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CVE-2026-56450 (GCVE-0-2026-56450)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-06-22 13:02 – Updated: 2026-06-22 15:48
VLAI
Title
AIL Framework - Missing Rate Limiting Enables Brute-Force Attacks Against Two-Factor Authentication Codes
Summary
AIL did not restrict repeated failed attempts to verify a two-factor authentication (OTP) code. An attacker who had reached the 2FA verification step, such as after successfully completing the password-authentication stage, could submit an unlimited number of OTP guesses. This could enable brute-force guessing of a valid code and bypass the intended second authentication factor, resulting in unauthorized account access. The patch introduces per-user failed-OTP tracking, blocks verification after 30 failed attempts for one hour, clears the counter after a successful OTP verification, and provides administrator recovery actions to purge affected lockouts.
Severity
5.1 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-06-22 15:48 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-307 - Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts
Assigner
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
ail project ail framework Affected: 0 , ≤ 6.8.0 (semver)
guessed Create a notification for this product.
Credits
Aurelien Thirion Stephen O
Show details on NVD website
To clipboard 

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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.


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Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.