GHSA-VCV2-R9JH-99M5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 15:12 – Updated: 2026-06-19 15:12Summary
agentic-flow versions <= 2.0.13 MCP server tools interpolated attacker-influenceable tool parameters (e.g. agent, task, name, language, agentdb arguments) directly into shell command strings passed to execSync(). A malicious value reaching any of the affected MCP tools could break out of the surrounding double-quoted argument and execute arbitrary OS commands with the privileges of the user running the MCP server.
This was a partial-fix gap: prior commit 6a06854 (#158) fixed CWE-78 elsewhere in the project but missed the MCP server files entirely.
Impact
Any MCP tool argument that the AI agent treats as data but the implementation interpolates into a shell command string becomes a command-injection vector. In MCP deployments where untrusted content (web pages, files, third-party tool output) is processed by the agent, this is reachable without direct attacker access to the host. The HTTP/SSE transports (http-sse.ts, http-streaming-updated.ts) expose the same sinks without authentication or Origin/Host validation, which may raise the effective severity in any deployment that binds them to a reachable network interface.
Affected components
src/mcp/standalone-stdio.ts—agentic_flow_agent,agentic_flow_create_agent,agentic_flow_list_all_agents,agentic_flow_agent_info,agentic_flow_check_conflicts,agentic_flow_optimize_model,agentic_flow_list_agents,agent_booster_edit_file,agent_booster_batch_edit,agent_booster_parse_markdown,agentdb_stats,agentdb_pattern_store,agentdb_pattern_search,agentdb_pattern_statssrc/mcp/fastmcp/servers/claude-flow-sdk.tssrc/mcp/fastmcp/servers/stdio-full.tssrc/mcp/fastmcp/servers/http-streaming-updated.tssrc/mcp/fastmcp/servers/http-sse.tssrc/mcp/fastmcp/servers/poc-stdio.tssrc/mcp/fastmcp/tools/agent/{execute,list,parallel}.tssrc/mcp/fastmcp/tools/swarm/orchestrate.tssrc/mcp/fastmcp/tools/hooks/pretrain.ts(depth path only)
Proof of Concept
// Pre-fix (standalone-stdio.ts, agentic_flow_agent)
let cmd = `npx --yes agentic-flow --agent "${agent}" --task "${task}"`;
const result = execSync(cmd, { encoding: 'utf-8', ... });
Invoking the MCP tool with:
{
"agent": "coder",
"task": "x\"; touch /tmp/INJECTED; id > /tmp/rce.txt; echo \""
}
produces, after interpolation:
npx --yes agentic-flow --agent "coder" --task "x"; touch /tmp/INJECTED; id > /tmp/rce.txt; echo ""
When execSync hands that to /bin/sh -c, the shell parses three commands: the truncated npx, then touch /tmp/INJECTED, then id > /tmp/rce.txt; echo "". The marker file /tmp/INJECTED is created and the user's id output is written to /tmp/rce.txt.
Patches
Fixed in agentic-flow@2.0.14 — every affected call site rewritten to use execFileSync(file, argv, { shell: false }) so attacker-controlled argv elements are passed straight to execve(2) without shell parsing.
Fix PR: ruvnet/agentic-flow#170 (merged at 0c2ec96)
A regression test (tests/security/cwe-78-mcp-execsync.test.ts) was added that statically scans every src/mcp/**/*.ts file and fails the build if any new execSync() call is reintroduced outside of a documented exemption, plus a behavioural smoke check that the canonical PoC payload remains inert when passed as an argv element to execFileSync.
Workarounds
Upgrade to agentic-flow >= 2.0.14. There is no in-product configuration that mitigates this without upgrading.
Downstream pin
The ruflo / claude-flow / @claude-flow/cli packages bumped from 3.12.3 → 3.12.4 to pull the patched agentic-flow:
ruflo@3.12.4claude-flow@3.12.4@claude-flow/cli@3.12.4
End users running any of npx ruflo@latest, npx claude-flow@latest, or npx @claude-flow/cli@latest are pinned to the fixed version.
Credit
Reported by hackchang via a well-scoped red-team report package (npm_agentic-flow_report_package_20260618_163017.zip) that included a sink inventory, a minimized PoC payload, and a clear explanation of why this was a partial-fix gap rather than intended behaviour. The sink inventory directly drove the single-grep pass that closed every reachable call site; the PoC payload became the behavioural smoke test that proves the canonical attack stays inert as an argv element.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.0.13"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "agentic-flow"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.14"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T15:12:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`agentic-flow` versions `\u003c= 2.0.13` MCP server tools interpolated attacker-influenceable tool parameters (e.g. `agent`, `task`, `name`, `language`, `agentdb` arguments) directly into shell command strings passed to `execSync()`. A malicious value reaching any of the affected MCP tools could break out of the surrounding double-quoted argument and execute arbitrary OS commands with the privileges of the user running the MCP server.\n\nThis was a partial-fix gap: prior commit `6a06854` (#158) fixed CWE-78 elsewhere in the project but missed the MCP server files entirely.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny MCP tool argument that the AI agent treats as data but the implementation interpolates into a shell command string becomes a command-injection vector. In MCP deployments where untrusted content (web pages, files, third-party tool output) is processed by the agent, this is reachable without direct attacker access to the host. The HTTP/SSE transports (`http-sse.ts`, `http-streaming-updated.ts`) expose the same sinks without authentication or Origin/Host validation, which may raise the effective severity in any deployment that binds them to a reachable network interface.\n\n## Affected components\n\n- `src/mcp/standalone-stdio.ts` \u2014 `agentic_flow_agent`, `agentic_flow_create_agent`, `agentic_flow_list_all_agents`, `agentic_flow_agent_info`, `agentic_flow_check_conflicts`, `agentic_flow_optimize_model`, `agentic_flow_list_agents`, `agent_booster_edit_file`, `agent_booster_batch_edit`, `agent_booster_parse_markdown`, `agentdb_stats`, `agentdb_pattern_store`, `agentdb_pattern_search`, `agentdb_pattern_stats`\n- `src/mcp/fastmcp/servers/claude-flow-sdk.ts`\n- `src/mcp/fastmcp/servers/stdio-full.ts`\n- `src/mcp/fastmcp/servers/http-streaming-updated.ts`\n- `src/mcp/fastmcp/servers/http-sse.ts`\n- `src/mcp/fastmcp/servers/poc-stdio.ts`\n- `src/mcp/fastmcp/tools/agent/{execute,list,parallel}.ts`\n- `src/mcp/fastmcp/tools/swarm/orchestrate.ts`\n- `src/mcp/fastmcp/tools/hooks/pretrain.ts` (depth path only)\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```ts\n// Pre-fix (standalone-stdio.ts, agentic_flow_agent)\nlet cmd = `npx --yes agentic-flow --agent \"${agent}\" --task \"${task}\"`;\nconst result = execSync(cmd, { encoding: \u0027utf-8\u0027, ... });\n```\n\nInvoking the MCP tool with:\n\n```json\n{\n \"agent\": \"coder\",\n \"task\": \"x\\\"; touch /tmp/INJECTED; id \u003e /tmp/rce.txt; echo \\\"\"\n}\n```\n\nproduces, after interpolation:\n\n```\nnpx --yes agentic-flow --agent \"coder\" --task \"x\"; touch /tmp/INJECTED; id \u003e /tmp/rce.txt; echo \"\"\n```\n\nWhen `execSync` hands that to `/bin/sh -c`, the shell parses three commands: the truncated `npx`, then `touch /tmp/INJECTED`, then `id \u003e /tmp/rce.txt; echo \"\"`. The marker file `/tmp/INJECTED` is created and the user\u0027s `id` output is written to `/tmp/rce.txt`.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in [`agentic-flow@2.0.14`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/agentic-flow/v/2.0.14) \u2014 every affected call site rewritten to use `execFileSync(file, argv, { shell: false })` so attacker-controlled argv elements are passed straight to `execve(2)` without shell parsing.\n\nFix PR: ruvnet/agentic-flow#170 (merged at `0c2ec96`)\n\nA regression test (`tests/security/cwe-78-mcp-execsync.test.ts`) was added that statically scans every `src/mcp/**/*.ts` file and fails the build if any new `execSync()` call is reintroduced outside of a documented exemption, plus a behavioural smoke check that the canonical PoC payload remains inert when passed as an argv element to `execFileSync`.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nUpgrade to `agentic-flow \u003e= 2.0.14`. There is no in-product configuration that mitigates this without upgrading.\n\n## Downstream pin\n\nThe `ruflo` / `claude-flow` / `@claude-flow/cli` packages bumped from `3.12.3` \u2192 `3.12.4` to pull the patched `agentic-flow`:\n\n- `ruflo@3.12.4`\n- `claude-flow@3.12.4`\n- `@claude-flow/cli@3.12.4`\n\nEnd users running any of `npx ruflo@latest`, `npx claude-flow@latest`, or `npx @claude-flow/cli@latest` are pinned to the fixed version.\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by **hackchang** via a well-scoped red-team report package (`npm_agentic-flow_report_package_20260618_163017.zip`) that included a sink inventory, a minimized PoC payload, and a clear explanation of why this was a partial-fix gap rather than intended behaviour. The sink inventory directly drove the single-grep pass that closed every reachable call site; the PoC payload became the behavioural smoke test that proves the canonical attack stays inert as an argv element.",
"id": "GHSA-vcv2-r9jh-99m5",
"modified": "2026-06-19T15:12:58Z",
"published": "2026-06-19T15:12:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruvnet/agentic-flow/security/advisories/GHSA-vcv2-r9jh-99m5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruvnet/agentic-flow/issues/169"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruvnet/ruflo/issues/2414"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruvnet/agentic-flow/pull/170"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruvnet/ruflo/pull/2415"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ruvnet/agentic-flow"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruvnet/ruflo/releases/tag/v3.12.4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/agentic-flow/v/2.0.14"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Agentic-Flow: OS Command Injection in agentic-flow MCP server tools via unsanitized tool-parameter interpolation into execSync"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.