MAL-2026-17711
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (4b0b4a2bb63a48ca7c9f712068de893526ec0e3515ffd367f37b5c251034965a)
The package shadows internal Wix registry module names (thunderboltRegistry, corvidRegistry, editorRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, and others) and ships a registry-manifest.min.json pointing at a parastorage CDN URL so that loading one of these registry entries resolves to this package's code. thunderboltRegistry.js runs an IIFE at module load that executes id and hostname via child_process.execSync, combines the output with process.platform, process.arch, process.pid, and process.version, and sends the values as query-string parameters in a fetch() call to the hardcoded collector https://webhook.site/43022177-de67-4d5c-a6df-33083b2b026f. The exported factories return Proxy stubs rather than implementing the real registry contracts, so the module's only effective behavior when loaded by a Wix SSR host is the reconnaissance beacon.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "thunderboltRegistry.js",
"sha256": "46519090230ab9b5dfcbb773c026b2e5bfb552541a3137cdb0b9da125e668792",
"tlsh": "5b41009a789ef001839374399d7f848af0bb4c632d6cba94b44491f02f7646c417aafd"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "wix-reg-poc-bypass-1.0.0.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "74b04dbe9fefdfc80e664b50ec42f4546a422ca3",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-rjZr1v0YcvQ/+WU1i97AVPgTKVUvSDLXg3s1HEW8WzUfeGwSglrYP28Ak4tD6pa9KEK3fbbxojmbOtgjl6fJ/g=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "wix-reg-poc-bypass"
},
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-021274",
"import_time": "2026-10-09T00:53:54.628574529Z",
"modified_time": "2026-10-09T00:02:40Z",
"sha256": "4b0b4a2bb63a48ca7c9f712068de893526ec0e3515ffd367f37b5c251034965a",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (4b0b4a2bb63a48ca7c9f712068de893526ec0e3515ffd367f37b5c251034965a)\nThe package shadows internal Wix registry module names (thunderboltRegistry, corvidRegistry, editorRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, and others) and ships a registry-manifest.min.json pointing at a parastorage CDN URL so that loading one of these registry entries resolves to this package\u0027s code. thunderboltRegistry.js runs an IIFE at module load that executes `id` and `hostname` via child_process.execSync, combines the output with process.platform, process.arch, process.pid, and process.version, and sends the values as query-string parameters in a fetch() call to the hardcoded collector https://webhook.site/43022177-de67-4d5c-a6df-33083b2b026f. The exported factories return Proxy stubs rather than implementing the real registry contracts, so the module\u0027s only effective behavior when loaded by a Wix SSR host is the reconnaissance beacon.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-17711",
"modified": "2026-10-09T00:02:40Z",
"published": "2026-10-09T00:02:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/wix-reg-poc-bypass/v/1.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in wix-reg-poc-bypass (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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