CVE-2026-71247 (GCVE-0-2026-71247)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-05 10:56 – Updated: 2026-08-05 12:32
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Documenso: Assistant Recipient Can Forge Another Signer's Signature in Sequential-Signing Documents
Summary
Documenso's sign-field-with-token.ts, used by the live document-signing UI, allows a recipient with the ASSISTANT role to fetch and complete fields belonging to any later-or-equal-order, not-yet-signed recipient in the same envelope, with no restriction on field type. The handler upserts a Signature record tied to the target field's recipientId with no check that field.type is SIGNATURE and the acting recipient owns it. A newer V2 signing path (sign-envelope-field.ts) explicitly blocks assistants from completing SIGNATURE fields, and the project's own test suite comments confirm this guard is absent from the V1 path used here. In a sequential-signing document, an assistant recipient can therefore forge another signer's signature field.
Severity
6.5 (Medium)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)
CWE
- CWE-863 - Incorrect Authorization
Assigner
References
1 reference
Credits
{
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-71247",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "no"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-08-05T12:31:13.509667Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T12:32:16.403Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unknown",
"product": "documenso",
"programFiles": [
"packages/lib/server-only/field/sign-field-with-token.ts"
],
"vendor": "documenso",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "0"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Bobur Abdugafforov"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Documenso\u0027s sign-field-with-token.ts, used by the live document-signing UI, allows a recipient with the ASSISTANT role to fetch and complete fields belonging to any later-or-equal-order, not-yet-signed recipient in the same envelope, with no restriction on field type. The handler upserts a Signature record tied to the target field\u0027s recipientId with no check that field.type is SIGNATURE and the acting recipient owns it. A newer V2 signing path (sign-envelope-field.ts) explicitly blocks assistants from completing SIGNATURE fields, and the project\u0027s own test suite comments confirm this guard is absent from the V1 path used here. In a sequential-signing document, an assistant recipient can therefore forge another signer\u0027s signature field."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"baseScore": 6.5,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
}
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-863",
"description": "CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T10:56:59.954Z",
"orgId": "309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c",
"shortName": "TuranSec"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://github.com/documenso/documenso"
}
],
"title": "Documenso: Assistant Recipient Can Forge Another Signer\u0027s Signature in Sequential-Signing Documents"
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c",
"assignerShortName": "TuranSec",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-71247",
"datePublished": "2026-08-05T10:56:59.954Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-08-05T10:53:53.176Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T12:32:16.403Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"epss": {
"cve": "CVE-2026-71247",
"date": "2026-08-06",
"epss": "0.00174",
"percentile": "0.07093"
},
"nvd": "{\"cve\":{\"id\":\"CVE-2026-71247\",\"sourceIdentifier\":\"309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c\",\"published\":\"2026-08-05T11:16:27.743\",\"lastModified\":\"2026-08-05T13:24:49.153\",\"vulnStatus\":\"Received\",\"cveTags\":[],\"descriptions\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"Documenso\u0027s sign-field-with-token.ts, used by the live document-signing UI, allows a recipient with the ASSISTANT role to fetch and complete fields belonging to any later-or-equal-order, not-yet-signed recipient in the same envelope, with no restriction on field type. The handler upserts a Signature record tied to the target field\u0027s recipientId with no check that field.type is SIGNATURE and the acting recipient owns it. A newer V2 signing path (sign-envelope-field.ts) explicitly blocks assistants from completing SIGNATURE fields, and the project\u0027s own test suite comments confirm this guard is absent from the V1 path used here. In a sequential-signing document, an assistant recipient can therefore forge another signer\u0027s signature field.\"}],\"affected\":[{\"source\":\"309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c\",\"affectedData\":[{\"vendor\":\"documenso\",\"product\":\"documenso\",\"defaultStatus\":\"unknown\",\"programFiles\":[\"packages/lib/server-only/field/sign-field-with-token.ts\"],\"versions\":[{\"version\":\"0\",\"status\":\"affected\"}]}]}],\"metrics\":{\"cvssMetricV31\":[{\"source\":\"309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c\",\"type\":\"Secondary\",\"cvssData\":{\"version\":\"3.1\",\"vectorString\":\"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N\",\"baseScore\":6.5,\"baseSeverity\":\"MEDIUM\",\"attackVector\":\"NETWORK\",\"attackComplexity\":\"LOW\",\"privilegesRequired\":\"LOW\",\"userInteraction\":\"NONE\",\"scope\":\"UNCHANGED\",\"confidentialityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"integrityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"availabilityImpact\":\"NONE\"},\"exploitabilityScore\":2.8,\"impactScore\":3.6}],\"ssvcV203\":[{\"source\":\"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0\",\"ssvcData\":{\"timestamp\":\"2026-08-05T12:31:13.509667Z\",\"id\":\"CVE-2026-71247\",\"options\":[{\"exploitation\":\"none\"},{\"automatable\":\"no\"},{\"technicalImpact\":\"partial\"}],\"role\":\"CISA Coordinator\",\"version\":\"2.0.3\"}}]},\"weaknesses\":[{\"source\":\"309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c\",\"type\":\"Secondary\",\"description\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"CWE-863\"}]}],\"references\":[{\"url\":\"https://github.com/documenso/documenso\",\"source\":\"309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c\"}]}}",
"vulnrichment": {
"containers": "{\"adp\": [{\"title\": \"CISA ADP Vulnrichment\", \"metrics\": [{\"other\": {\"type\": \"ssvc\", \"content\": {\"id\": \"CVE-2026-71247\", \"role\": \"CISA Coordinator\", \"options\": [{\"Exploitation\": \"none\"}, {\"Automatable\": \"no\"}, {\"Technical Impact\": \"partial\"}], \"version\": \"2.0.3\", \"timestamp\": \"2026-08-05T12:31:13.509667Z\"}}}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0\", \"shortName\": \"CISA-ADP\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-08-05T12:32:11.469Z\"}}], \"cna\": {\"title\": \"Documenso: Assistant Recipient Can Forge Another Signer\u0027s Signature in Sequential-Signing Documents\", \"credits\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"finder\", \"value\": \"Bobur Abdugafforov\"}], \"metrics\": [{\"cvssV3_1\": {\"version\": \"3.1\", \"baseScore\": 6.5, \"baseSeverity\": \"MEDIUM\", \"vectorString\": \"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N\"}}], \"affected\": [{\"vendor\": \"documenso\", \"product\": \"documenso\", \"versions\": [{\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"0\"}], \"programFiles\": [\"packages/lib/server-only/field/sign-field-with-token.ts\"], \"defaultStatus\": \"unknown\"}], \"references\": [{\"url\": \"https://github.com/documenso/documenso\"}], \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"Documenso\u0027s sign-field-with-token.ts, used by the live document-signing UI, allows a recipient with the ASSISTANT role to fetch and complete fields belonging to any later-or-equal-order, not-yet-signed recipient in the same envelope, with no restriction on field type. The handler upserts a Signature record tied to the target field\u0027s recipientId with no check that field.type is SIGNATURE and the acting recipient owns it. A newer V2 signing path (sign-envelope-field.ts) explicitly blocks assistants from completing SIGNATURE fields, and the project\u0027s own test suite comments confirm this guard is absent from the V1 path used here. In a sequential-signing document, an assistant recipient can therefore forge another signer\u0027s signature field.\"}], \"problemTypes\": [{\"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"CWE\", \"cweId\": \"CWE-863\", \"description\": \"CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization\"}]}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c\", \"shortName\": \"TuranSec\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-08-05T10:56:59.954Z\"}}}",
"cveMetadata": "{\"cveId\": \"CVE-2026-71247\", \"state\": \"PUBLISHED\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2026-08-05T12:32:16.403Z\", \"dateReserved\": \"2026-08-05T10:53:53.176Z\", \"assignerOrgId\": \"309f9ea4-e3e9-4c6c-b79d-e8eb01244f2c\", \"datePublished\": \"2026-08-05T10:56:59.954Z\", \"assignerShortName\": \"TuranSec\"}",
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
Loading…
Loading…
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Loading…
The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
Loading…
Loading…