"vulnIntegrityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"vulnAvailabilityImpact\":\"LOW\",\"subConfidentialityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"subIntegrityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"subAvailabilityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"exploitMaturity\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"confidentialityRequirement\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"integrityRequirement\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"availabilityRequirement\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedAttackVector\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedAttackComplexity\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedAttackRequirements\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedPrivilegesRequired\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedUserInteraction\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"Safety\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"Automatable\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"Recovery\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"valueDensity\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"vulnerabilityResponseEffort\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"providerUrgency\":\"NOT_DEFINED\"}}]},\"weaknesses\":[{\"source\":\"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\",\"type\":\"Secondary\",\"description\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"CWE-1284\"}]}],\"references\":[{\"url\":\"https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-82751.html\",\"source\":\"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\"},{\"url\":\"https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/0482572b47e1ffe1537ab80ab613d47b92833c2d\",\"source\":\"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\"},{\"url\":\"https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/security/advisories/GHSA-rpwj-vrf7-4x36\",\"source\":\"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\"},{\"url\":\"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-82751\",\"source\":\"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db\"}]}}"
  }
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…

Loading…