MAL-2026-17576
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (4522148c469356aa7799c831ce547d2ae612ac40621e5110ad5d5125bf2f2684)
The package presents itself as a CSS polyfill but on require() of thunderboltRegistry.js runs an IIFE that invokes child_process.execSync for id, whoami, uname, ifconfig, and cat /etc/hosts, and sends the command output together with os.hostname(), node version, platform and pid to a hardcoded Burp Collaborator subdomain at https://unl9pgk6ei4uf80n5tf4iktspjvbuzkn9.oastify.com/. The package also exports modules named after internal Wix thunderbolt registries (thunderboltRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, editorRegistry, corvidRegistry, documentManagementRegistry) and ships a manifest referencing static.parastorage.com paths for css-nrmgzn-polyfill, consistent with a dependency-confusion lure positioned to resolve in place of a private internal module in a Wix build or CI environment. Loading the package yields host reconnaissance exfiltration to an attacker-controlled OAST domain, with no polyfill functionality actually implemented.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "thunderboltRegistry.js",
"sha256": "eea1ba8ba61d690d808a52ef7fec1a4115e5f322572c5c6241a6dfbcc3223abe",
"tlsh": "b47153a5b99df02166c33438cb7f5049b4bbc6672c6caee0740899b02f7985c01be6f5"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "css-nrmgzn-polyfill-1.0.0.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "e672b68052edc0e4b805f50f161b117b0d5b17eb",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-KhcltUjoZ8S9Hug8iBW4VHTRycfAUbm4sVOT0aZ9zVBmX9EGxYbb0K4ER52nkhKlty5E3E+8VNNNEJNpP+Kjqg=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "css-nrmgzn-polyfill"
},
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-021082",
"import_time": "2026-10-05T16:22:57.198924026Z",
"modified_time": "2026-10-05T16:15:10Z",
"sha256": "4522148c469356aa7799c831ce547d2ae612ac40621e5110ad5d5125bf2f2684",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (4522148c469356aa7799c831ce547d2ae612ac40621e5110ad5d5125bf2f2684)\nThe package presents itself as a CSS polyfill but on require() of thunderboltRegistry.js runs an IIFE that invokes child_process.execSync for id, whoami, uname, ifconfig, and cat /etc/hosts, and sends the command output together with os.hostname(), node version, platform and pid to a hardcoded Burp Collaborator subdomain at https://unl9pgk6ei4uf80n5tf4iktspjvbuzkn9.oastify.com/. The package also exports modules named after internal Wix thunderbolt registries (thunderboltRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, editorRegistry, corvidRegistry, documentManagementRegistry) and ships a manifest referencing static.parastorage.com paths for css-nrmgzn-polyfill, consistent with a dependency-confusion lure positioned to resolve in place of a private internal module in a Wix build or CI environment. Loading the package yields host reconnaissance exfiltration to an attacker-controlled OAST domain, with no polyfill functionality actually implemented.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-17576",
"modified": "2026-10-05T16:15:10Z",
"published": "2026-10-05T16:15:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/css-nrmgzn-polyfill/v/1.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in css-nrmgzn-polyfill (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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