cve-2023-52828
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2024-05-21 15:31
Modified
2024-12-19 08:26
Severity ?
6.6 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Detect IP == ksym.end as part of BPF program Now that bpf_throw kfunc is the first such call instruction that has noreturn semantics within the verifier, this also kicks in dead code elimination in unprecedented ways. For one, any instruction following a bpf_throw call will never be marked as seen. Moreover, if a callchain ends up throwing, any instructions after the call instruction to the eventually throwing subprog in callers will also never be marked as seen. The tempting way to fix this would be to emit extra 'int3' instructions which bump the jited_len of a program, and ensure that during runtime when a program throws, we can discover its boundaries even if the call instruction to bpf_throw (or to subprogs that always throw) is emitted as the final instruction in the program. An example of such a program would be this: do_something(): ... r0 = 0 exit foo(): r1 = 0 call bpf_throw r0 = 0 exit bar(cond): if r1 != 0 goto pc+2 call do_something exit call foo r0 = 0 // Never seen by verifier exit // main(ctx): r1 = ... call bar r0 = 0 exit Here, if we do end up throwing, the stacktrace would be the following: bpf_throw foo bar main In bar, the final instruction emitted will be the call to foo, as such, the return address will be the subsequent instruction (which the JIT emits as int3 on x86). This will end up lying outside the jited_len of the program, thus, when unwinding, we will fail to discover the return address as belonging to any program and end up in a panic due to the unreliable stack unwinding of BPF programs that we never expect. To remedy this case, make bpf_prog_ksym_find treat IP == ksym.end as part of the BPF program, so that is_bpf_text_address returns true when such a case occurs, and we are able to unwind reliably when the final instruction ends up being a call instruction.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/327b92e8cb527ae097961ffd1610c720481947f5
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6058e4829696412457729a00734969acc6fd1d18
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/66d9111f3517f85ef2af0337ece02683ce0faf21
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/821a7e4143af115b840ec199eb179537e18af922
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa42a7cb92647786719fe9608685da345883878f
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cf353904a82873e952633fcac4385c2fcd3a46e1
af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/327b92e8cb527ae097961ffd1610c720481947f5
af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6058e4829696412457729a00734969acc6fd1d18
af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/66d9111f3517f85ef2af0337ece02683ce0faf21
af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/821a7e4143af115b840ec199eb179537e18af922
af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa42a7cb92647786719fe9608685da345883878f
af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cf353904a82873e952633fcac4385c2fcd3a46e1
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Version: 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2
Version: 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2
Version: 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2
Version: 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2
Version: 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2
Version: 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2
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Moreover, if a callchain\\nends up throwing, any instructions after the call instruction to the\\neventually throwing subprog in callers will also never be marked as\\nseen.\\n\\nThe tempting way to fix this would be to emit extra 'int3' instructions\\nwhich bump the jited_len of a program, and ensure that during runtime\\nwhen a program throws, we can discover its boundaries even if the call\\ninstruction to bpf_throw (or to subprogs that always throw) is emitted\\nas the final instruction in the program.\\n\\nAn example of such a program would be this:\\n\\ndo_something():\\n\\t...\\n\\tr0 = 0\\n\\texit\\n\\nfoo():\\n\\tr1 = 0\\n\\tcall bpf_throw\\n\\tr0 = 0\\n\\texit\\n\\nbar(cond):\\n\\tif r1 != 0 goto pc+2\\n\\tcall do_something\\n\\texit\\n\\tcall foo\\n\\tr0 = 0  // Never seen by verifier\\n\\texit\\t//\\n\\nmain(ctx):\\n\\tr1 = ...\\n\\tcall bar\\n\\tr0 = 0\\n\\texit\\n\\nHere, if we do end up throwing, the stacktrace would be the following:\\n\\nbpf_throw\\nfoo\\nbar\\nmain\\n\\nIn bar, the final instruction emitted will be the call to foo, as such,\\nthe return address will be the subsequent instruction (which the JIT\\nemits as int3 on x86). This will end up lying outside the jited_len of\\nthe program, thus, when unwinding, we will fail to discover the return\\naddress as belonging to any program and end up in a panic due to the\\nunreliable stack unwinding of BPF programs that we never expect.\\n\\nTo remedy this case, make bpf_prog_ksym_find treat IP == ksym.end as\\npart of the BPF program, so that is_bpf_text_address returns true when\\nsuch a case occurs, and we are able to unwind reliably when the final\\ninstruction ends up being a call instruction.\"},{\"lang\":\"es\",\"value\":\"En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: bpf: Detectar IP == ksym.end como parte del programa BPF. Ahora que bpf_throw kfunc es la primera instrucción de llamada que no tiene semántica de retorno dentro del verificador, esto también activa el código muerto eliminación de formas sin precedentes. Por un lado, cualquier instrucción que siga a una llamada a bpf_throw nunca se marcará como vista. Además, si una cadena de llamadas termina lanzándose, cualquier instrucción posterior a la instrucción de llamada al subprog que finalmente se lance en las personas que llaman tampoco se marcará como vista. La forma tentadora de solucionar este problema sería emitir instrucciones 'int3' adicionales que superen el jited_len de un programa y garantizar que, durante el tiempo de ejecución, cuando se inicia un programa, podamos descubrir sus límites incluso si la instrucción de llamada a bpf_throw (o a subprogs que siempre tirar) se emite como instrucción final en el programa. Un ejemplo de un programa de este tipo sería este: do_something(): ... r0 = 0 salir foo(): r1 = 0 llamar a bpf_throw r0 = 0 salir de la barra (cond): si r1 != 0 ir a pc+2 llamar a hacer_algo exit call foo r0 = 0 // Nunca visto por el verificador exit // main(ctx): r1 = ... call bar r0 = 0 exit Aquí, si terminamos lanzando, el seguimiento de pila sería el siguiente: bpf_throw foo bar main En bar, la instrucción final emitida será la llamada a foo, como tal, la dirección de retorno será la instrucción posterior (que el JIT emite como int3 en x86). Esto terminará quedando fuera del jited_len del programa, por lo tanto, al desenrollarlo, no podremos descubrir que la dirección del remitente pertenece a ningún programa y terminaremos en pánico debido al desenrollado poco confiable de la pila de programas BPF que nunca esperamos. Para remediar este caso, haga que bpf_prog_ksym_find trate IP == ksym.end como parte del programa BPF, de modo que is_bpf_text_address devuelva verdadero cuando ocurra tal caso, y podamos desenredarlo de manera confiable cuando la instrucción final termine siendo una instrucción de llamada.\"}],\"metrics\":{\"cvssMetricV31\":[{\"source\":\"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0\",\"type\":\"Secondary\",\"cvssData\":{\"version\":\"3.1\",\"vectorString\":\"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L\",\"baseScore\":6.6,\"baseSeverity\":\"MEDIUM\",\"attackVector\":\"LOCAL\",\"attackComplexity\":\"LOW\",\"privilegesRequired\":\"LOW\",\"userInteraction\":\"NONE\",\"scope\":\"UNCHANGED\",\"confidentialityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"integrityImpact\":\"LOW\",\"availabilityImpact\":\"LOW\"},\"exploitabilityScore\":1.8,\"impactScore\":4.7}]},\"references\":[{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/327b92e8cb527ae097961ffd1610c720481947f5\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6058e4829696412457729a00734969acc6fd1d18\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/66d9111f3517f85ef2af0337ece02683ce0faf21\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/821a7e4143af115b840ec199eb179537e18af922\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa42a7cb92647786719fe9608685da345883878f\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cf353904a82873e952633fcac4385c2fcd3a46e1\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/327b92e8cb527ae097961ffd1610c720481947f5\",\"source\":\"af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6058e4829696412457729a00734969acc6fd1d18\",\"source\":\"af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/66d9111f3517f85ef2af0337ece02683ce0faf21\",\"source\":\"af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/821a7e4143af115b840ec199eb179537e18af922\",\"source\":\"af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa42a7cb92647786719fe9608685da345883878f\",\"source\":\"af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cf353904a82873e952633fcac4385c2fcd3a46e1\",\"source\":\"af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108\"}]}}",
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\"2024-05-29T17:18:06.504Z\"}}], \"cna\": {\"title\": \"bpf: Detect IP == ksym.end as part of BPF program\", \"affected\": [{\"repo\": \"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git\", \"vendor\": \"Linux\", \"product\": \"Linux\", \"versions\": [{\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2\", \"lessThan\": \"6058e4829696412457729a00734969acc6fd1d18\", \"versionType\": \"git\"}, {\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2\", \"lessThan\": \"cf353904a82873e952633fcac4385c2fcd3a46e1\", \"versionType\": \"git\"}, {\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2\", \"lessThan\": \"aa42a7cb92647786719fe9608685da345883878f\", \"versionType\": \"git\"}, {\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2\", \"lessThan\": \"327b92e8cb527ae097961ffd1610c720481947f5\", \"versionType\": \"git\"}, {\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": 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{\"status\": \"unaffected\", \"version\": \"6.6.3\", \"versionType\": \"semver\", \"lessThanOrEqual\": \"6.6.*\"}, {\"status\": \"unaffected\", \"version\": \"6.7\", \"versionType\": \"original_commit_for_fix\", \"lessThanOrEqual\": \"*\"}], \"programFiles\": [\"kernel/bpf/core.c\"], \"defaultStatus\": \"affected\"}], \"references\": [{\"url\": \"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6058e4829696412457729a00734969acc6fd1d18\"}, {\"url\": \"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cf353904a82873e952633fcac4385c2fcd3a46e1\"}, {\"url\": \"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa42a7cb92647786719fe9608685da345883878f\"}, {\"url\": \"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/327b92e8cb527ae097961ffd1610c720481947f5\"}, {\"url\": \"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/821a7e4143af115b840ec199eb179537e18af922\"}, {\"url\": \"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/66d9111f3517f85ef2af0337ece02683ce0faf21\"}], \"x_generator\": {\"engine\": \"bippy-5f407fcff5a0\"}, \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nbpf: Detect IP == ksym.end as part of BPF program\\n\\nNow that bpf_throw kfunc is the first such call instruction that has\\nnoreturn semantics within the verifier, this also kicks in dead code\\nelimination in unprecedented ways. For one, any instruction following\\na bpf_throw call will never be marked as seen. Moreover, if a callchain\\nends up throwing, any instructions after the call instruction to the\\neventually throwing subprog in callers will also never be marked as\\nseen.\\n\\nThe tempting way to fix this would be to emit extra 'int3' instructions\\nwhich bump the jited_len of a program, and ensure that during runtime\\nwhen a program throws, we can discover its boundaries even if the call\\ninstruction to bpf_throw (or to subprogs that always throw) is emitted\\nas the final instruction in the program.\\n\\nAn example of such a program would be this:\\n\\ndo_something():\\n\\t...\\n\\tr0 = 0\\n\\texit\\n\\nfoo():\\n\\tr1 = 0\\n\\tcall bpf_throw\\n\\tr0 = 0\\n\\texit\\n\\nbar(cond):\\n\\tif r1 != 0 goto pc+2\\n\\tcall do_something\\n\\texit\\n\\tcall foo\\n\\tr0 = 0  // Never seen by verifier\\n\\texit\\t//\\n\\nmain(ctx):\\n\\tr1 = ...\\n\\tcall bar\\n\\tr0 = 0\\n\\texit\\n\\nHere, if we do end up throwing, the stacktrace would be the following:\\n\\nbpf_throw\\nfoo\\nbar\\nmain\\n\\nIn bar, the final instruction emitted will be the call to foo, as such,\\nthe return address will be the subsequent instruction (which the JIT\\nemits as int3 on x86). This will end up lying outside the jited_len of\\nthe program, thus, when unwinding, we will fail to discover the return\\naddress as belonging to any program and end up in a panic due to the\\nunreliable stack unwinding of BPF programs that we never expect.\\n\\nTo remedy this case, make bpf_prog_ksym_find treat IP == ksym.end as\\npart of the BPF program, so that is_bpf_text_address returns true when\\nsuch a case occurs, and we are able to unwind reliably when the final\\ninstruction ends up being a call instruction.\"}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\", \"shortName\": \"Linux\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2024-12-19T08:26:45.372Z\"}}}",
         cveMetadata: "{\"cveId\": \"CVE-2023-52828\", \"state\": \"PUBLISHED\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2024-12-19T08:26:45.372Z\", \"dateReserved\": \"2024-05-21T15:19:24.251Z\", \"assignerOrgId\": \"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\", \"datePublished\": \"2024-05-21T15:31:31.501Z\", \"assignerShortName\": \"Linux\"}",
         dataType: "CVE_RECORD",
         dataVersion: "5.1",
      },
   },
}


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