CVE-2026-48080 (GCVE-0-2026-48080)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-06 18:26 – Updated: 2026-08-07 17:42
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
OpenReception's tenant detail endpoint discloses live PostgreSQL connection string, superuser-scoped in the tested official deployment
Summary
OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, the `GET /api/tenants/{id}` endpoint returns the full tenant record to any authenticated `TENANT_ADMIN` of that tenant, including the `databaseUrl` field. This field contains the live PostgreSQL connection string the application uses to connect to that tenant's database. In the tested official `docker-compose.prod.yml` deployment, the connection string contained the user `postgres` with `rolsuper=true` and the plaintext password from `secrets/postgres_password.txt`. Operators who configure a non-superuser PostgreSQL user via `secrets/postgres_user.txt` would expose a less privileged credential, but the disclosure of the connection string itself is independent of that choice. The same credential applies to every database managed by that PostgreSQL instance: the central `appointment_booking` database, every per-tenant database (one per tenant), and the postgres administrative database. A `TENANT_ADMIN` of one tenant who can reach `postgres:5432` (directly via internal network, indirectly via any SSRF, RCE, or file-read in the application) can read every other tenant's appointment ciphertexts, key shares, and metadata; read the central user table, including all `GLOBAL_ADMIN` accounts, password hashes, and session records; modify or delete any data in any tenant database; and/or i a superuser-scoped deployment: use PostgreSQL's `pg_read_server_files`, `COPY ... FROM PROGRAM`, and `CREATE EXTENSION` for further escalation inside the database container. This breaks the per-tenant database isolation that is otherwise the primary cross-tenant control in the application. The application code carefully scopes most queries to the calling tenant's database, but those scopings are irrelevant once the attacker holds the credentials that bypass the application entirely. Version 1.0.2 fixes the issue.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)
CWE
- CWE-200 - Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
Assigner
References
2 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-boo… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
| https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-boo… | x_refsource_MISC |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| open-reception | appointment-booking-software |
Affected:
< 1.0.2
|
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
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