{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In 29.0 and earlier, an unauthenticated remote attacker can read arbitrary image files anywhere on disk that the PHP user can open \u2014 including private user-profile photos that the application\u0027s normal serving wrappers gate behind ACLs, admin-uploaded thumbnails, encrypted-video poster frames, and image content under sibling-app directories reachable via .. traversal. The endpoint requires no authentication."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-46337",
  "lastModified": "2026-05-29T15:06:44.207",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV40": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackRequirements": "NONE",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "baseScore": 6.9,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
          "version": "4.0",
          "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
          "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
        },
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-05-29T14:16:31.520",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-w4qq-74h6-58wq"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Undergoing Analysis",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-22"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "WWBN/AVideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "29.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-46337"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862",
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-284"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-19T16:25:27Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe endpoint requires **no authentication**. An unauthenticated remote attacker can read arbitrary image files anywhere on disk that the PHP user can open \u2014 including private user-profile photos that the application\u0027s normal serving wrappers gate behind ACLs, admin-uploaded thumbnails, encrypted-video poster frames, and image content under sibling-app directories reachable via `..` traversal.\n\n### Details\n`view/img/image404Raw.php` reads the `image` GET parameter and joins it directly into a filesystem path served via `readfile()`.  `view/img/image404Raw.php` (full file, current `master` @ `0dbadbcaaa1b415c7db078a72dc4b26d9fac0485`):\n\n```php\n\u003c?php\n\n// Fetch requested image URL\n$imageURL = !empty($_GET[\u0027image\u0027]) ? $_GET[\u0027image\u0027] : $_SERVER[\"REQUEST_URI\"];\n$rootDir = dirname(__FILE__) . \u0027/../../\u0027;\nif ($imageURL == \u0027favicon.ico\u0027) {\n    $imgLocalFile = \"{$rootDir}/videos/{$imageURL}\";\n} else {\n    $imgLocalFile = \"{$rootDir}/{$imageURL}\";   // \u2190 attacker-controlled\n}\n\nif (file_exists($imgLocalFile)) {\n    $imageInfo = getimagesize($imgLocalFile);   // \u2190 format gate\n    if (empty($imageInfo)) {\n        die(\u0027not image\u0027);\n    }\n    // \u2026extension \u2192 Content-Type mapping\u2026\n    header(\"HTTP/1.0 200 OK\");\n    header(\u0027Content-Type: \u0027 . $type);\n    header(\u0027Content-Length: \u0027 . filesize($imgLocalFile));\n    readfile($imgLocalFile);   // \u2190 exfil bytes\n    exit;\n}\n```\n\nIssues:\n\n1. **No authentication.** The file is reachable via direct GET; no `require` of `globals.php`, no session check, no API-key gate.\n2. **No basename / realpath / prefix containment.** `$_GET[\u0027image\u0027]`  is concatenated into `$imgLocalFile` with no `..` filtering, no `realpath()` resolution, no allowlist check against the intended `view/img/` directory.\n3. **`getimagesize()` is a magic-bytes check, not a path constraint.**  Any file on disk whose first bytes match a recognized image format (`FFD8FF` JPEG, `89504E47` PNG, `474946` GIF, `52494646\u202657454250` WebP) passes the gate \u2014 including images stored outside any ACL\u0027d area of the application.\n4. **`$_SERVER[\"REQUEST_URI\"]` fallback** when `image` is empty widens the attack surface (path components in the URI itself land in `$imgLocalFile`).\n\n**Re-verified pre-submission** on 2026-05-13 against `view/img/image404Raw.php` blob SHA `c670b0faff4fbea1fd0508f179956975477d4340` \u2014 unsafe shape unchanged since first discovery on 2026-05-12.\n\n**Recommended fix** \u2014 three layered checks, any one alone is insufficient:\n\n```php\n// view/img/image404Raw.php \u2014 proposed fix\n\u003c?php\n\n$imageURL = !empty($_GET[\u0027image\u0027]) ? $_GET[\u0027image\u0027] : \u0027\u0027;\nif ($imageURL === \u0027\u0027) {\n    http_response_code(400);\n    exit(\u0027bad request\u0027);\n}\n\n// 1. Reject any path-traversal segment outright.\nif (strpos($imageURL, \u0027..\u0027) !== false\n    || strpos($imageURL, \"\\0\") !== false\n    || strpos($imageURL, \u0027://\u0027) !== false) {\n    http_response_code(400);\n    exit(\u0027bad request\u0027);\n}\n\n// 2. Resolve to a real path and verify prefix containment under the\n//    intended image directory.\n$rootDir = realpath(dirname(__FILE__) . \u0027/../../\u0027);\n$imgLocalFile = realpath($rootDir . \u0027/\u0027 . $imageURL);\nif ($imgLocalFile === false\n    || (strpos($imgLocalFile, $rootDir . \u0027/videos/\u0027) !== 0\n        \u0026\u0026 strpos($imgLocalFile, $rootDir . \u0027/view/img/\u0027) !== 0)) {\n    http_response_code(404);\n    exit(\u0027not found\u0027);\n}\n\n// 3. Existing getimagesize() check stays as defense-in-depth.\nif (!is_file($imgLocalFile)) {\n    http_response_code(404);\n    exit(\u0027not found\u0027);\n}\n$imageInfo = @getimagesize($imgLocalFile);\nif (empty($imageInfo)) {\n    http_response_code(404);\n    exit(\u0027not image\u0027);\n}\n\n// \u2026rest of the original Content-Type + readfile() flow unchanged\u2026\n```\n\nDrop the `$_SERVER[\"REQUEST_URI\"]` fallback entirely; if no `image`\nparameter is provided, return 400.\n\n### PoC\n\nDiscovery probe \u2014 any HTTP client, no authentication, no cookies:\n\n```http\nGET /view/img/image404Raw.php?image=../videos/userPhoto/photo1.jpg HTTP/1.1\nHost: avideo.example.com\n```\n\nIf `videos/userPhoto/photo1.jpg` exists on the server, the response is the raw image bytes (HTTP 200, `Content-Type: image/jpeg`). The application\u0027s normal user-photo serving wrapper (which can gate by session / channel ownership) is bypassed entirely.\n\nCross-directory probe \u2014 read images outside the AVideo install root:\n\n```http\nGET /view/img/image404Raw.php?image=../../../var/www/other-app/uploads/users/admin.jpg HTTP/1.1\nHost: avideo.example.com\n```\n\nIf the PHP user has read access to a sibling app\u0027s image directory, those files are exfiltrable too.\n\nEnumeration \u2014 iterate over predictable numeric IDs:\n\n```\nGET /view/img/image404Raw.php?image=../videos/userPhoto/photo1.jpg\nGET /view/img/image404Raw.php?image=../videos/userPhoto/photo2.jpg\nGET /view/img/image404Raw.php?image=../videos/userPhoto/photo3.jpg\n...\n```\n\n\u2026to harvest all profile images regardless of the application\u0027s intended privacy controls.\n\n### Impact\n\n**Path traversal \u2192 arbitrary image read (CWE-22 + CWE-284).** Affects any AVideo deployment running master through commit `0dbadbca` and likely every release on the supported branches. The attacker:\n\n1. **Bypasses the application\u0027s image-content ACLs.** Profile photos under `videos/userPhoto/` and admin-uploaded private thumbnails  that AVideo\u0027s normal image-serving wrappers gate by session / channel ownership become readable to any anonymous internet user.\n2. **Reads images stored outside the AVideo install root.** On shared-hosting / multi-tenant deployments, `..` traversal lets the  attacker page into sibling-app upload directories \u2014 anywhere the PHP user has read access on disk and the target file\u0027s first bytes form a valid image header.\n3. **Enables enumeration at scale.** Numeric ID schemes (`photo1.jpg`, `photo2.jpg`, \u2026) and predictable filenames let an attacker harvest every private image on a deployment without detection (each request looks like a single 200-image-OK to the web log).\n\nBecause the read primitive is restricted to image-magic-bytes files, there is no source-code or credential exfiltration via this primitive alone \u2014 but the **privacy / GDPR exposure** is substantial on any deployment that hosts user-uploaded photos. CVSS 5.3 (Medium) reflects the limited but real confidentiality impact; many operators will rate this higher because the leaked content is user-private by intent.\n\nThis is **not** a silent-fix disclosure \u2014 the bug is still present on current `master` at submission time; the maintainer is being\nnotified of a previously-unknown issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-w4qq-74h6-58wq",
  "modified": "2026-05-19T16:25:27Z",
  "published": "2026-05-19T16:25:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-w4qq-74h6-58wq"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AVideo: Unauthenticated Arbitrary Image Read via Path Traversal in `view/img/image404Raw.php`"
}