{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Russh is a Rust SSH client \u0026 server library. Prior to version 0.60.1, a pre-authentication denial-of-service vulnerability exists in the server\u0027s keyboard-interactive authentication handler. A malicious client can crash any russh-based server that implements keyboard-interactive auth (e.g., for 2FA/TOTP) with a single malformed packet, requiring no credentials. This issue has been patched in version 0.60.1."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-42189",
  "lastModified": "2026-05-08T20:16:31.443",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 7.5,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-05-08T20:16:31.443",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/commit/6c3c80a9b6d60763d6227d60fa8310e57172a4d1"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/releases/tag/v0.60.1"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisories/GHSA-f5v4-2wr6-hqmg"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Received",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-770"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-789"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "russh"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.60.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42189"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770",
      "CWE-789"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-24T15:39:37Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nA pre-authentication denial-of-service vulnerability exists in the server\u0027s keyboard-interactive authentication handler. A malicious client can crash any russh-based server that implements keyboard-interactive auth (e.g., for 2FA/TOTP) with a single malformed packet, requiring no credentials.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\nIn `russh/src/server/encrypted.rs`, the function `read_userauth_info_response` decodes a `u32` count from the client\u0027s `SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE` and passes it directly to `Vec::with_capacity()`:\n\n```rust\nlet n = map_err!(u32::decode(r))?;\n\n// Bound both allocation and iteration by remaining packet data to\n// prevent a malicious client from causing a multi-GB allocation or\n// billions of loop iterations with a crafted count.\n// Each response needs at least 4 bytes (length prefix).\nlet max_responses = r.remaining_len().saturating_add(3) / 4;\nlet n = (n as usize).min(max_responses);\nlet mut responses = Vec::with_capacity(n);\nfor _ in 0..n {\n    responses.push(Bytes::decode(r).ok())\n}\n```\n\nAn attacker can send `n = 0x10000000` (268M) or larger in a minimal packet (~50 bytes after encryption). The server attempts to allocate `n * ~24 bytes` (size of `Option\u003cBytes\u003e`) = ~6.4GB, causing an OOM crash.\n\n## Attack Flow\n\n1. Attacker connects via TCP, completes key exchange (no credentials needed -- this is the anonymous DH handshake, not authentication)\n2. Sends `USERAUTH_REQUEST` with method `keyboard-interactive`\n3. Server handler returns `Auth::Partial` with prompts (standard for 2FA/TOTP)\n4. Attacker sends `USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE` with `n = 0x10000000` and no response data\n5. Server calls `Vec::with_capacity(268_435_456)`, OOM killed\n\nNo authentication is required. The allocation occurs before the handler validates any credentials. The attack is repeatable faster than the server can restart.\n\n## Affected Configurations\n\nAny russh-based server where the `Handler::auth_keyboard_interactive` implementation returns `Auth::Partial` (i.e., sends prompts to the client). The default handler returns `Auth::reject()` and is not affected.\n\nSource code review suggests that downstream projects using keyboard-interactive for multi-step auth (e.g., TOTP/2FA) follow the affected pattern, since returning `Auth::Partial` before credential verification is the intended API usage for prompting.\n\n## Confirmed End-to-End PoC\n\nThere is a complete Docker-contained PoC confirming the OOM kill:\n- Minimal russh server returning `Auth::Partial` for keyboard-interactive\n- Python client (paramiko for key exchange) sends malformed `USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE`\n- Container with 512MB memory limit; server is OOM-killed (exit code 137)\n\nAvailable on request.\n\n## Proposed Fix\n\nCap the `Vec::with_capacity` allocation to what the remaining packet data can actually contain. Each response requires at least 4 bytes (length prefix), so:\n\n```rust\nlet n = map_err!(u32::decode(r))?;\n\n// Bound both allocation and iteration by remaining packet data to\n// prevent a malicious client from causing a multi-GB allocation or\n// billions of loop iterations with a crafted count.\n// Each response needs at least 4 bytes (length prefix).\nlet max_responses = r.remaining_len().saturating_add(3) / 4;\nlet n = (n as usize).min(max_responses);\nlet mut responses = Vec::with_capacity(n);\nfor _ in 0..n {\n    responses.push(Bytes::decode(r).ok())\n}\n```\n\nThis bounds the allocation to at most the packet size (~256KB), while preserving the existing behavior for well-formed packets. This fix has been implemented, tested, and contributed via the temporary private fork.\n\n## Severity\n\nPre-auth, remote, no credentials required, crashes the server process affecting all active sessions.",
  "id": "GHSA-f5v4-2wr6-hqmg",
  "modified": "2026-05-04T20:36:57Z",
  "published": "2026-04-24T15:39:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisories/GHSA-f5v4-2wr6-hqmg"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/commit/6c3c80a9b6d60763d6227d60fa8310e57172a4d1"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/releases/tag/v0.60.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "russh has pre-auth DoS via unbounded allocation in its keyboard-interactive auth handler"
}