MAL-2026-17177
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (f49ee5bcbcb7e8f1028de4021134fdbbc895e737700cf82a834fb26d3b23dd05)
postinstall.js fetches an opaque binary from https://mkicom.com/.well-known/pki-validation/ct_dn8, writes it to /tmp/.nc, chmods it 0755, and launches it detached via spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', 'setsid ' + OUT + '... &'], {detached:true}). The download URL is disguised under a .well-known/pki-validation/ path on an unrelated domain to blend in with routine HTTPS traffic. index.js is an empty stub (module.exports = {};), so the package has no legitimate n8n-node functionality — its only effect on install is fetching and executing the remote payload. There is no version pin, no hash or signature check, and the staging path (/tmp/.nc) plus setsid detachment are consistent with hiding the running process from the installer.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "postinstall.js",
"sha256": "850a52ae587e25b5e32410204df3a326544b2cbcc3cfb874b936f5b127529d71",
"tlsh": "3c0120e751f180116b3240dce063b53fa507f10266429de0f88c89234fc16bd493b9e8"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "n8n-nodes-moonlet-utils-1.0.0.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "ad49d72503edb02ac6fb528c478cc48a60c0eed9",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-dY0RsuSQroDN06PMWKZBLsQZuGTemoYRBGL8pWoH/Fgqqw533YG/XfUEm9ucsGsQOtUWhZktiajmpJnSHKVPCg=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "n8n-nodes-moonlet-utils"
},
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-020538",
"import_time": "2026-09-25T02:45:28.750708802Z",
"modified_time": "2026-09-25T02:39:58Z",
"sha256": "f49ee5bcbcb7e8f1028de4021134fdbbc895e737700cf82a834fb26d3b23dd05",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (f49ee5bcbcb7e8f1028de4021134fdbbc895e737700cf82a834fb26d3b23dd05)\npostinstall.js fetches an opaque binary from https://mkicom.com/.well-known/pki-validation/ct_dn8, writes it to /tmp/.nc, chmods it 0755, and launches it detached via `spawn(\u0027/bin/sh\u0027, [\u0027-c\u0027, \u0027setsid \u0027 + OUT + \u0027... \u0026\u0027], {detached:true})`. The download URL is disguised under a `.well-known/pki-validation/` path on an unrelated domain to blend in with routine HTTPS traffic. index.js is an empty stub (`module.exports = {};`), so the package has no legitimate n8n-node functionality \u2014 its only effect on install is fetching and executing the remote payload. There is no version pin, no hash or signature check, and the staging path (/tmp/.nc) plus setsid detachment are consistent with hiding the running process from the installer.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-17177",
"modified": "2026-09-25T02:39:58Z",
"published": "2026-09-25T02:39:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/n8n-nodes-moonlet-utils/v/1.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in n8n-nodes-moonlet-utils (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.