GHSA-F9F8-RM49-7JV2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-19 16:17 – Updated: 2026-05-19 16:17Summary
Composer leaks the full contents of tokens configured as GitHub OAuth tokens if they do not match Composer's expected format for such tokens to stderr. GitHub has introduced a new format for GitHub Actions GITHUB_TOKEN values. These tokens are validated in the same way by Composer on GitHub Actions. The new format including a - (hyphen) fails Composer's validation and leads to disclosure of the GITHUB_TOKEN in logs.
Many widely-used Actions (e.g. shivammathur/setup-php) auto-register GITHUB_TOKEN into composer's global auth.json, so the leak triggers without any unusual user configuration.
GitHub Actions tokens expire when the associated job finishes, and they are scoped to the respective repository only. So in most regular cases the Composer validation, which errors while leaking the token, also immediately ends the job, expiring the token immediately. Tokens expire at the very latest after 6 hours on GitHub-hosted runners. If you use self-hosted runner, expiration is at most 24 hours after creation. The new token format is being rolled out gradually, so not all repositories are affected yet, but will be soon.
Classic ghp_ PATs are not affected by the regex bug per se, but the same leak primitive applies to any future credential that fails validation for any reason.
Details
When a GitHub token fails regular expression validation of the character set, the rejected token is interpolated verbatim into the UnexpectedValueException message thrown by Composer\IO\BaseIO::loadConfiguration(), which Symfony Console then prints. Validation reliably fails for any token containing a - (hyphen), which includes the modern ghs_<id>_<base64url-JWT> GitHub App installation token format, the same format used by GitHub Actions' built-in GITHUB_TOKEN and by actions/create-github-app-token.
Severity: medium. Pre-conditions are common in real-world CI. Practical blast radius is bounded by the leaked credential's scope and TTL (short for a workflow GITHUB_TOKEN, longer for App-minted tokens or user-issued credentials that happen to contain -).
Vulnerable code, src/Composer/IO/BaseIO.php (line 139 on main, line 143 on 2.8.x), inside loadConfiguration():
// allowed chars for GH tokens are from https://github.blog/changelog/2021-03-04-authentication-token-format-updates/
// plus dots which were at some point used for GH app integration tokens
if (!Preg::isMatch('{^[.A-Za-z0-9_]+$}', $token)) {
throw new \UnexpectedValueException(
'Your github oauth token for '.$domain.' contains invalid characters: "'.$token.'"'
);
}
Three issues combine to produce the leak:
-
The rejected token is interpolated into the exception message. The exception bubbles up to Symfony Console's default error renderer, which writes it to stderr. Any environment that captures stderr (CI logs, log shippers, monitoring, support transcripts) now has the raw token.
-
The validation regex
^[.A-Za-z0-9_]+$does not permit-. GitHub's currentghs_<numeric-id>_<base64url-JWT>structured installation tokens routinely contain-, because base64url (RFC 4648 §5) uses-and_as URL-safe replacements for+and/. The regex was chosen in 2021 on the understanding that GitHub tokens use only[A-Za-z0-9_]plus.. -
Detection / mitigation in upstream platforms is unreliable. GitHub Actions' built-in secret masker matches registered values as exact substrings. When the exception message is rendered by Symfony Console it may wrap, embed in
In BaseIO.php line N:framing, or interleave with ANSI control sequences. So the masker does not redact, and the plaintext token reaches the log.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "composer/composer"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.9.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "composer/composer"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.2.28"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "composer/composer"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.10.28"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45793"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-19T16:17:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nComposer leaks the full contents of tokens configured as GitHub OAuth tokens if they do not match Composer\u0027s expected format for such tokens to stderr. GitHub has introduced a new format for GitHub Actions GITHUB_TOKEN values. These tokens are validated in the same way by Composer on GitHub Actions. The new format including a `-` (hyphen) fails Composer\u0027s validation and leads to disclosure of the GITHUB_TOKEN in logs.\n\nMany widely-used Actions (e.g. `shivammathur/setup-php`) auto-register `GITHUB_TOKEN` into composer\u0027s global `auth.json`, so the leak triggers without any unusual user configuration.\n\nGitHub Actions tokens expire when the associated job finishes, and they are scoped to the respective repository only. So in most regular cases the Composer validation, which errors while leaking the token, also immediately ends the job, expiring the token immediately. Tokens expire at the very latest after 6 hours on GitHub-hosted runners. If you use self-hosted runner, expiration is at most 24 hours after creation. The new token format is being rolled out gradually, so not all repositories are affected yet, but will be soon.\n\nClassic `ghp_` PATs are not affected by the regex bug per se, but the same leak primitive applies to any future credential that fails validation for any reason.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen a GitHub token fails regular expression validation of the character set, the rejected token is interpolated verbatim into the `UnexpectedValueException` message thrown by `Composer\\IO\\BaseIO::loadConfiguration()`, which Symfony Console then prints. Validation reliably fails for any token containing a `-` (hyphen), which includes the modern `ghs_\u003cid\u003e_\u003cbase64url-JWT\u003e` GitHub App installation token format, the same format used by GitHub Actions\u0027 built-in `GITHUB_TOKEN` and by `actions/create-github-app-token`. \n\nSeverity: medium. Pre-conditions are common in real-world CI. Practical blast radius is bounded by the leaked credential\u0027s scope and TTL (short for a workflow `GITHUB_TOKEN`, longer for App-minted tokens or user-issued credentials that happen to contain `-`).\n\nVulnerable code, `src/Composer/IO/BaseIO.php` (line 139 on `main`, line 143 on 2.8.x), inside `loadConfiguration()`:\n\n```php\n// allowed chars for GH tokens are from https://github.blog/changelog/2021-03-04-authentication-token-format-updates/\n// plus dots which were at some point used for GH app integration tokens\nif (!Preg::isMatch(\u0027{^[.A-Za-z0-9_]+$}\u0027, $token)) {\n throw new \\UnexpectedValueException(\n \u0027Your github oauth token for \u0027.$domain.\u0027 contains invalid characters: \"\u0027.$token.\u0027\"\u0027\n );\n}\n```\n\nThree issues combine to produce the leak:\n\n1. **The rejected token is interpolated into the exception message.** The exception bubbles up to Symfony Console\u0027s default error renderer, which writes it to stderr. Any environment that captures stderr (CI logs, log shippers, monitoring, support transcripts) now has the raw token.\n\n2. **The validation regex `^[.A-Za-z0-9_]+$` does not permit `-`.** GitHub\u0027s current `ghs_\u003cnumeric-id\u003e_\u003cbase64url-JWT\u003e` structured installation tokens routinely contain `-`, because base64url (RFC 4648 \u00a75) uses `-` and `_` as URL-safe replacements for `+` and `/`. The regex was chosen in 2021 on the understanding that GitHub tokens use only `[A-Za-z0-9_]` plus `.`.\n\n3. **Detection / mitigation in upstream platforms is unreliable.** GitHub Actions\u0027 built-in secret masker matches registered values as exact substrings. When the exception message is rendered by Symfony Console it may wrap, embed in `In BaseIO.php line N:` framing, or interleave with ANSI control sequences. So the masker does not redact, and the plaintext token reaches the log.",
"id": "GHSA-f9f8-rm49-7jv2",
"modified": "2026-05-19T16:17:58Z",
"published": "2026-05-19T16:17:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/composer/composer/security/advisories/GHSA-f9f8-rm49-7jv2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/composer/composer/CVE-2026-45793.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/composer/composer"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Github Actions issued GITHUB_TOKEN disclosure in GitHub Actions logs"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.