CVE-2026-43388 (GCVE-0-2026-43388)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-05-08 14:21 – Updated: 2026-05-08 14:21
VLAI?
Title
mm/damon/core: clear walk_control on inactive context in damos_walk()
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/damon/core: clear walk_control on inactive context in damos_walk()
damos_walk() sets ctx->walk_control to the caller-provided control
structure before checking whether the context is running. If the context
is inactive (damon_is_running() returns false), the function returns
-EINVAL without clearing ctx->walk_control. This leaves a dangling
pointer to a stack-allocated structure that will be freed when the caller
returns.
This is structurally identical to the bug fixed in commit f9132fbc2e83
("mm/damon/core: remove call_control in inactive contexts") for
damon_call(), which had the same pattern of linking a control object and
returning an error without unlinking it.
The dangling walk_control pointer can cause:
1. Use-after-free if the context is later started and kdamond
dereferences ctx->walk_control (e.g., in damos_walk_cancel()
which writes to control->canceled and calls complete())
2. Permanent -EBUSY from subsequent damos_walk() calls, since the
stale pointer is non-NULL
Nonetheless, the real user impact is quite restrictive. The
use-after-free is impossible because there is no damos_walk() callers who
starts the context later. The permanent -EBUSY can actually confuse
users, as DAMON is not running. But the symptom is kept only while the
context is turned off. Turning it on again will make DAMON internally
uses a newly generated damon_ctx object that doesn't have the invalid
damos_walk_control pointer, so everything will work fine again.
Fix this by clearing ctx->walk_control under walk_control_lock before
returning -EINVAL, mirroring the fix pattern from f9132fbc2e83.
Severity ?
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
bf0eaba0ff9c9c8e6fd58ddfa1a8b6df4b813f61 , < ce0aa47c963b8c3e5beace89e2b5a665a64b5b6b
(git)
Affected: bf0eaba0ff9c9c8e6fd58ddfa1a8b6df4b813f61 , < 9320c77134ab8d7701e20608bbf08517df4fa321 (git) Affected: bf0eaba0ff9c9c8e6fd58ddfa1a8b6df4b813f61 , < d210fdcac9c0d1380eab448aebc93f602c1cd4e6 (git) |
||
{
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"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.14"
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{
"lessThan": "6.14",
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"version": "0",
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{
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"version": "6.18.19",
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{
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"version": "6.19.9",
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{
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"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.0",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
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"nodes": [
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],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm/damon/core: clear walk_control on inactive context in damos_walk()\n\ndamos_walk() sets ctx-\u003ewalk_control to the caller-provided control\nstructure before checking whether the context is running. If the context\nis inactive (damon_is_running() returns false), the function returns\n-EINVAL without clearing ctx-\u003ewalk_control. This leaves a dangling\npointer to a stack-allocated structure that will be freed when the caller\nreturns.\n\nThis is structurally identical to the bug fixed in commit f9132fbc2e83\n(\"mm/damon/core: remove call_control in inactive contexts\") for\ndamon_call(), which had the same pattern of linking a control object and\nreturning an error without unlinking it.\n\nThe dangling walk_control pointer can cause:\n1. Use-after-free if the context is later started and kdamond\n\u00a0 \u00a0dereferences ctx-\u003ewalk_control (e.g., in damos_walk_cancel()\n\u00a0 \u00a0which writes to control-\u003ecanceled and calls complete())\n2. Permanent -EBUSY from subsequent damos_walk() calls, since the\n\u00a0 \u00a0stale pointer is non-NULL\n\nNonetheless, the real user impact is quite restrictive. The\nuse-after-free is impossible because there is no damos_walk() callers who\nstarts the context later. The permanent -EBUSY can actually confuse\nusers, as DAMON is not running. But the symptom is kept only while the\ncontext is turned off. Turning it on again will make DAMON internally\nuses a newly generated damon_ctx object that doesn\u0027t have the invalid\ndamos_walk_control pointer, so everything will work fine again.\n\nFix this by clearing ctx-\u003ewalk_control under walk_control_lock before\nreturning -EINVAL, mirroring the fix pattern from f9132fbc2e83."
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-05-08T14:21:33.966Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ce0aa47c963b8c3e5beace89e2b5a665a64b5b6b"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9320c77134ab8d7701e20608bbf08517df4fa321"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d210fdcac9c0d1380eab448aebc93f602c1cd4e6"
}
],
"title": "mm/damon/core: clear walk_control on inactive context in damos_walk()",
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}
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"cveMetadata": {
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"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-43388",
"datePublished": "2026-05-08T14:21:33.966Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-05-01T14:12:56.006Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-05-08T14:21:33.966Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"nvd": "{\"cve\":{\"id\":\"CVE-2026-43388\",\"sourceIdentifier\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"published\":\"2026-05-08T15:16:50.180\",\"lastModified\":\"2026-05-08T15:16:50.180\",\"vulnStatus\":\"Received\",\"cveTags\":[],\"descriptions\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nmm/damon/core: clear walk_control on inactive context in damos_walk()\\n\\ndamos_walk() sets ctx-\u003ewalk_control to the caller-provided control\\nstructure before checking whether the context is running. If the context\\nis inactive (damon_is_running() returns false), the function returns\\n-EINVAL without clearing ctx-\u003ewalk_control. This leaves a dangling\\npointer to a stack-allocated structure that will be freed when the caller\\nreturns.\\n\\nThis is structurally identical to the bug fixed in commit f9132fbc2e83\\n(\\\"mm/damon/core: remove call_control in inactive contexts\\\") for\\ndamon_call(), which had the same pattern of linking a control object and\\nreturning an error without unlinking it.\\n\\nThe dangling walk_control pointer can cause:\\n1. Use-after-free if the context is later started and kdamond\\n\u00a0 \u00a0dereferences ctx-\u003ewalk_control (e.g., in damos_walk_cancel()\\n\u00a0 \u00a0which writes to control-\u003ecanceled and calls complete())\\n2. Permanent -EBUSY from subsequent damos_walk() calls, since the\\n\u00a0 \u00a0stale pointer is non-NULL\\n\\nNonetheless, the real user impact is quite restrictive. The\\nuse-after-free is impossible because there is no damos_walk() callers who\\nstarts the context later. The permanent -EBUSY can actually confuse\\nusers, as DAMON is not running. But the symptom is kept only while the\\ncontext is turned off. Turning it on again will make DAMON internally\\nuses a newly generated damon_ctx object that doesn\u0027t have the invalid\\ndamos_walk_control pointer, so everything will work fine again.\\n\\nFix this by clearing ctx-\u003ewalk_control under walk_control_lock before\\nreturning -EINVAL, mirroring the fix pattern from f9132fbc2e83.\"}],\"metrics\":{},\"references\":[{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9320c77134ab8d7701e20608bbf08517df4fa321\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ce0aa47c963b8c3e5beace89e2b5a665a64b5b6b\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d210fdcac9c0d1380eab448aebc93f602c1cd4e6\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"}]}}"
}
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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