CVE-2018-14085 (GCVE-0-2018-14085)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2018-07-16 02:00 – Updated: 2024-09-16 16:22
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Summary
An issue was discovered in a smart contract implementation for UserWallet 0x0a7bca9FB7AfF26c6ED8029BB6f0F5D291587c42, an Ethereum token. First, suppose that the owner adds the evil contract address to his sweepers. The evil contract looks like this: contract Exploit { uint public start; function sweep(address _token, uint _amount) returns (bool) { start = 0x123456789; return true;} }. Then, when one calls the function sweep() in the UserWallet contract, it will change the sweeperList to 0X123456789.
Severity
7.5 (High)
CWE
- n/a
Assigner
References
1 reference
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/hellowuzekai/blockchains/blob/… | x_refsource_MISC |
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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