CVE-2026-6406 (GCVE-0-2026-6406)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-05-22 18:32 – Updated: 2026-05-23 03:56
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Docker Desktop Enhanced Container Isolation bypass via --use-api-socket CLI flag
Summary
The Docker CLI --use-api-socket flag bypasses Enhanced Container Isolation (ECI) restrictions in Docker Desktop. When ECI is enabled, Docker socket mounts from containers are denied unless explicitly allowed via the admin-settings configuration. However, the --use-api-socket flag adds the Docker socket mount via the HostConfig.Mounts field rather than the HostConfig.Binds field. The ECI enforcement in the Docker Desktop API proxy only inspected Binds, allowing the mount to pass unchecked. This grants a container full access to the Docker Engine socket and, if the host user has logged in to container registries, their authentication credentials.
A local attacker with the ability to run Docker CLI commands can exploit this to escape ECI restrictions, access the Docker Engine, and potentially escalate privileges.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)
CWE
- CWE-863 - Incorrect Authorization
Assigner
References
2 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://docs.docker.com/desktop/release-notes/#4590 | release-notes |
| https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-… | third-party-advisory |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Docker | Docker Desktop |
Affected:
4.41.0 , < 4.59.0
(semver)
|
Date Public
2026-04-23 00:00
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
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