CVE-2026-48079 (GCVE-0-2026-48079)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-06 21:00 – Updated: 2026-08-07 17:11
VLAI
Title
OpenReception's logout page clears local access_token before server-side revocation, leaving duplicated tokens valid until expiry
Summary
OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, when a user navigates to the `/logout` page, the page's server-side load handler deletes the `access_token` cookie before calling `/api/auth/logout` via an internal `event.fetch()`. The internal fetch consequently runs without the auth cookie, so `apiAuthHandle` rejects it, the logout handler never executes, and `SessionService.revokeSession()` is never called for the current session. The DB session row remains valid until its natural expiry (one week by default). The user sees a successful logout (cookie gone, UI returns to login), but any party still holding a copy of the now-deleted access token can continue making authenticated API calls until the session naturally expires. The root cause is a simple ordering mistake. The same auth subsystem implements the correct order in `/api/auth/logout`: revoke the current DB session first, then delete the cookie. The page-level wrapper does the opposite. Version 1.0.2 initiates server-side logout before removing authentication cookies and first appears in version 1.0.2. Version 2.0.0 later replaces this with a race-free client-side logout flow.
Severity
7.4 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)
CWE
  • CWE-613 - Insufficient Session Expiration
Assigner
References
Impacted products
Show details on NVD website
To clipboard 

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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

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Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.