MAL-2026-17756
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: kam193 (a74b7c5b356a87fe0262954cbedbcc432497ab25edaccbade0ce9ce04b16a8c9)
In this campaign, the main package (webreader) has an embeded pickle disguised as a config. A related dependency (pafer) contains code to load the pickle. During unpickling, malicious code embeded in the pickle file is automatically executed. It then establishes persistence via a PTH file and downloads the next stage payload. It finally acts like a RAT, allowing remote exfiltration and code execution.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-10-webreader
Reasons (based on the campaign):
-
rat
-
Downloads and executes a remote malicious script.
-
obfuscation
-
The package contains code to execute remote commands (probably limited to a specific set) on the victim's machine.
-
abuses-pth
-
persistence
-
The malicious code is intentionally included in a dependency of the package
-
files-exfiltration
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "pafer"
},
"versions": [
"0.9.7",
"0.9.8"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"https://github.com/kam193",
"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"
],
"name": "Kamil Ma\u0144kowski (kam193)",
"type": "REPORTER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"iocs": {
"domains": [
"frjmzbjbhwvtdnsuodmu.supabase.co"
],
"urls": [
"https://api.npoint.io/40e32d283a9d97e59252/a"
]
},
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "pypi/2026-10-webreader/pafer",
"import_time": "2026-10-10T11:40:44.044102873Z",
"modified_time": "2026-10-10T11:11:35.029137Z",
"sha256": "a74b7c5b356a87fe0262954cbedbcc432497ab25edaccbade0ce9ce04b16a8c9",
"source": "kam193",
"versions": [
"0.9.7",
"0.9.8"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: kam193 (a74b7c5b356a87fe0262954cbedbcc432497ab25edaccbade0ce9ce04b16a8c9)\nIn this campaign, the main package (webreader) has an embeded pickle disguised as a config. A related dependency (pafer) contains code to load the pickle. During unpickling, malicious code embeded in the pickle file is automatically executed. It then establishes persistence via a PTH file and downloads the next stage payload. It finally acts like a RAT, allowing remote exfiltration and code execution.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: 2026-10-webreader\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - rat\n\n\n - Downloads and executes a remote malicious script.\n\n\n - obfuscation\n\n\n - The package contains code to execute remote commands (probably limited to a specific set) on the victim\u0027s machine.\n\n\n - abuses-pth\n\n\n - persistence\n\n\n - The malicious code is intentionally included in a dependency of the package\n\n\n - files-exfiltration\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-17756",
"modified": "2026-10-10T11:11:35Z",
"published": "2026-10-10T11:11:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/pafer"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in pafer (PyPI)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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