CVE-2026-71247 (GCVE-0-2026-71247)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-05 10:56 – Updated: 2026-08-05 12:32
VLAI
Title
Documenso: Assistant Recipient Can Forge Another Signer's Signature in Sequential-Signing Documents
Summary
Documenso's sign-field-with-token.ts, used by the live document-signing UI, allows a recipient with the ASSISTANT role to fetch and complete fields belonging to any later-or-equal-order, not-yet-signed recipient in the same envelope, with no restriction on field type. The handler upserts a Signature record tied to the target field's recipientId with no check that field.type is SIGNATURE and the acting recipient owns it. A newer V2 signing path (sign-envelope-field.ts) explicitly blocks assistants from completing SIGNATURE fields, and the project's own test suite comments confirm this guard is absent from the V1 path used here. In a sequential-signing document, an assistant recipient can therefore forge another signer's signature field.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)
CWE
  • CWE-863 - Incorrect Authorization
Assigner
References
Impacted products
Credits
Bobur Abdugafforov
Show details on NVD website

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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

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Nomenclature

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