Vulnerability from bitnami_vulndb
Published
2026-06-30 23:39
Modified
2026-07-01 00:07
Summary
Envoy: HTTP/3 to HTTP/1 request smuggling via headers-only request with nonzero Content-Length
Details

Envoy is an open source edge and service proxy designed for cloud-native applications. Prior to 1.35.11, 1.36.7, 1.37.3, and 1.38.1, Envoy can translate a downstream HTTP/3 request that is complete at the transport layer (HEADERS with FIN / headers-only close) but still carries a nonzero Content-Length into a complete upstream HTTP/1 request with unresolved body debt. In an HTTP/1 upstream deployment where the origin replies before reading the declared body and keeps the connection reusable, the beginning of the next Envoy-generated upstream request can be consumed as the first request's body. The remaining bytes are then parsed by the origin as a new HTTP/1 request. This was reproduced as a route-bypass/desync: direct /pwn was denied by Envoy, but the second downstream H3 stream received the response for backend-parsed GET /pwn HTTP/1.1. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.35.11, 1.36.7, 1.37.3, and 1.38.1.


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Bitnami",
        "name": "envoy",
        "purl": "pkg:bitnami/envoy"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.35.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.35.13"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "1.36.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.36.9"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "1.37.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.37.5"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "1.38.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.38.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "severity": [
        {
          "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N",
          "type": "CVSS_V3"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-48743"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cpes": [
      "cpe:2.3:a:envoyproxy:envoy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
    ],
    "severity": "High"
  },
  "details": "Envoy is an open source edge and service proxy designed for cloud-native applications. Prior to 1.35.11, 1.36.7, 1.37.3, and 1.38.1, Envoy can translate a downstream HTTP/3 request that is complete at the transport layer (HEADERS with FIN / headers-only close) but still carries a nonzero Content-Length into a complete upstream HTTP/1 request with unresolved body debt. In an HTTP/1 upstream deployment where the origin replies before reading the declared body and keeps the connection reusable, the beginning of the next Envoy-generated upstream request can be consumed as the first request\u0027s body. The remaining bytes are then parsed by the origin as a new HTTP/1 request. This was reproduced as a route-bypass/desync: direct /pwn was denied by Envoy, but the second downstream H3 stream received the response for backend-parsed GET /pwn HTTP/1.1. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.35.11, 1.36.7, 1.37.3, and 1.38.1.",
  "id": "BIT-envoy-2026-48743",
  "modified": "2026-07-01T00:07:50.168Z",
  "published": "2026-06-30T23:39:39.412Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/security/advisories/GHSA-8phg-2h2q-jgxf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48743"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.6.2",
  "summary": "Envoy: HTTP/3 to HTTP/1 request smuggling via headers-only request with nonzero Content-Length"
}


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