CVE-2026-15924 (GCVE-0-2026-15924)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-14 19:33 – Updated: 2026-09-14 20:04
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Use-after-free / double-free from unsynchronized concurrent access to the TLS client session cache in Zephyr sockets
Summary
Zephyr's TLS socket layer in subsys/net/lib/sockets/sockets_tls.c keeps a single process-global array, client_cache, of cached client sessions that is shared by every TLS socket context. The functions that mutate and read it — tls_session_save(), tls_session_get(), tls_session_cache_reset(), and the settings restore handler — allocate, free, and dereference each entry's heap buffer (entry->session). Before the fix these accesses were serialized only by the per-socket context mutex ctx->lock (assigned per socket in ctx_set_lock()), which provides no mutual exclusion between different sockets touching the shared cache.
Because CONFIG_NET_SOCKETS_TLS_MAX_CLIENT_SESSION_COUNT defaults to 1, any two concurrent client sockets contend for the same slot. A thread in tls_session_get() reading entry->session inside mbedtls_ssl_session_load() can run concurrently with another thread in tls_session_save() that selects the same entry for reuse and executes mbedtls_free(entry->session) before reallocating — a use-after-free read, and a double-free when two saves evict the same entry. Both corrupt the mbedTLS heap. The cache is reached on ordinary client paths: at connect time via tls_session_store()/tls_session_restore(), and (on main) whenever a TLS 1.3 session ticket arrives during recv()/poll() via tls_session_store_current().
Exploitation requires an application that opts into per-socket client session caching (the TLS_SESSION_CACHE socket option, off by default) and runs concurrent TLS client connections on multiple threads; the timing that opens the window is influenced by the remote peer(s), so a malicious or compromised server can raise session-ticket frequency to widen it. The reliably-demonstrable impact is memory corruption leading to a crash or heap corruption (denial of service). The fix adds a dedicated session_cache_lock mutex taken across every accessor of client_cache, serializing all reads and frees and closing the race.
Severity
5.9 (Medium)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-14 20:04 UTC
CWE
- CWE-416 - use-after-free
Assigner
References
2 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| zephyrproject | zephyr |
Affected:
3.1.0 , < 4.4.2
(semver)
|
guessed |
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
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