GHSA-CWJ3-VQPP-PMXR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-05 18:44 – Updated: 2026-05-05 18:44Summary
The agent-facing gateway tool protects config.apply and config.patch with a model-to-operator trust boundary. That guard used a hand-maintained denylist of protected config paths. The config schema outgrew that denylist, leaving sensitive subtrees writable through model-driven gateway config mutations.
Impact
A prompt-injected or otherwise compromised model running with access to the owner-only gateway tool could persist unsafe config changes that crossed security boundaries. Examples included config paths affecting command execution, network/proxy/TLS behavior, credential forwarding, telemetry or hook endpoints, memory/indexing surfaces, and operator policy controls. These changes could survive restart once written to config.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclawon npm - Affected: versions before
2026.4.23 - Fixed:
2026.4.23 - Latest stable verified fixed:
openclaw@2026.4.23, tagv2026.4.23
Fix
OpenClaw replaced the denylist with a fail-closed allowlist. Agent-driven gateway config.apply and gateway config.patch now permit only narrow agent-tunable prompt/model settings and mention-gating paths. Other config changes are rejected before the gateway mutation RPC is invoked.
Fix Commit(s)
bceda6089aa7b3695cc7696b43c61ae3d01bb0ec(fix(gateway): fail closed on runtime config edits)
Severity
Severity remains high. The vulnerable entry point is owner-only, but the model/agent is not a trusted principal under OpenClaw's security model, and the guard is the explicit model-to-operator boundary for persisted config mutation.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.4.23"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T18:44:31Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe agent-facing `gateway` tool protects `config.apply` and `config.patch` with a model-to-operator trust boundary. That guard used a hand-maintained denylist of protected config paths. The config schema outgrew that denylist, leaving sensitive subtrees writable through model-driven gateway config mutations.\n\n## Impact\n\nA prompt-injected or otherwise compromised model running with access to the owner-only `gateway` tool could persist unsafe config changes that crossed security boundaries. Examples included config paths affecting command execution, network/proxy/TLS behavior, credential forwarding, telemetry or hook endpoints, memory/indexing surfaces, and operator policy controls. These changes could survive restart once written to config.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` on npm\n- Affected: versions before `2026.4.23`\n- Fixed: `2026.4.23`\n- Latest stable verified fixed: `openclaw@2026.4.23`, tag `v2026.4.23`\n\n## Fix\n\nOpenClaw replaced the denylist with a fail-closed allowlist. Agent-driven `gateway config.apply` and `gateway config.patch` now permit only narrow agent-tunable prompt/model settings and mention-gating paths. Other config changes are rejected before the gateway mutation RPC is invoked.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- `bceda6089aa7b3695cc7696b43c61ae3d01bb0ec` (`fix(gateway): fail closed on runtime config edits`)\n\n## Severity\n\nSeverity remains `high`. The vulnerable entry point is owner-only, but the model/agent is not a trusted principal under OpenClaw\u0027s security model, and the guard is the explicit model-to-operator boundary for persisted config mutation.",
"id": "GHSA-cwj3-vqpp-pmxr",
"modified": "2026-05-05T18:44:31Z",
"published": "2026-05-05T18:44:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-cwj3-vqpp-pmxr"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/bceda6089aa7b3695cc7696b43c61ae3d01bb0ec"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw\u0027s gateway config mutation guard allowed unsafe model-driven config writes"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.